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Abstract: Our book examines the mechanisms that underlie social behavior and communication in East African vervet monkeys. Our
goal is to describe the sophistication of primate intelligence and to probe its limits. We suggest that vervets and other primates make
good primatologists. They observe social interactions, recognize the relations that exist among others, and classify relationships into
types. Monkeys also use sounds to represent features of their environment and compare different vocalizations according to their
meaning. Monkeys may use abstract concepts and have motives, beliefs, and desires, however, their mental states are apparently not
accessible: They do not know what they know. In addition, monkeys seem unable to attribute mental states to others: They lack a
"theory of mind." Their inability to. examine their own mental states or to attribute mental states to others severely constrains their
ability to transmit information or to deceive one another. It also limits the extent to which their vocalizations can be called semantic.
Finally, the skills that monkeys exhibit in social behavior are apparently domain specific. For reasons that are at present unclear,
vervets exhibit adaptive specializations in social interactions that are not extended to their interactions with other species (although
they should be).
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How monkeys see the world reviews 11 years' research on
social behavior and communication in East African vervet
monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops). Although our work
falls squarely within the ethological tradition - a long-
term study of a single species in its natural habitat — our
broader objectives are explicitly interdisciplinary. We
believe that ethologists can profit from an exposure to
theories and research in cognitive science and that cog-
nitive scientists have much to learn from research in
evolution, animal behavior, and behavioral ecology.
Questions central to all of these fields include:
What is the relation between communication, cogni-
tion, and social behavior? We typically assume that hu-
mans have more complex social relationships than other
species, that this social complexity is linked to our cog-
nitive abilities, and that language plays a crucial role in
structuring social interactions. Comparative research on
animals, however, indicates that the relation between
cognitive and social complexity is far from clear: The
sophisticated societies of insects, for example, often re-
sult from comparatively simple perceptual and behavioral
mechanisms. Language, moreover, is not a necessary
component of social complexity: Vervet monkeys live in
highly complex societies, yet individuals apparently lack
language, self-awareness, and an awareness of the mental
states of others. What, then, are the elements of social
behavior most crucially affected by language and cogni-
tion? Or, putting the question in evolutionary terms, how
did language and cognition evolve? How would a particu-
lar cognitive skill give an individual bird, monkey or ape a
selective advantage over others?
Chapter 1: What Is it like to be a monkey?
We begin by outlining the book's contents and placing
our methods and assumptions in historical perspective.
We borrow from the philosopher Quine (1960) the exam-
ple of an imaginary linguist who has entered an unknown
land where none of the sounds people make are familiar.
The linguist's goal is to construct a dictionary of the local
language, to learn what each word means, and thus to
begin to understand how the people think. But if a native
shouts, "Gavagai!" when a rabbit appears, can the linguist
conclude that gavagai means the same as rabbit in En-
glish? Can we ever really understand what the words,
sounds, or communicative signs of an alien culture actu-
ally mean? Quine (and many other philosophers, often for
different reasons) believes that precise understanding of
word meaning is impossible even in our own species;
attempts to understand another species are therefore
certainly doomed to fail. We argue instead that even if
Quine is ultimately proved right there is much to be
learned from the attempt to understand how animals
1992 Cambridge University Press 0140-525X192 $5.00+.00 135
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00067959
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:55:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Cheney & Seyfarth: How monkeys see the world
perceive their world and how these perceptions structure
their social interactions.
Our research, like that of many ethologists, adopts an
evolutionary, ecological perspective, first documenting
what animals do in their natural habitat and then asking
what sorts of underlying mental operations might account
for this behavior. What are the problems vervet monkeys
face in their daily lives? What do they need to know, and
how might one method of obtaining, storing, and commu-
nicating knowledge give certain individuals a reproduc-
tive advantage over others? Unlike traditional laboratory
tests of primate intelligence, research on group-living
primates inevitably leads to a focus on social stimuli. We
ask not what monkeys know about blocks, tones, blue
triangles, or computer lexigrams but what they know
about each other and about the vocalizations they hear
during encounters with predators, other groups, or famil-
iar companions. This focus on social behavior allows us to
examine primate intelligence in the environment where
it presumably evolved; it also allows us to compare the
monkeys' performance when dealing with one another
with their performance outside the social domain.
There is at present a tension in ethology, psychology,
and cognitive science between traditional empiricists
who disavow the use of mental terms like "concept" or
"representation" and those who, in varying degrees,
believe that such terms are useful, either as heuristic
devices or because behavior simply cannot be explained
without them (for reviews see Gardner 1987; Kamil 1987;
Roitblat 1987). Regardless of the exact position they
adopt, all participants in the debate agree that assump-
tions about the mental processes of others are controver-
sial enough when we discuss our own species; when the
minds of animals are at issue the problem becomes even
more intractable.
Given these difficulties, our solution has been adopted
as much from necessity as from conviction: We borrow
the methods of the empiricists but place them tentatively
within the framework of a more mentalistic approach.
Because we cannot interview our subjects and ask them
for introspective reports of their current or recent
thoughts, we must, in conducting our observations and
experiments, adopt a nonmentalistic position and study
communication and behavior operationally, in terms of
the responses they evoke in others. This method carries
with it all of the limitations pointed out by Quine. Can we
ever really know, from a study of responses alone, what
"Gavagai!" means?
On the other hand, though armed with behaviorist
methods, we are less agnostic about the mind as a causal
agent than behaviorists might like us to be, and we
cautiously adopt such words as attribution, representa-
tion, consciousness, and strategy. In using these terms,
our approach is mentalist rather than behaviorist, as we
assume that mental states are characterized not just by
external environmental influences but also by reference
to other mental states (Churchland 1984).
Our openness to the use of mental terms also means
that, in spite of our efforts to avoid it, the word cognition
occasionally appears and therefore requires definition.
For present purposes we adopt MarkTs (1985) definition
of cognition as the ability to relate different unconnected
pieces of information in new ways and to apply the results
in an adaptive manner. This definition is useful to those
who study animals because it examines cognition in terms
of what individuals do without specifying or being limited
to any particular mental mechanism that might underlie
behavior.
Our approach to animal intelligence is not original; it
borrows much from the writings of Kummer (1982),
Premack (1983), Dennett (1983), Mason (1986), Kamil
(1987), Gallistel (1989), and others. It is, however, a
hybrid, combining the methods of behaviorists (who
don't believe in mentality) with many interpretations of
mentalists (who feel that the behaviorist approach is
inadequate). This uneasy alliance of two historically dif-
ferent viewpoints recalls the comment of Saki's character
Reginald (in the short-story compendium, "The Com-
plete Works of Saki") who, when asked to name his
religion, said, "The fashion just now is a Roman Catholic
frame of mind with an agnostic conscience: You get the
medieval picturesqueness of the one with the modern
conveniences of the other."
;er 2: Social behawior
Chapter 2 reviews what we and our colleagues learned
during 11 years' continuous research on the behavior and
ecology of vervet monkeys in Amboseli National Park,
Kenya. Although the primary focus is on vervets, we also
draw on other research, emphasizing in particular studies
of baboons and macaques.
In Amboseli, vervets live in groups of 10 to 30 indi-
viduals. Each group occupies an area roughly four hec-
tares in size that it aggressively defends against incursion
by other groups. Within groups there are anywhere from
one to eight adult males, two to eight adult females, and
their offspring.
As in many other Old World monkey species like
baboons (Papio cynocephalus), rhesus macaques (Macaca
mulatto), or Japanese macaques (M. fuscata), vervet
females generally remain throughout their lives in the
group where they were born. Males, in contrast, transfer
to neighboring groups when they become sexually ma-
ture, at around four years of age. Adult females can be
ranked in a linear dominance hierarchy, and offspring
acquire ranks immediately below those of their mothers.
As a result, vervet monkey groups actually consist of a
hierarchy of families, with all the members of family A
outranking all the members of family B, all the members
of family B outranking all the members of family C, and so
on. Even a male assumes his mother's rank until he
transfers to another group. After that, a male's rank
depends on more subtle factors, including fighting abili-
ty, age, and his acceptance by the adult females in his
adopted group.
Vervet society is characterized by close bonds among
matrilineal kin, who groom one another at high rates,
often forage and sleep together, and come to one an-
other's aid in alliances (alliances occur whenever two
individuals are involved in an aggressive interaction and a
third, previously uninvolved, animal intervenes to aid
one of them in attack or defense). Bonds among maternal
kin apparently have their genesis in the close relationship
between a mother and her offspring (Kummer 1971).
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By contrast, there is little evidence that vervets recog-
nize their paternal kin. Adult males interact only rarely
with infants and typically show no special preference for
those infants that are likely to be their offspring (but see
Hauser 1986). The monkeys behave as if they have no way
of distinguishing who their fathers are and hence no way
of distinguishing kinship through the paternal line. When
we speak of kin, therefore, we are referring only to
individuals related through the maternal line.
In addition to establishing close bonds among maternal
kin, vervet monkeys attempt to form bonds with higher-
ranking individuals - a strategy apparently designed to
win some of the benefits associated with high rank even if
an animal's actual status remains low. Evidence for such
"status striving" (de Waal 1987) comes from data on
alliance formation and grooming.
When an aggressive interaction occurs, vervet
monkeys are given an opportunity to "choose" whether to
intervene on behalf of one of the animals involved. Data
on alliance formation indicate that, in addition to forming
alliances at high rates with their kin, adult females and
juveniles form alliances with individuals that are higher-
ranking than themselves at higher rates per opportunity
than they do with individuals that are lower-ranking.
Similarly, vervets compete for the opportunity to groom
particular partners and the most attractive partners are
high-ranking individuals.
Why are females attracted to high-ranking individuals?
We have argued that individual monkeys attempt to
maximize the benefits they derive from such social in-
teractions as grooming, much as they attempt to max-
imize the benefits derived from foraging or mate choice.
High-ranking individuals are preferred social partners
because bonds with these individuals can result in the
greatest benefit to the individuals involved. Though such
bonds may not actually increase an individual's rank, they
may nevertheless allow lower-ranking animals to acquire
some of the benefits enjoyed by higher-ranking group
members. This argument rests on three points.
First, in many species, high-ranking females win the
majority of the disputes they enter and have preferential
access to scarce resources. Second, even among unrelat-
ed animals there is often a strong positive correlation
between alliances and other cooperative behavior such as
grooming or tolerance at feeding sites (e.g., Colvin 1983;
Packer 1977; Seyfarth 1977). Animals that form alliances
at high rates are also those that groom, feed, or play
together most often (Cheney 1983; Lee 1983; Seyfarth
1980; see also below, and Walters & Seyfarth, 1987, who
review data on other species). Third, we argue that these
correlations reflect causal relations: If a low-ranking ani-
mal forms an alliance with a higher-ranking one, the
higher-ranking animal will subsequently be more likely
to support her partner in an alliance or allow her partner
access to a resource she could not otherwise obtain.
Alternatively, the higher-ranking animal may simply be
less aggressive in the future toward her partner or her
partner's offspring (Silk 1982). Experiments with vervets
have shown that when one individual grooms an unrelat-
ed animal, grooming increases the recipient's willingness
to respond to the groomer's subsequent solicitations for
support (Seyfarth & Cheney 1984).
Status-striving is not limited to adult females, nor is it
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manifested only in grooming and the formation of al-
liances. Frans de Waal (1982; 1987), for example, de-
scribes a variety of interactions among male and female
chimpanzees that cannot be explained except by assum-
ing that the animals were selectively forming bonds (by
means of grooming, alliances, tolerance, reconciliation,
and reassurance) with those from whom they could poten-
tially derive the most benefit (see also Nishida 1983).
Focusing on the stable core of vervet monkey groups -
the adult females — we therefore conclude that three
motives underlie much of female behavior: attraction to
kin, deference to those of high rank, and a desire to
increase their own status. These motives are not merely
descriptive, but offer an explanation of why vervet society
takes the form that it does. They account for what we
observe, can be used to generate models that accurately
predict social interaction in novel circumstances, and
predict features of behavior that might otherwise have
escaped our notice. For example, attraction to kin and to
high-ranking individuals is additive and reinforces bonds
within high-ranking families but counteracts and weakens
bonds within low-ranking families. High-ranking families
should thus be more cohesive than low-ranking families, a
prediction that is borne out by observation.
The motives also make evolutionary sense. Attraction
to kin reflects the evolutionary benefits to be gained
through kin selection (Hamilton 1964); deferring to those
of higher rank while simultaneously attempting to in-
crease one's status reflects the best "mixed strategy"
(Maynard Smith 1974) for animals in groups where high
rank is often correlated with greater reproductive suc-
cess. [See also Maynard Smith: "Game Theory and the
Evolution of Behavior" BBS 7(1) 1984.]
There remains a crucial unanswered question, how-
ever. Has our analysis really revealed something about
the essential nature of vervet monkeys, or has it only told
us something about ourselves? After all, the motives we
are attributing to monkeys are products of human minds,
the minds of those who observe the monkeys. But the
ultimate goal of our analysis should not just be social
structure as understood by primatologists, but social
structure as it appears to the animals themselves. No self-
respecting anthropologist would return from two years
with the Dobu content to report only what he thinks of
Dobu social structure - the other half of the puzzle is
what the Dobu think, and how their view of themselves
differs from that of a foreign observer. Have the monkeys,
who have certainly seen the same events and more, made
the same deductions that we have? Do they understand
kinship and dominance rank? Or are they just sleepwalk-
ing through life, acting out complex strategies without
being in any sense aware of what they are doing? To probe
further into the minds of our subjects, Chapter 3 presents
a series of observations and experiments designed to test
whether the regularities of social behavior we humans see
might also exist in the minds of the monkeys themselves.
Chapter 3: Social knowledge
In a brief methodological digression, Chapter 3 describes
the use of playback experiments to study vocal commu-
nication, social behavior, and social knowledge in pri-
mates. We began using this method in 1977, in collabora-
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tion with Peter Marler; colleagues in ethology, however,
will recognize that many of the techniques we describe
are not original but borrow extensively from work con-
ducted on birds over the past 30 years.
To begin an experiment, we tape-record a vocalization
from a known individual in a particular social context.
Then, some days later, we select a subject, hide a loud-
speaker in a bush or tall grass, begin filming the subject,
and then play the vocalization while filming the subject's
response.
Playback experiments can be designed simply to re-
produce events that occur naturally. In such cases they
allow us to present a call we know is coming, to select
particular animals whose responses we want to measure,
and to film their responses for subsequent analysis. Alter-
natively, playbacks allow us to confront the monkeys with
a particular signal in a context where they are unlikely to
have experienced it before. Such novel and perhaps even
alarming material can elicit responses that reveal some of
what animals know about features of their environment.
When conducting experiments, we set a number of
conditions that must be met before a trial can proceed.
For example, the subject cannot have been involved in
interactions with a predator or another group during the
previous hour, the animal whose call is being played has
to be a member of the subject's own group and yet out of
sight of the subject, no other experiment of the same type
can have been conducted earlier the same day, and so on.
Despite these precautions, none of our experiments
ever achieves the precision and control of some laborato-
ry tests. We simply do not know everything that has
happened to our subjects on the day they are tested, nor
can we completely control the myriad contextual vari-
ables — birds, ungulates, insects, other monkeys — pre-
sent under natural conditions. Despite our care in select-
ing equipment, no loudspeaker can ever perfectly
duplicate a monkey's voice, and when we say "a speaker
was hidden behind a tree or in a bush," this is a hopeful
euphemism; a speaker may have looked well hidden to
us, but almost certainly the vervets could often see it.
Many of these problems can be alleviated by allowing
different vocalizations to serve as each other's controls. If
some aspect of our procedure in a given experiment is
biased, for example, it should be equally biased in trials
that involve different call types. In the end, we control
what we can and hope that the benefits of experimenting
on animals in their natural habitat will outweigh the
imprecision of our techniques.
Our explanations of vervet behavior in Chapter 2
implied that monkeys possess a sophisticated knowledge
of their social companions and the relations that exist
among them. In Chapter 3 we offer some preliminary
tests of this hypothesis.
Although individuals of many animal species seem to
know a great deal about their own social relations, the
social knowledge of primates is most striking when we
consider what a monkey knows about the social relations
of others in her group. A variety of evidence indicates that
monkeys recognize the close associations that exist among
others. For example, when we played back the scream of
a two-year-old juvenile to a group of adult females, a
significant number of females responded by looking at the
juvenile's mother. They appeared to associate particular
screams with particular juveniles and these juveniles with
particular adult females. They behaved as if they recog-
nized the kin relationships that existed among other
group members.
As a second example, consider the phenomenon of
redirected aggression. In many primate species, an ani-
mal that has been involved in a fight will "redirect"
aggression and threaten a third, previously uninvolved,
individual. Rhesus macaques (Judge 1982) and vervet
monkeys do not distribute such redirected aggression
randomly, but direct it toward a close relative of the prior
opponent. Vervets were significantly more likely to
threaten unrelated individuals following a fight with
those animals' close kin than during matched control
periods. This was not because fights caused a general
increase in aggression toward unrelated animals. Instead,
aggression seemed to be directed specifically toward the
kin of prior opponents. Similar data emerge in patterns of
reconciliation among longtailed macaques (Macaca fas-
cicularis - Cords 1988), rhesus macaques (de Waal &
Yoshihara 1983), stumptailed macaques (Macaca arc-
toides - de Waal & Ren 1988), patas monkeys (Erythro-
cebus patas - York & Rowell 1988), and chimpanzees (de
Waal 1989; de Waal & Roosmalen 1979). Monkeys may
also recognize the dominance relations of others - knowl-
edge that allows them to construct a dominance hierarchy
of their fellow group members.
Many animals appear to classify objects according to
"concepts" - relatively abstract criteria that are not based
on any single perceptual feature (Lea 1984). In oddity
tests, for instance, subjects are presented with three
objects, two of which are the same and one of which is
different. They receive a reward only if they choose the
different object. If a small number of stimulus objects are
recombined trial after trial, subjects could achieve above-
chance performance through associative learning. Many
monkey species, however, achieve scores of 80 to 90%
correct even when new stimuli are used for each problem
and a given set of stimuli is presented for only one trial
(e.g., Davis et al. 1967; Harlow 1949; Strong & Hedges
1966). Such levels of performance suggest that animals
are using an abstract hypothesis, "pick the odd object."
The hypothesis is called abstract because "odd" does not
refer to any specific stimulus dimension, as does "red" or
"square." Instead, oddity is a concept that specifies a
relation between objects independent of their specific
attributes (Essock-Vitale & Seyfarth 1987; Roitblat 1987).
Premack (1983; 1986) contends that such tasks as oddity
tests require only judgments about relations between
elements, not relations between relations. By contrast,
judgments about relations between relations are involved
in tasks like analogical reasoning. They are less funda-
mental and universal than judgments about relations
between elements, and thus far have been demonstrated
only in language-trained chimpanzees.
In his study of analogical reasoning in chimpanzees,
Premack (1976; 1983) trained an adult female subject,
Sarah, to make same /different judgments between pairs
of stimuli. Once Sarah could use the words "same" and
"different" correctly even when she was confronted with
entirely new stimuli, she was shown two pairs of items
arranged in the form A/A' and B/B'. Her task was to
judge whether the relation shown on the left was the same
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as or different from the one shown on the right. Alter-
natively, Sarah was given an incomplete analogy (e.g.,
A/A' same as B/?). Her task then was to complete the
.analogy in a way that satisfied this relation. Sarah per-
formed these analogy problems with apparent ease.
Premack (1983) argued that the ability to form such
abstract representations is enhanced by, and may re-
quire, language training. His claim is not that chim-
panzees naturally lack the ability to reason abstractly.
Instead, he believes that all primates have the potential
for such skills but that only chimpanzees given language
training are able to realize this potential.
Premack's tests prompt one to ask whether group-
living primates might use abstract criteria to make rela-
tional judgments about their social companions. The data
that most directly address this question come from a
study conducted by Dasser (1988) on a group of 40 captive
longtailed macaques. Dasser trained two adult females so
that they could be temporarily removed from the group
and placed in a small test room to view slides of other
group members. In one test that used a simultaneous
discrimination procedure, the subject saw two slides.
One showed a mother and her offspring and the other
showed an unrelated pair of group members. The subject
was rewarded for pressing a response button below the
mother-offspring slide. Having been trained to respond
to one mother-offspring pair (five different slides of the
same mother and her juvenile daughter), the subject was
tested using 14 novel slides of different mothers and
offspring paired with 14 novel pairs of unrelated animals
(all of which included at least one adult female). The
mother-offspring pairs varied widely in their physical
characteristics. Some slides showed mothers and infant
daughters, others showed mothers and juvenile sons or
mothers and adult daughters. Nonetheless, in all 14 tests
the subject correctly selected the mother-offspring pair.
Data on redirected aggression and reconciliation in
vervet monkeys provide additional evidence that animals
classify social relationships into types that are not re-
stricted to the particular individuals involved. Our obser-
vations of vervets suggested that animal A was more likely
to threaten animal B if one of A's own close relatives and
one of B's close relatives had recently been, involved in a
fight. The same was true of reconciliation: Two unrelated
individuals were more likely to engage in an affinitive
interaction following a fight between their close kin than
during matched control periods. Of course, the parallel is
not exact: If the prior opponents were both adult females,
this did not necessarily mean that the subsequent oppo-
nents would both be their daughters. Vervet families are
simply too small for such perfectly balanced events ever
to arise.
These results, we emphasize, are preliminary. They
have not yet been replicated in other populations and
possible confounding factors have not been eliminated
entirely. Bearing in mind their speculative nature, how-
ever, this more complex form of redirected aggression in
vervet monkeys supports Dasser's experiments in sug-
gesting that monkeys recognize that certain types of social
relationships share similar characteristics. When a vervet
(say, A2) threatens an unrelated animal (B2) following a
fight between one of her own relatives (Al) and one of her
opponent's relatives (Bl), A2 acts as if she recognizes that
the relationship between B2 and Bl is in some way similar
to her own relationship with Al. In other words, we may
think of A2 as having been presented with a natural
problem in analogical reasoning:
Al/Bl same as A2/?
A2 correctly completes the analogy by directing aggres-
sion to another member of the B family.
In summary, monkeys seem to recognize that bonds
within families share similar features even when the
individuals involved are of widely different ages and sex.
Monkeys therefore seem capable of classifying rela-
tionships according to one or more abstract properties:
They represent social relationships in their minds and
compare relationships on the basis of these representa-
tions. Whether they are at all aware of what they are
doing, or whether they can use this ability outside the
context of social interactions, remains to be determined.
Chapter 4: ¥ocal communication
Early studies of primate communication drew sharp dis-
tinctions in neural control, development, and function,
between nonhuman primate vocalizations and human
language. Subsequent research paints a more compli-
cated picture.
The vocal repertoires of nonhuman primates are far
larger than scientists initially perceived them to be. The
information each call contains is also more specific and
less dependent on context than previously imagined. For
example, vervets grunt to one another in a number of
different social situations: when approaching a dominant
member of their group, when approaching a subordinate,
when observing an individual move into an open area,
and on seeing another group. Even to an experienced
human listener there are no immediately obvious audible
differences among grunts, either from one context to the
next or across individuals. Playback experiments, how-
ever, show that monkeys respond differently to each
grunt type. Grunts to a dominant, for example, cause
individuals to look toward the speaker, whereas grunts to
another group cause individuals to look out, toward the
horizon, in the direction the speaker is pointing. By their
behavior, the monkeys seem to be saying that although
their grunts sound more or less the same to us, to them
each grunt transmits a specific sort of information. And
because monkeys respond in consistently different ways
to different grunt types despite variation in social context,
we conclude that the information conveyed by grunts -
like the information contained in human words - depends
as much (or more) on a particular call's acoustical proper-
ties as it does on the circumstances in which it is given.
Free-ranging monkeys also use calls - for example, the
grunt to another group - in a manner that effectively
represents, or denotes, objects and events in the environ-
ment. Perhaps the best-known examples of such repre-
sentational vocalizations are the alarm calls made by
vervet monkeys in response to different predators, first
described by Struhsaker (1967).
Vervets produce a loud, barking alarm call in response
to leopards (Panthera pardus) and such other cat species
as caracals {Fells caracal) and servals (Fells serval). We
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refer to this call as the vervets' "leopard alarm." When
vervets on the ground hear a leopard alarm they run into
trees, where they are safe from a leopard's attack. In
contrast, vervets produce an acoustically different call
(their "eagle alarm") in response to two species of eagle,
the martial eagle (Polemaetus bellicosus) and the crowned
eagle (Stephanoetus coronatus). Vervets on the ground
respond to eagle alarms by looking up or running into
bushes. Finally, when vervets encounter pythons
(Python sehae), they produced a third, acoustically dis-
tinct, "snake alarm." On hearing a snake alarm, vervets
on the ground stand bipedally and peer into the grass
around them.
Struhsaker's description of vervet alarm calls initially
attracted attention because the monkeys seemed to be
using different vocalizations to denote different external
referents (e.g., Altmann 1967; Marler 1977), an in-
terpretation that directly contradicted views of primate
vocalizations held at the time. Nevertheless, legitimate
doubts were raised. For example, the psycholinguist
John Marshall claimed, "Even the alarm calls of the
vervet monkey which seem, superficially, to be 'naming'
the type of predator are more plausibly regarded as
expressing no more than the relative intensity of the
fearful and aggressive emotions aroused by the various
predators' (1970, p. 234). Given the information available
at the time, Marshall was appropriately conservative in
his interpretations. He distinguished bet-ween calls that
provide information only about the signaler's emotional
state or subsequent behavior (a relatively simple,
straightforward explanation) and calls that denote a spe-
cific external referent (an explanation that implied more
complex cognitive processes). There seemed no need to
attribute sophisticated mental processes to vervet
monkeys when simpler mechanisms could adequately
account for their behavior. Not discussed was the pos-
sibility that calls might both denote external referents and
signal other sorts of information.
Working jointly with Marler, we found that playback
experiments conducted in the absence of predators
evoked responses similar to those originally observed by
Struhsaker. Playback of leopard alarms caused a signifi-
cant number of monkeys to run into trees; playback of
eagle alarms caused them to look up into the air or run
into bushes; and playback of snake alarms caused them to
stand on their hind legs and peer into the grass around
them. There was, moreover, evidence that alarm calls did
not simply reflect the caller's degree of fear or excite-
ment: When we altered our tapes so that calls were made
longer or shorter, louder or softer (two variations we
assumed might approximate changes in a caller's level of
excitement), this had no effect on the qualitatively differ-
ent responses to each alarm call type. And because we
presented alarm calls when there were no real predators
around, we could rule out the hypothesis that the
monkeys' different responses depended on what they had
seen rather than on what they had heard. In summary,
each type of alarm call, presented on its own, elicited the
same response as would a particular predator itself. We
concluded that alarm calls functioned as representational,
or semantic, signals.
The use of alarm calls, grunts, and many other non-
human primate vocalizations seems to be under relatively
voluntary control, because call production can be condi-
tioned in the laboratory (reviewed in Steklis & Raleigh
1979), and group-living animals routinely give specific
vocalizations only in particular circumstances (e.g.,
Smith et al. 1982; Snowdon & Hodun 1981). Primates
make subtle acoustic discriminations when distinguishing
between calls, and one well-studied case provides evi-
dence of left hemispheric specialization in vocal
perception.
Vocal development in primates exhibits many parallels
with the early stages of speech development in young
children. [See Greenfield: "Language, Tools and the
Brain: The Development and Evolution of Hierarchically
Organized Sequential Behavior" BBS 14(4) 1991.]
Monkeys begin by using certain vocalizations - some
clearly pronounced, others more garbled - in particular
social situations. They behave as if they were predisposed
to divide events in the world around them into broad
categories that require a grunt, a scream, an alarm call, or
no vocalization at all. Over time, pronunciation improves
and infants sharpen the relation between a call and the
objects to which it refers. Older infants and juveniles
begin to recognize that within each broad context there is
a further subdivision into circumstances that call for a
specific kind of grunt, a particular sort of scream, or an
acoustically different alarm. Throughout development,
comprehension precedes production.
Because nonhuman primates use vocalizations to signal
about things, research on communication offers a glimpse
of how they see the world. Studies of vocal communi-
cation reinforce the conclusion, already obtained from
studies of social behavior, that monkeys classify members
of their own species according to group membership,
dominance rank, and behavior. Through vocal commu-
nication monkeys also reveal their knowledge of other
individuals' social relationships and their knowledge of
other species.
But what, in the end, do monkeys really mean when
they vocalize to one another? Can we actually define
"leopard alarm" or "grunt to a dominant" in the same way
we define words like anarchist, bordello, or sycophant?
Thus far, we have been deliberately vague where ques-
tions of meaning are concerned in order to present
necessary background information. This done, we consid-
er what it all means in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5: What the wocalizations
©f monkef s mean
We have called the vocalizations of vervet monkeys
semantic signals and drawn an analogy with human words
because of the way these calls function in the monkeys'
daily lives. When one vervet hears another give an eagle
alarm call, the listener responds just as he would if he had
seen the eagle himself. It is tempting to suppose that in
the monkey's mind the call "stands for" or "conjures up
images of" an avian predator even when the bird itself has
not yet been seen. The same is true of leopard alarm calls,
grunts to neighboring groups, and many other nonhuman
primate vocalizations.
Clearly, however, descriptive evidence of this sort
does not elevate animal signals to the status of human
words. Consider first the problem of whether a signaler
intends (wants or desires) to communicate with others. In
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Pavlov's classic experiments, dogs heard a bell every time
they were given meat. After a while they began salivating
whenever they heard the bell, even if meat did not
appear. To Pavlov's dogs, bells evoked the same re-
sponse, or "stood for," or "conjured up images of," meat,
even when the meat wasn't there. This hardly proves that
the bells intended to communicate to the dogs in the way
that a human intends to communicate when he says,
"Dinner is served," or, "Your understanding of semantics
is really very superficial."
One issue we must confront, therefore, concerns the
factors that cause one animal to vocalize in the presence
or even the absence of another. Given that listeners treat
vocalizations as conveying a particular sort of information,
is it also the case that signalers intend for them to do so?
As a guide to analyzing what may be the mental states of
signaler and recipient, we draw on the philosopher Den-
nett's (1971; 1983; 1987) scheme for assessing levels of
intentionality in animal vocalizations.
Dennett argues that there is much to be gained from
assuming that animals are intentional systems, capable of
mental states like beliefs and desires. But what kinds of
beliefs and desires? Here Dennett's different "levels
of intentionality" provide us with a number of alternative
hypotheses. A vervet giving an alarm call, for example,
could be a zero-order intentional system, with no beliefs
or desires at all. A zero-order explanation holds that
vervets give alarm calls because they are frightened.
Alternatively, vervets might be first-order intentional
systems, with beliefs and desires but not beliefs about
beliefs. At this level, vervets give leopard alarm calls, for
example, because they believe there is a leopard nearby
or because they want others to run into trees. The caller
does not need to have any conception of his audience's
state of mind, nor need he recognize the distinction
between his own and another animal's beliefs.
Vervets might also be second-, third-, or even higher-
order intentional systems, with some conception about
their own and other individuals' states of mind. A vervet
monkey capable of second-order intentionality gives a
leopard alarm call because he wants others to believe that
there is a leopard nearby. At higher and increasingly
baroque levels, both the signaler's and the audience's
states of mind come into play. At the third level of
intentionality, vervets give an alarm call because they
want others to believe that they want them to run into
trees.
Despite some recent progress, we still know relatively
little about the cognitive mechanisms that might underlie
vocal signals. At one extreme, simple explanations that
posit no mentality at all (e.g., "monkeys give alarm calls
because they are excited") can be ruled out for a variety of
reasons - not just in the case of monkeys, but for many
other animals as well (e.g., Marler et al. 1990). On the
other hand, there is as yet no evidence that monkeys
attribute mental states to others. Taking an intermediate
position, we conclude that vervet communication is most
consistent with Dennett's first-order intentionality:
Monkeys give leopard alarms because they want others to
run into trees, not necessarily because they want others
to think that there is a leopard nearby.
As a second approach to the study of call meaning, we
examine the relation between a vocalization and the
objects or events it denotes. Here, once again, there are
reasons for caution in drawing parallels between monkey
vocalizations and human words.
When humans use words like "apple" or "eagle," we
recognize the referential relation that holds between such
signs and the things for which they stand. Referential
relations can, for example, be distinguished from causal
relations (Premack 1976): The word "eagle" does not
cause a particular bird to appear or result in a particular
pattern of behavior. Instead, the word stands for, or
represents, an object even when it cannot be seen. We
know, moreover, that there is no obligatory relation
between the acoustic features of a word and its referent.
When comparing words, we judge them to be similar or
different not on the basis of their physical properties but
on the basis of their meaning. Words that sound different,
like treachery and deceit, are judged to be similar if they
mean the same thing, whereas similar sounding words,
like treachery and lechery, are judged to be different if
they have different meanings.
To paraphrase Premack (1976), a monkey's call is a
word if and only if the properties ascribed to the call are
not merely those of a sound but those of the object it
denotes. As a test of this hypothesis, we carried out
habituation/dishabituation experiments in which vervets
were asked to compare vocalizations with either (a) sim-
ilar referents but different acoustic properties, or (b)
different referents and different acoustic properties. Re-
sults suggested that vervets compare different calls on the
basis of their meaning and not just their acoustic proper-
ties. When subjects heard from the same individual two
acoustically different calls with similar referents - a wrr
and chutter given to members of another group - they
transferred habituation across call types. By contrast,
when subjects heard from the same individual two acous-
tically different calls with different referents - in this
case, a leopard alarm and an eagle alarm - they did not
transfer habituation across call types.
Compared with our earlier experiments on the vervets'
alarm calls, these tests addressed the question of meaning
and reference more directly by asking animals to compare
two vocalizations (i.e., to make a same/different judg-
ment between them) and to reveal the criteria they use in
making their comparison. Results suggest that when one
vervet hears another vocalize the listener forms a repre-
sentation of what that call means. And if, shortly there-
after, the listener hears a second vocalization, the two
calls are compared not just according to their acoustic
properties but according to their meanings. If we accept
the notion that a monkey's call becomes a word when the
properties ascribed to the call are not those of a sound but
those of the object it denotes, wrrs and chutters seem to
have become words. Vervets present us with a rudimen-
tary semantic system in which some calls, such as leopard
and snake alarms, are markedly different in meaning
whereas others, like wrrs and chutters, are linked to a
common referent and can be used to represent shades of
meaning within a general class.
It would obviously be as incorrect to claim that monkey
vocalizations convey information only about external ref-
erents as it is to argue that they convey information only
about the signaler's motivational state or subsequent
behavior. Clearly, as Smith (1986; 1990) has argued,
whenever one animal vocalizes to another, a variety of
information is made available - information about the
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identity and physical characteristics of the signaler, about
what the signaler is likely to do next, and about events in
the environment. From the listener's point of view, the
sort of information that is most important will vary from
one situation to the next. In human language, where the
existence of external referents is not disputed, words and
sentences convey information about a speaker's identity,
mood, and subsequent behavior in addition to informa-
tion about particular external referents (e.g., Johnson-
Laird 1987). Language, in this respect, is both expressive
and denotative: It conveys the emotions, thoughts, and
beliefs of the speaker while simultaneously referring to
objects or events in the external world. In emphasizing
the external referents of primate vocalizations, our aim is
not to minimize the importance of either emotion, con-
textual cues, or the caller's subsequent behavior. Instead,
we hope to show that the communication of monkeys and
apes - long known to be highly expressive (e.g., jolly
1985) - can be denotative as well.
But what, precisely, do their calls denote? This is
difficult to state, for two reasons. First, call meaning
cannot be described in absolute terms (e.g., "'snake
alarm' means the African python, Python sebae"). In-
stead, the meaning of a call can only be stated relative to
the meaning of other calls in a species' repertoire. Among
vervets, for example, "snake alarm" denotes something
that is both different from the objects that elicit eagle and
leopard alarms and different from objects that elicit no
alarm at all, such as harmless snakes or lizards. Our
dictionary of vervet words thus builds slowly, with each
word being defined in relation to the others. Under these
conditions, as Quine's (1960) imaginary linguist would no
doubt have discovered, the more words you have the
more precise your definitions can be. For us, in the land
of vervet monkeys, words are relatively few and their
meanings are ill-defined.
Our assessment of call meaning is also imprecise be-
cause we cannot yet tell whether a vervet's call should be
glossed as a word (simply, "snake") or as a proposition
("Snake! Let's approach and mob it!"). Hence we make no
absolute distinction between a call that provides informa-
tion about an external referent and a call that combines
referential information with information about the caller's
attitude or disposition toward that referent.
Finally, we note that our inability to state the precise
meaning of vervet vocalizations is not peculiar to work on
nonhuman species, but parallels similar difficulties in the
assessment of word meaning among very young children.
Chapter 6: Summarizing the mental
representations of wocaiizations
and social relationships
To this point we have made two claims about the knowl-
edge that underlies social behavior and communication in
vervets and other nonhuman primates. First, we have
suggested that in their social interactions monkeys do not
simply associate some individuals with others but instead
classify relationships into types. "Mother-offspring
bonds" or "bonds between the members of family X" are
abstractions that allow different relationships to be com-
pared with one another. Second, we have argued that
monkeys classify sounds according to the objects and
events they denote. As in their assessment of social
relationships, the monkeys seem to represent a sound's
meaning in their mind and compare different sounds on
the basis of these representations.
Although in each of these instances there seems to be a
strong case for mental representations, or concepts, it is
important to emphasize again how little we know about
what actually exists in the minds of our subjects. At this
stage, for example, It is unclear precisely how the
monkeys' representations might differ from associations
formed through classical conditioning, associations which
can themselves be extremely complex (e.g., Dickinson
1980; Rescorla 1988). Similarly, we cannot specify how
much information Is contained within a representation,
how the information is structured, or how it is coded in
the nervous system. We can, however, consider what
representations are good for and how under natural
conditions monkeys might benefit from having them.
Perhaps the content of representations can be elucidated,
at least in part, from their function (Fodor & Pylyshyn
1981; Herrnstein 1990).
We argue that the monkeys' ability to represent social
relationships has evolved because it offers the most accu-
rate means of predicting the behavior of others (see also
Humphrey 1976; 1983; Whiten & Byrne 1988). But there
are also other advantages. Because relationships con-
ceived In this way are abstractions, they can be more
parsimonious and simpler than absolute judgments,
which require learning the characteristics of every in-
teraction (Allen 1989; Dasser 1985; Kummer 1982; Pre-
mack 1983). If a monkey can assess the relationships of
others - rather than having to remember or observe all of
their interactions - he may be able to predict what
opponents will do next even when he has seen them
interact only once or twice. In other words, a monkey
would be considerably better off if he had some represen-
tation of a social relationship.
A similar argument can be made for the representation
of meaning In vocal communication. Assume, for the
moment, that we are dealing with cases in which signalers
gain by providing truthful information to their audience —
say, a female communicating with her offspring or a close
relative (the problem of deception is discussed in Chapter
7). In these circumstances, we argue that the monkeys'
ability to represent the meaning of vocalizations has
evolved because of the advantages that accrue to indi-
viduals who can interpret sounds without relying on
either contextual cues or the behavior of those who
vocalize. In more complex systems of communication,
the ability to link one or more vocalizations with a
common referent (wrrs and chutters, for instance) and to
compare calls on the basis of the things they represent,
allows individuals to develop a rich semantic system in
which some calls, like eagle and snake alarms, are mark-
edly different, while others, like wrrs and chutters, show
more subtle differences from each other and can be used
to represent shades of meaning within a general class.
Beyond this, however, our understanding of monkeys'
representations of social relationships and call meaning is
fuzzy and imprecise. Given the difficulty of stating pre-
cisely what Is contained In a monkey's mind, we turn
Instead to what may not be.
First, even If monkeys do distinguish among different
types of social relationships, their ability to compare
142 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1992) 15:1
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00067959
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:55:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Cheney & Seyfarth: How monkeys see the world
relationships may be relatively inflexible and limited to
circumstances in which the individuals involved are fa-
miliar. In all the studies described to date, subjects have
of necessity been tested only with the familiar social
companions that make up their group. As a result, we
cannot state conclusively that a monkey confronted with
an entirely new set of individuals - a young male transfer-
ring into a new group, for example - would be pre-
disposed to look for close bonds among matrilineal kin,
linear dominance relations, and so on. More to the point,
how long would it take for a vervet or baboon to learn that
not all primate species have the same patterns of social
interaction? If a vervet male transferred into a gorilla
group, where females are seldom closely related (Stewart
& Harcourt 1987), how long would it take for the male to
cease expecting the females to interact at high rates?
Would he ever?
Second, although monkeys may be able to represent
social relationships, their ability to make use of such
representations in reasoning or computation may be
limited. Representations of social phenomena may there-
fore differ from the representations of rate, time, and
space used by birds and other animals when computing,
for example, feeding returns at alternative food patches
(Gallistel 1989).
Third, as we noted in Chapter 3, we have no evidence
that monkeys can label social relationships or give names
to the criteria they use in classifying them. Although
certain primate vocalizations do function in a manner that
effectively labels different predators (e.g., leopards and
eagles) or different classes of conspecifics (e.g., dominant
or subordinate) we do not know whether monkeys have
calls referring to "close partners," "friends," or "en-
emies" that could be used to classify relationships.
Whether they could learn such terms under the appropri-
ate conditions remains an open question: None of the ape
language studies has ever asked subjects about each
other's relationships. If the presence or absence of a label
is some measure of an individual's awareness of classes
and of relations between classes, then the ability of
monkeys to compare relationships and generalize to
novel social situations may be severely limited.
The monkeys' apparent lack of vocalizations to label
superordinate classes may be symptomatic of a larger
problem: The monkeys may be unaware of their own
knowledge. In Rozin's (1976) terms, a monkey's knowl-
edge of social relationships or word meaning may be
inaccessible. Whereas monkeys can classify familiar rela-
tionships into types and even compare social rela-
tionships involving different individuals, they may not be
able to examine their own knowledge, label it, apply it to
new stimuli, or use it to deduce new knowledge. In
addition, perhaps because monkeys cannot reflect on
what they know about others, they may be unable to
attribute motives and hence understand why some rela-
tionships are alike and others are quite different.
We have argued that monkeys, to succeed socially,
must be able to predict the behavior of others. To do this
well, they cannot rely on memorizing single interactions
but must instead deal in abstractions, deducing the rela-
tionships that exist among others. For humans, the quest
to predict behavior prompts us to search still further, for
the knowledge, motives, and beliefs that cause some
relationships to differ form others.
In the end, we confront the relation between an indi-
vidual's behavior and his recognition of the mental states
of others. Given that monkeys recognize relationships, do
they understand the motives that underlie them? Given
that monkeys can communicate selectively about things,
do they use these calls simply to affect each other's
behavior, or do they ever attempt to change each other's
minds? These questions strike at the heart of how
monkeys see the world and lead us directly into the next
three chapters on deception, attribution, and the limits of
primate intelligence.
Chapter 7: Deception
Whether or not animal signals are considered "truthful"
or "deceptive" depends to some extent on the sorts of
data one decides to emphasize. In most cases, signals do
seem to provide accurate and reliable information to
those nearby. In other cases, however, they clearly do
not. Here we use an operational definition: A deceptive
signal is one that provides others with false information.
We review some of the evidence for deceptive commu-
nication and the detection of unreliable signals in pri-
mates and other animals. We describe the form that
deceptive signals take and discuss their possible function,
concentrating in particular on signals that convey infor-
mation about the environment or the signaler's probable
behavior, because these signals offer the widest scope for
modification. Our primary purpose is to provide a frame-
work, however rickety, within which we can consider the
far more speculative and controversial issue of what
deception might tell us about other animals' minds. We
reserve this topic for Chapter 8.
Deception can take a number of forms. Among group-
living animals, where the risk of detection is greatest, one
of the most effective means of deceiving others is through
silence: Withholding information that might be beneficial
to others. Although signal concealment involves no active
falsification of information and cannot distract attention
from one event to another, it can certainly function to
deceive.
Kummer (1982) reports observing a female hamadryas
baboon who spent 20 minutes gradually shifting her way
in a seated position toward a rock where she began to
groom a subadult male - an act that would not normally
be tolerated by the dominant adult male. From his
resting position, the dominant male could see the back
and head of the female, but not her arms. The subadult
male sat in a bent position and was also invisible to the
dominant male. What made Kummer doubt that this
arrangement was accidental was the exceptionally slow,
inch-by-inch shifting of the female toward the rock (for
many similar accounts see Whiten & Byrne 1988).
What do such anecdotes tell us? They suggest, but
clearly do not prove, that nonhuman primates do not
simply monitor physical aspects of their world, such as
the location of a food item or another individual; they also
monitor and predict the mental states of other animals
and the effects of their own behavior on the behavior of
others. What is presently lacking is a method for system-
atically observing the frequency and consequences of
such apparent attempts at deception. More important,
we need some way of discriminating between explana-
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tions that assume that animals have the ability to monitor
the thoughts of others and simpler interpretations that
make no such assumption. In the case of the female
hamadryas baboon, for example, explanations based on
learned behavioral contingencies are as plausible as those
based on mental attributions; the female could have
groomed the subadult male behind a rock simply because
she had learned from past experience that she could avoid
attack by grooming other males out of sight of the domi-
nant male.
Choosing between simpler and more complex explana-
tions becomes particularly difficult when we attempt to
compare apparent acts of deception across species. Al-
though both chimpanzees and house sparrows, for exam-
ple, modify the rate at which they utter food calls depend-
ing on the size of the food source (see Chapter 5), many
investigators are inclined to believe that chimpanzee food
calls are governed by mechanisms that differ from those of
house sparrows. In the absence of any systematic infor-
mation about the flexibility and modifiability of calls in
each of these species, however, we are left simply with
two very similar patterns of behavior.
Those taking an exclusively functional or evolutionary
perspective (e.g., Krebs & Dawkins 1984) might argue
that the mechanisms underlying the food calls of chim-
panzees and house sparrows are irrelevant as long as the
calls function to manipulate others. Mechanisms become
more important, however, if we want to use deception as
a means of studying the mental states and capacities of
animals, or if we want to understand the constraints
within which communication operates and the different
forms that manipulation can take.
More direct manipulation can occur through the active
falsification of signals. This strategy will be most effective
if it occurs at low rates and if the circumstances surround-
ing successive acts of deception are varied - for example,
if a false food call is subsequently followed by a false alarm
call rather than simply by another false food call. Varia-
tion in the context of deception, at least among vervet
monkeys, potentially allows individuals to maintain the
highest rates of deceptive signaling without producing
permanent skepticism among others in their group.
At the moment, we have no evidence that any animal
species regularly varies the rate and context of false
signals. Through more systematic observations and ex-
periments it should eventually become possible to deter-
mine whether the intriguing anecdotes reported in the
literature represent, at least in some cases, intentional
signal falsification, as well as to specify more precisely the
constraints under which deceptive communication is
practiced.
Chapter 8: Attribution
When humans try to deceive each other, we try among
other things to alter what another individual thinks.
Conversely, to detect deception we must be able to read
another's mind: to distinguish, for example, between a
person who seeks help and genuinely intends to recipro-
cate and one who seeks help for more selfish reasons. The
supplicant's behavior may in each case be the same - it is
the difference between states of minds that must be
detected. In other words, deceit and its detection assume
(at least in the case of humans) that individuals can
attribute mental states to others. Can the same be said of
animals? Is it valid to assume, in Premack and Woodruff's
(1978) words, that animals have "a theory of mind"? In
Chapter 8 we consider the question of attribution and ask
whether monkeys and apes recognize the existence of
mental states in others.
The study of attribution in monkeys and apes is still in
its infancy and continues to rely heavily on intriguing but
largely unsubstantiated anecdotes. Although it is difficult
to summarize an issue for which there is only a small
amount of confusing and sometimes contradictory data,
we risk a few speculations.
Monkeys and apes do occasionally act as if they recog-
nize that other individuals have beliefs, but even the most
compelling examples can usually be explained in terms of
learned behavioral contingencies, without recourse to
higher-order intentionality. What little evidence there is
suggests that apes, in particular, may have a theory of
mind, but not one that allows them to differentiate clearly
or easily among different theories or different minds.
Indeed, we cannot even state conclusively that non-
human primates attribute ignorance to each other. The
problem may be at least partially related to the ani-
mals' inability to recognize and represent their own
knowledge.
Many different examples, reflecting many different
approaches to the same problem, all support the hypoth-
esis that monkeys are unable to attribute mental states to
others. First, although monkeys can easily learn the
necessary steps to complete a task, they apparently find it
more difficult to learn the roles of others, perhaps be-
cause they cannot impute motives to other individuals.
Second, although they do attempt to deceive each other,
monkeys' attempts at deception seem aimed more at
altering their rivals' behavior than at affecting their rivals'
thoughts. Third, although their vocalizations certainly
function to alert others to the presence of food, danger, or
each other, we have no evidence that monkeys ever
communicate with the intent of changing a listener's
mental state or of drawing the listener's attention to their
own mental state. Monkeys do not adjust their behavior
according to whether or not their audience is ignorant or
informed, perhaps because they do not recognize that
such mental states exist. Fourth, although monkeys are
clearly able to acquire novel skills from others through
observation, social enhancement, and trial and error
learning, there is little evidence that they imitate each
other, again perhaps because they are unable to impute
motive. Fifth, monkeys do not teach each other. Again,
we would argue that this lack of pedagogy reflects the
animals' inability to distinguish between their own states
of mind and the states of mind of others. Sixth, although
monkeys experience such emotions as fear and grief, they
show no evidence of compassion or empathy and do not
seem to recognize emotions in others. Finally, although
monkeys are adept at recognizing their own position in a
social network or dominance hierarchy, they show little
self-awareness. This, too, is consistent with the view that
monkeys do not know what they know and cannot reflect
upon their knowledge, their emotions, or their beliefs.
Many of these generalizations may apply more to
monkeys than to apes. Indeed, having gone so far as to
suggest that monkeys, for the most part, lack a theory of
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mind, we speculate further and predict that many of the
most fundamental differences between the minds of
monkeys and the minds of apes will ultimately be traced
to the apes' superior skills in attributing states of mind to
each other (see also Mason 1978).
Although most of the data are anecdotal, there is strong
suggestive evidence that chimpanzees, if not other apes,
recognize that other individuals have beliefs and that
their own behavior can affect those beliefs. Unlike
monkeys, chimpanzees seem to understand each other's
goals and motives. They deceive each other in more ways
and in more contexts than monkeys, and they seem better
than monkeys at recognizing both their own and other
individuals' knowledge and limitations.
At the same time, however, chimpanzees may be like
very young children in failing to attribute false beliefs to
others. There is very little evidence that chimpanzees
recognize a discrepancy between their own states of mind
and the states of mind of others. They show little empathy
for each other and do not explicitly teach each other. One
study conducted with captive subjects has suggested that
chimpanzees may be able to distinguish between a
human trainer who is ignorant about the location of food
and one who is knowledgeable. To date, however, there
is no comparable evidence from free-ranging chim-
panzees to suggest that signalers recognize whether their
audience is ignorant or knowledgeable when, for exam-
ple, they utter food calls.
Why is the attribution of mental states so important?
Consider just one example of what one cannot do if one
lacks a theory of mind. Suppose there exists a group of
macaques in which one animal, like the famous Japanese
macaque Imo, suddenly develops a new method for
acquiring and preparing food. If the inventor deals only
with behavioral contingencies, there is relatively little
adaptive value to be gained from her discovery. She can
feed herself better and raise healthier offspring. Other
animals may learn that she, alone among her companions,
can acquire this kind of food, and this may cause others to
approach her when she is preparing the food and to
handle the food as she does. Through such social en™
hancement, her offspring might eventually also acquire
the skill. The female might also become a more attractive
social partner to others, and her attractiveness might
allow her to establish a relationship with a high-ranking
female or male that might otherwise not have developed
(Stammbach, 1988, provides a good example).
If the inventor can attribute ignorance to others and
understands that mental states can affect behavior, how-
ever, there is an immense amount to be gained. Inventors
who have a theory of mind can selectively transmit their
knowledge to kin, much as they can selectively distribute
their grooming. They can also selectively withhold their
knowledge from rivals, much as they selectively withhold
such other cooperative behavior as alliances. Finally, if
inventors can recognize the difference between their own
knowledge and that of others, they need not depend on
the relatively slow process of observational learning to
transmit their skill, but can instead engage in active
pedagogy. Once again, an individual capable of attribu-
tion would seem to have a clear selective advantage over
others.
We offer this hypothetical example to emphasize that
the existence (or lack) of a theory of mind, long recognized
as an important watershed in children's cognitive devel-
opment, also has considerable evolutionary significance.
Once individuals recognize that their companions not
only behave but also think, desire, and have beliefs about
behavior, they become much better social strategists and
can use their knowledge much more skillfully to their own
and their relatives' benefit.
The probability that a monkey with a typewriter would
produce the complete works of Shakespeare is one in
many billions. Even given thousands of years, the right
combinations of letters and spaces would simply never
arise by chance (Dawkins 1986). Monkeys would have to
rely on chance because they lack a theory of mind. Even if
a monkey could type and describe his characters' behav-
ior, he could not reveal their minds. And without such
attribution there could be no tragedy or comedy, no
irony, and no paradox.
Chapter 9: Social and nonsociaS intelligence
One of the striking features of adult human intelligence is
our ability to apply what we have learned in one context to
other, quite different circumstances. We take for
granted, for example, that the basic rules of physics apply
equally well regardless of whether we are playing bil-
liards, hanging a picture, or building a house. In short,
the knowledge we possess is in many cases accessible to
us - we are aware of it, or know that we know it (Rozin
1976).
In contrast, animals often seem to have a kind of "laser
beam" intelligence - extraordinarily powerful when
focused in a single domain but much less well developed
outside that narrow sphere. Birds (e.g., homing pigeons)
can navigate enormous distances using the sun, the stars,
geographical markers, or a magnetic sense to guide them
(reviewed in Gould 1982). Honey bees dance to inform
one another about the distance, size, and location of a
food source, compensating as the sun changes its angle
throughout the day so that the flight from hive to food is
always indicated as a straight line (Gould & Gould 1988;
von Frisch 1967). And yet we rarely think of animals like
homing pigeons or bees as intelligent in the human sense,
primarily because their sophisticated performance seems
limited to specific, highly circumscribed spheres. In
Rozin's (1976) terms, the homing pigeon's navigational
and the bee's communicative skills are "inaccessible":
The animals don't know what they know and cannot apply
their knowledge to problems in other domains.
Most monkeys and apes are social creatures, and their
expertise in the domain of social interactions is striking.
But how accessible is their intelligence? Do they under-
stand how much they know? Our first attempt to grapple
with the question of "metaknowledge" came in Chapters
3 and 8, where we explored the extent to which monkeys
not only engage in flexible, adaptive behavior but also
recognize that they and others do so. Chapter 9 ap-
proaches the issue from a different angle, by comparing
the performance of nonhuman primates in their social
interactions with their performance outside the social
domain.
It has been hypothesized (e.g., Humphrey 1976; Jolly
1966) that primate intelligence (including our own) origi-
nally evolved to solve social problems and was only later
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extended to problems outside the social domain. The
argument predicts that at least some of the abilities that
vervets and other primates demonstrate in their social
interactions will be relatively inaccessible and not easily
generalized to nonsocial problems.
Supporting this view, we find that vervets do not seem
to attend to many aspects of their physical environment,
even when to do so would be adaptive. Although the
monkeys do recognize and respond to the different alarm
calls given by birds and nonprimate mammals, they
appear to ignore the visual and behavioral cues associated
with some predators. Apparently, they do not recognize
the relationship between a python and its track, nor do
they understand that a carcass in a tree indicates a
leopard's proximity, even though they have had ample
opportunity to learn such associations.
Similarly, although vervets and other primates exhibit
many forms of cooperation and reciprocity in their social
interactions, comparable behavior using nonsocial cur-
rency (e.g., food sharing) is relatively rare. Monkeys
behave altruistically and form alliances to achieve social
goals, but they seldom cooperate to learn new ways of
exploiting food.
This is not to say that primates never face - nor solve -
challenging ecological problems. Clearly they do, as
many field studies have shown (e.g., Boesch & Boesch
1984; Milton 1988; Sigg & Stolba 1981). Arguments about
domain-specific intelligence do not aim to oppose one
comprehensive ecological argument against an equally
comprehensive social one. The evolution of specialized
skills to solve social problems by no means precludes the
evolution of other, equally specialized skills to solve
problems in other domains. Instead, the hypothesis
posits that specific abilities - or adaptive specializations
(Rozin & Schull 1988) — have evolved to cope with specific
social or ecological demands. As a result, skills exhibited
in one context may not always be generalized to another.
So, for example, although a male baboon might have no
difficulty in assessing the relative ranks of other males, he
might be unable to rank the relative amounts of water in a
series of containers. Similarly, if the need to exploit
widely dispersed and ephemeral waterholes has favored
the evolution of complex spatial memory in hamadryas
baboons, we should not necessarily expect hamadryas
baboons to be better than other monkeys at remembering
the genealogies of band members. Instead, we suggest
that the monkeys' intelligence is largely inaccessible to
them: Knowledge gained in one domain is not necessarily
extended to another.
There is no need to limit these arguments to nonhuman
primates. To cite just one example, white-fronted bee-
eaters (Merops bullockoides) are colonial, communally
breeding birds that display both highly developed spatial
memory in their foraging behavior and primate-like social
skills. Not only do they remember the location and
boundaries of distant feeding territories, but they also
seem to distinguish kin from nonkin, close relatives from
nonrelatives, and unrelated neighbors from non-neigh-
bors (e.g., Emlen & Wrege 1988; Hegner & Emlen
1987). It is not yet possible to say whether bee-eaters
approach primates in recognizing both their own social
relationships and the social relationships of others, be-
cause the relevant observations and experiments have not
been conducted. We also do not know whether any of the
specific skills that bee-eaters use in foraging are also
manifested in social interactions. Do bee-eaters, for ex-
ample, distinguish the mates of other, unrelated birds
with the same acuity that they distinguish these indi-
viduals' territorial boundaries? If bee-eaters (or any other
species) failed to extend an ability used in a foraging
context to a comparable social context, this would provide
further support for the domain specific view of in-
telligence.
Observations suggest that there is, in nonhuman and
perhaps also human primates, an evolutionary pre-
disposition that makes it easier for individuals to under-
stand relationships among conspecifics than to under-
stand similar relations among things. Among humans, the
predisposition is more subtle but nevertheless apparent
in the earliest years of childhood when infants seem
remarkably sensitive to the emotions, behavior, and
social relations of other people while at the same time
remaining ignorant of much of the world around them.
Monkeys have a kind of laser beam intelligence. Al-
though they solve social problems with little difficulty or
training, they often flounder when confronted with the
same problems outside the social domain. They do not
always generalize their social abilities to other species or
to inanimate objects, and in this sense their skills seem
relatively restricted. Apparently, the animals do not
know what they know and cannot apply their knowledge
to problems in other domains.
Chapter 10: How monkeys
When we study the social behavior of monkeys we are
tempted to anthropomorphize and treat them as if they
were human. This is not entirely inappropriate. Like the
primatologists who study them, vervet monkeys observe
social interactions and draw generalizations about the
types of relationships that exist among individuals. The
monkeys also use sounds to represent things and compare
different vocalizations according to their meaning.
There are many ways in which vervets' view of their
world is very different from our own, however. Though
monkeys may make use of abstract concepts and have
motives, beliefs, and desires, their mental states are not
accessible to them: They do not know what they know.
Furthermore, monkeys seem unable to attribute mental
states to others or to recognize that, others' behavior is also
caused by motives, beliefs, and desires.
The inability to examine their own mental states or to
attribute mentality to others severely constrains the abili-
ty of monkeys to transmit information, deceive, or feel
empathy with one another. It. also limits the extent to
which monkey vocalizations can be called semantic.
True, calls function to denote objects and events in the
environment and, like words, are caused by the mental
states of those who use them. Unlike our language,
however, the vocalizations of monkeys are not produced
with an intent to modify the mental states of others.
Though monkeys are skilled observers of each other's
behavior, they seem to be far less astute observers of each
other's minds, and they seldom seem to proceed beyond
other animals' actions to analyze the motives underlying
their behavior. We attribute motives, plans, and strat-
egies to the animals, but they, for the most part, do not.
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In the last chapter of How; Monkeys See the World, Cheney &
Seyfarth (C & S) ask, "Do . . . mental states really exist in the
mind of any animal? Or are they artifacts, invented by eth-
ologists as the best means of describing what they have seen?"
(p. 303) These questions are about ontological realism with
respect to mental states in animals. At least one philosopher
(Daniel Dennett) who has influenced C & S thinks that the
answer to these questions should be "no" and "yes" respectively
(see, e.g., Dennett 1987 and multiple book review, BBS 11(3)
1988).
Disappointingly (or, some might say, shrewdly), C & S do not
answer these questions directly. They indicate that the use of
anthropomorphic terms "is not entirely inappropriate" (p. 312).
But even an eliminativist might accept this claim if all it means is
that there are pragmatic or instrumentalist reasons for an-
thropomorphizing. They also consider the question of whether
monkeys attribute mental states to each other (Chapter 8),
concluding that, in general, they do not.
Neither a positive nor a negative answer to this question helps
settle the issue of realism. Although Davidson (1975) holds the
view that to have beliefs one must be capable of attributing
beliefs to others, this is not a typical, view, and it is reasonable to
think that there is no logical incompatibility between having
beliefs and not being able to attribute beliefs to others. So the
negative conclusion produced by C & S does not rule out
realism. Neither, however, would a positive conclusion support
realism, because monkeys could be just as mistaken about a
correct theory of mind as, some would maintain, humans are.
In other places, commitment to realism about monkey minds
is clearly suggested by C & S. For example, they assert that
"monkeys may . . . create in their minds a number of represen-
tations that describe different sorts of social relationship" (p.
304), and they describe evidence that makes them "suspect that
such representations exist" (p. 305). In places where C & S
produce this kind of claim, they usually justify it as a form of
inference to the best explanation. I am inclined to agree with
this strategy, but it will not satisfy those, such as instrumen-
talists in the philosophy of science, who are convinced that the
explanatory power is no evidence for truth.
Thus, the explicit statements about whether animals really
have minds are unlikely to be convincing on either side. But that
is to miss the real strength of this book, which is the extraordi-
nary detail it gives about the lives and abilities of vervet
monkeys, both in their natural state and in comparison to other
apes. The details described in this book show why a number of
philosophers (myself included) are excited about developments
in ethology and its potential as a testing ground for philosophical
theories of mind. C & S present the material with a great deal of
philosophical sophistication, which greatly enhances the value
of this book for the purpose just mentioned.
So, when the last chapter fails to answer the question posed at
the beginning, the disappointment is only relative. Indeed, it
would be unreasonable to expect C & S to declare explicitly in
favor of realism when philosophy of mind often appears to be
dominated by those who disparage "folk" psychology. But here,
work by ethologists can have a very large impact on philosoph-
ical theorizing. First, philosophy of mind has been dominated
by considerations arising from the philosophy of psychology,
particularly the explanation of individual behavior. Ethology, is
concerned with the behavior in an evolutionary context, how-
ever. If brain mechanisms are to be given an adaptive explana-
tion, it is worth considering the possibility that they are adaptive
because of the connections they provide from the organism to its
environment. Such connections may best be captured in terms
of mental content. So, whether or not mental content is dispens-
able for the purposes of explaining individual behavior, it may
be indispensable for ethology.
Second, philosophers who have argued against animal minds
have emphasized the respects in which nonhuman animals
differ from humans. Those who have argued in favor have
emphasized similarities. But the proper attitude, admirably
demonstrated by C & S, is to describe similarities and dif-
ferences without having a particular axe to grind. We should not
expect to be able to answer the question of whether animals
have minds by looking at a single feature in isolation. As C & S
show, in many respects the vervets are quite like us, and in
many respects they are quite different. Telling such a compli-
cated story requires an enormous amount of work, but without it
philosophical attempts to understand animal minds are so much
whistling in the wind.
So, what is it like to be a monkey? Nagel (1974) is right in
thinking that no amount of neurophysiological information can
answer this question and its cohorts. But, as C & S show us,
there are other kinds of information pertinent to answering the
question. With other humans, the more I know about you the
better idea I have of what it is like to be you, even if your way of
life is quite different from my own. The same should be said
about other animals. After reading Cheney & Seyfarth's book
one realizes that one is a lot closer to knowing what it is like to be
a vervet than one might originally have thought possible.
Finally, the question of instrumentalism versus realism about
animal minds cannot be as easily dismissed as might its counter-
parts concerning quarks or electrons. The ethics of our treat-
ment of other animals is intimately tied up with our assessments
of their minds, so whether or not we decide that monkeys really
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A lesson of science is that if one is to understand and explain the
workings of a complex system one should seek to analyze it in
terms of cooperating subsystems. One should also consider and
seek to explain the workings of any systems that approximate,
but are simpler than, the complex system to be explained. These
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maxims are more than ever to be borne In mind when consider-
ing the most complex and most complexly operating system that
we know of: the human mind. What the maxims dictate about
the mind is, among other things, the closest attention to the
mental processes of small children, nonhuman primates, and
monkeys.
Through a study of vervet monkeys we may come to under-
stand ourselves somewhat better. This, for me, is the major
Interest of Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) fine book, although It
has many other claims to attention.
One fundamental question about the mind that C & S's work
helps to Illuminate is that of consciousness. It cannot be doubted
that these monkeys have minds. They mentally represent the
world. They mentally represent themselves and the complex
social relations in which they stand to the other members of
their groups. In one sense, then, they are conscious, at least
during their waking hours. They are functioning mentally, and
at quite a high level. But they do not appear to have con-
sciousness In the sense of "meta-self-awareness," defined by C
& S as Implying "that the Individual Is aware of his own state of
mind and can use this awareness to predict and explain the
behavior of both himself and others" (p. 240).
I suggest that this definition of consciousness should be
restricted to Its first half: "that the Individual Is aware of his own
state of mind." The second half describes a function of con-
sciousness that, C & S suggest, is the evolutionary explanation,
or part of the evolutionary explanation, of why such awareness
emerged In the first place. It is certainly a very Interesting
explanation. Consider the vexing question of whether vervets
ever try to deceive each other. C & S give us the wonderful
anecdote of the vervet Leslie who has a grudge against a lower-
ranking female, offers to groom her, but in the course of the
grooming bites the tail of her unsuspecting victim. Was this
really deception in the full sense of the word? That depends on
whether Leslie's grooming was Intended to produce a belief In
the mind of the other that Leslie had good intentions toward
her. If that were the real content of Leslie's intention, then she
would have to have had the notion of the other monkey having
mental states. But could she ever have developed this sophisti-
cated notion unless she had some awareness, however rudimen-
tary, that she herself had mental states? This may seem Im-
plausible. That being so, we have to consider very seriously the
hypothesis that all Leslie Intended to do was to affect the other
female's actions. An offer of grooming would produce relaxed
quiesence, which would enable Leslie to attack. C & S know of
no evidence at present available to rule out this second hypoth-
esis; indeed they seem Inclined to think that that is all that
vervets are capable of. Apes are a different matter. It seems
likely that they understand, and so are capable of, full-blooded
deception. The evolutionary gain in this intellectual advance Is
the possibility of concealing intentions and manipulating others
In a much more thoroughgoing way.
All this is exceedingly penetrating and suggestive. But It
remains true that any hypothesis about the evolutionary value of
consciousness Is speculative at the present time. For myself, I
should like to emphasize another Idea. I do not think It Is absent
from C & S's thought, but I do think it deserves more
prominence.
One of the most Interesting things in C & S's book Is the
demonstration that the discriminations that vervets make In
social matters are subtle and penetrating, yet that transfer of this
capacity to some other matters that ought to be of extreme
concern to vervets Is quite lacking. This failure of transference Is
also to be found In the apes, though to a lesser degree, and even
in ourselves. This is something that might be very obvious to a
higher species that observed us as we observe apes and
monkeys. Intelligence seems to start as a social affair and does
not transfer easily. But when transference actually Is effected,
what Is the mental mechanism for transfer? I think that con-
sciousness, taken as awareness of our own mental states, plays a
central role.
If the discriminations and Insights achieved in one field are to
be transferred to another, or a common feature is to be ab-
stracted from both, Ideas or images from both fields will have to
be brought together In a common arena. But this, though
necessary, is hardly sufficient. Some sort of mental work will
have to be brought to the arena, If only a recognition that a
certain association of images Is a fruitful one. One way or another
there must be purposive manipulation within the arena. It Is
well recognized that a necessary condition for the carrying out of
purposes is that there be cognitive access to the situation as it
develops. Only then can there be the cognitive feedback re-
quired for the successful prosecution of an enterprise. In the
field of physical action, feedback is supplied by perception. In
the field of the mental, feedback is supplied by awareness on the
part of the agent of (some of) the agent's mental states. (Such
awareness seems to deserve the term "inner sense," a phrase
found In both Locke and Kant. This brings out the parallel with
perception.) That, perhaps, Is why awareness of our own mental
states permits Intellectual advance of a transferring or connect-
ing sort.
H@w monkefs do things with "words"
Simon Baron-Cohen
Department of Psychology, Institute of Psychiatry, University of London,
London SE5 8AF, England
Electronic mail: scohen@ux.psych.lon.ac.uk
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book Is a fascinating excursion
into both the mind of the monkey and the debates surrounding
animal Intelligence. Their conclusion on the existence of a
theory of mind in nonhuman primates Is appropriately cautious:
There Is no "tight" evidence that monkeys or apes recognize the
mental states of knowledge or belief (although apes may recog-
nize the mental states of desire and goal). Monkeys and apes
clearly distinguish complex social relationships and behaviour,
but they do not necessarily distinguish minds. This conclusion Is
altogether less controversial than Premack & Woodruff's (1978)
position In BBS and is In line with Premack's (1988a) later work.
This conclusion has Implications for what might be going on in
monkey communication.
C & S's work on monkey communication has been of major
importance, illustrating how the experimental method can be
used even in their subject's natural habitat of rural southern
Kenya. Suppose we accept C & S's claim that monkeys can
produce "words," because their vocalizations appear to refer to
events In the outside world. This still leaves open the question of
what monkeys are trying to do with their words. As Austin (1962)
discussed, words can be used for a variety of different functions.
C & S approach this problem at one point by means of a
comparison between the way human children and monkeys
communicate: "Although children quickly go on to much great-
er things, for a few brief months communication by the child and
monkey Is similar In the following respects. Both use sounds In a
limited set of circumstances, as If they are denoting particular
features of their environment or "commenting" on the situation
In which they find themselves" (p. 173). I would like to unpack
this comparison a little more, to see whether it really holds. Are
words really used for "commenting" by both populations?
C & S Illustrate this comparison with an example from a
human Infant who said "Zert!", whilst gesturing toward the
refrigerator, apparently with the meaning, "Get me the des-
sert!" The equivalent communication by the monkey Is a vervet
vocalization with the apparent meaning, "Leopard!", and so on.
This comparison seems reasonable when considered In this
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form: Both the human and the monkey utterances appear to be
intended to get another individual to do something (produce the
dessert, flee from the leopard, etc.). In this sense, they are both
"protoimperatives" (Bates et al. 1975). The utterance, or speech
act, is used to produce a particular outcome in the physical
world - obtain an object, cause someone to move, and so on.
(Human infants also point or gesture to achieve the same effect.)
But the comparison between human and monkey commu-
nication breaks down, I suggest, when the wider repertoire of
human infant communication is considered. Whilst monkeys
appear to be restricted to using words only as imperatives,
human infants - right from the beginning of their communica-
tion - use words not only as imperatives but also as declaratives
(Bates et al. 1975). Protodeclaratives (which may also be a single
"word," or even a single, silent gesture) function not primarily
to obtain a result in the physical world, but to direct another
individual's attention (their mental state) to an object or event,
as an end in itself. Thus, a human toddler might say "Plane!"
apparently to mean, "It's a plane!" or, "Look! A plane," and so
on. Here, the child communicates simply to share interest in
something. This is "commenting" on a situation for its own sake.
In this sense, the use of communication strongly suggests that
the speaker is trying to affect the listener's mind (Baron-Cohen
1989a; 1991b). There is no overtly physical goal: The child is not
trying to obtain the object, or get the listener to act, and so on.
C & S's claim that monkeys are also "commenting" (p. 173)
may therefore need some qualification: Insofar as monkeys
comment, they appear to do so to produce physical, not mental
effects. Monkeys' communication may thus resemble human
children's communication in its imperative but not its de-
clarative use. As with the question of whether monkeys have a
theory of mind, the evidence appears to still be quite fragile as to
whether monkeys can use "words" purely as declaratives. We
need further research of C & S's excellent quality to answer the
question of whether monkeys or any other nonhuman primate
can produce genuine declaratives. This is not just a question
about communication: It may also be critical for understanding
the evolution of a theory of mind, in that proto-declaratives and
other forms of "joint-attention" behaviours have been proposed
as a precursor in the development of a theory of mind (Baron-
Cohen 1991b).
New elements of a theory of mini in wild
chimpanzees
Christophe Boesch
Institute of Zoology, University of Basel, 4051 Basel, Switzerland
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book makes it clear that rather
little is known about the social cognition of primates. They stress
this point repeatedly and correctly remind us to be careful
whenever we want to generalize. The role of scientists, how-
ever, is to draw conclusions, and given the present state of
knowledge, they are bound to be proven wrong at one time or
another when new observations are reported. Let me address
some of the points related to the theory of mind that would
benefit from new observations made with the Tai" chimpanzees.
Imitation as a measure of attribution. Imitation has recently
become the centre of a debate concerning the transmission
process in primates. The conclusion, supported by C & S, is that
primates are not copying each other; only humans do so. The
new observations that cast doubt on such imitative abilities were
mostly carried out in restricted, captive settings within artificial
groups, however. Imitation presupposes a natural and trustful
relationship between two individuals that should motivate one
of them to copy a specific behaviour of the other. In comparison,
captive studies provide a rather inappropriate social environ-
ment. In an attempt to investigate the imitative abilities of the
chimpanzee, Tomasello et al. (1987) observed that captive
young chimpanzees fail to copy the behaviour of others who
were throwing sand or using reaching sticks.. Well-fed zoo
chimpanzees may not be very motivated to use a stick and even
less to throw sand (interestingly enough, only four out of seven
young chimpanzees and none of the older ones tested showed
any interest in the raking tool during the test trials). In addition,
the models (an adult female) may not have had the prestige of a
mother or a familiar adult male to inspire imitation of their
behaviour. Finally, the fact that rake use in an American zoo is
not imitated by the chimpanzees tells us nothing about the
learning processes involved in termite fishing or nut cracking by
Gombe or Tai chimpanzees, two of the behaviours considered
by some as possible candidates for cultural transmission through
imitation. Evidence of imitation in chimpanzees must hence be
sought in animals possessing behaviours that are candidates for
cultural transmission, for example, the imitation of termite
fishing should be studied with Gombe chimpanzees and nut
cracking with Tai chimpanzees (Boesch, in press a).
Empathy as measures of attribution. As C & S mentioned,
Gombe chimpanzees may show compassion for wounded indi-
viduals, but only between close kin. Whenever a nonkin pres-
ents a wound to a chimpanzee, this induces a reaction of fear or
disgust (Goodall 1986), a reaction similar to that described in
monkeys. Tai chimpanzees, however, totally independent of kin
relationship, were regularly seen to tend wounded animals for
extended periods of time. Once this care was observed for more
than 2 months (Boesch in press b). Individual reactions tend to
indicate that they are aware of the needs of the wounded, e.g.,
they lick the blood away and remove all dirt particles with
fingers and lips, as well as preventing flies from coming near the
wounds. In addition, empathy for the pain resulting from such
wounds was clearly demonstrated by the reaction of other group
members: After having received fresh wounds from an attack of
a leopard, the injured individual is constantly looked after by
group members, all trying to help by grooming and tending the
wounds. Dominant adult males prevented other group mem-
bers from disturbing the wounded chimp by chasing playing
infants or noisy group members away from his vicinity. In
addition, as wounds handicapped the movements of the injured
animal, group members remained with him as long as he needed
before he was able to begin to walk again; some just waited,
whereas others would return to him until he started to move
(three times the group waited for four hours at the same spot).
Whenever he stopped, they waited for him. Such a difference
with the Gombe chimpanzees may be explained by the high
predation pressure Tai chimpanzees suffer from leopards
(Boesch, in press b).
Teaching as a measure of attribution. C & S agree with most
authors that teaching is unique to humans. Contrary to C & S's
proposal that teaching only requires attributing ignorance to
others, I suggest that teaching requires much more: In most
situations, the naive individual has some knowledge of the task
already, and in teaching one must not only attribute knowledge
to the other individual different from that of the teacher, but this
knowledge must be compared with the teacher's own in order to
determine what aspect is incomplete or inappropriate and needs
to be changed. This comparison between two mental knowl-
edges has to be done accurately enough for the teaching to be
understood by the naive one and to improve his performance.
Apart from the cognitive capacities needed to make judgements
about another individual's errors and needs, biologists would
say that teaching should appear only when it is necessary for
improving the survival and reproductive abilities of an
individual.
The lack of observations on teaching in apes might only reflect
the fact that we have looked for tasks that didn't require teaching
in order to be normally acquired. The nut-cracking behaviours
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in Tai" chimpanzees require many years to be fully acquired and
the mother who normally shares the nuts with her infant must at
a certain moment interrupt her investment to be able to invest
in a second infant. This period may be costly to the first infant, as
it does not fully possess the nut-cracking behaviour. Nut crack-
ing may therefore be one of the rare behaviours that could force
the mother to accelerate the learning process of her infant if she
does not want to harm her own fitness, in fact, Tai chimpanzee
mothers were observed to teach some aspects of nut-cracking
technique to their infants who already had some of these skills,
either by demonstrating the right movement or by correcting an
error in the infant's technique (Boesch 1991).
Cheney & Seyfarth's synthesis of their observations on rhesus
monkeys is fascinating and I can only hope that their example
will be followed with some of the monkeys and apes species
about which we know so much less.
inside monkey minds: milestone or
Gordon M. Burghardt
Departments of Psychology & Zoology, Graduate Program in Ethology,
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996-0900
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) is an important book, a seminal
contribution to ethology. The authors are well-known for the
elegant field observations and experiments on the function,
ontogeny, and proximate mechanisms of vervet vocalizations
and social interactions that are integrated here. In their evalua-
tion of alarm behavior from three of the four classical ethological
queries (Tinbergen 1963), C & S have shown the power of a
multifaceted approach. They have also solved some important
methodological problems, although it is ironic that to show
complex cognitive recognition they rely on that most "primi-
tive" of learning processes, habituation.
But what about the mentalistic and subjective language in
which these studies are embedded and interpreted? This is a
programmatic example of "closing the circle," acknowledging
both instinct and mind in both human and nonhuman (Burg-
hardt 1978). My comments here explore the "inside the mind"
subtitle, and I would like to know from C & S whether I was at all
able to get inside their minds.
Are mentalistic constructs necessary for conducting and pre-
senting studies such as these? I have argued previously concern-
ing the vervet work that the answer is no (Burghardt 1985), but
not being necessary in principle does not mean that it was not an
important factor for C & S. Did the mentalistic aspects develop
gradually or were they explicit from the beginning?
It does seem true that much creative research in ethology and
psychology relies on using an unacknowledged critical an-
thropomorphism (CA) (Burghardt 1985; Donnelley & Nolan
1990). This is the use of one's experiences, intuitions, and
empathy, tempered by prior studies and knowledge of the
biology and natural history of both people and the species in
question, to design experiments and generate predictions about
what other species (or other members of our own species) will
do. [See Dennett: "Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology"
BBS 6(3) 1983 and Precis of "The Intentional Stance" BBS 11(3)
1988.] C & S do an admirable job of using subjective analogical
inference, applying the constraints that make the an-
thropomorphic stance critical. The last chapter (10) represents
this point clearly. But do C & S feel that they have really gotten
inside the mind of another species? Alternatively, is speculating
on what monkeys may need to think about or entering their
Umwelt (von Uexkiill 1934/1957) heuristically useful, even nec-
essary, in order to understand, model, or predict behavior?
Chapter 10 suggests the latter, but the title and often the
language promise the former. Perhaps both are true. This is not
a trivial epistemological problem (Burghardt 1991).
Such confusion, so easily removed, yet so persistent in recent
scholarly writings (Skinner 1990) suggests that something else is
operative. An eminent scientific associate of C & S's told me
years ago that a major benefit of Don Griffin's writings (e.g.,
1976) was that they were liberating, opening up new kinds of
questions that could be asked. For years I was perplexed
because critical anthropomorphism, although receiving little
systematic attention, has been around a long time. But now I
think I understand. The liberation and freedom is in the
Zeitgeist, the receptivity of granting agencies, the respect by
the scientific and publishing elite.
Claiming to have as a goal "knowing" the mind, feelings,
subjective world, or consciousness of a monkey (or other "high"
mammal) is a decided help in getting people to pay attention to
your results. Regardless of what behaviorist purists would say, it
is clear that many of us, scientists and nonscientists alike, really
want to have an understanding of other worlds, long for an entry
to their private experience. Do not most scientists, our most
"rational" subpopulation, have an intense devotion (if not time
to devote) to theater, music, art, history, or literature? The
popular press, films, and television respond, even pander, to a
perennial affinity for "human interest" stories, a preoccupation
with the bizarre and macabre in human psychology, and a
fascination with serial killers, celebrities, royalty, the wealthy,
the powerful, despots, and the long dead. Doesn't this reflect a
universal yearning to know, "What would it be like to experi-
ence . . . ?"
Animals fascinate us the same way. Yet with animals we
recognize difficulties in empathy and understanding, limits to
our ability to read minds, that we are often reluctant to recog-
nize when we evaluate the inner world and future behavior of
friends, enemies, colleagues, lovers, children, and politicians.
We so much need to rely on mentalistic inferences about other
people in our everyday life that applying critical an-
thropomorphism in these contexts seems either demeaning or
excessive.
How monkeys see the world is a milestone in cognitive
ethology and may well be another harbinger of a substantial
change in received scientific opinion about animal behavior and
what can be known about comparative cognition (see also de
Waal 1982). It delivers on Griffin's call to open up the question
of animal mentality in a species where there is less resistance at
least to discussing the issue than if bees or parrots were the
focus. It does so using biologically meaningful behavior, ecologi-
cally realistic settings, sound experimental techniques, and data
analysis. C & S acknowledge that their conclusions will stand or
fall on the basis of empirical data rather than compounded
anecdotes or profound sounding, but sometimes ethologically
naive, philosophical exegesis. It is less antagonistic in its discus-
sion of behaviorism than some other writings have been, al-
though the pioneering cognitive ethology of von Uexkiill
(1934/1957) should merit more than an aside provided by a
reviewer!
But the book could also be a millstone. The new comparative
mentalistic ethology and psychology may, if its practitioners are
not careful, repeat the errors that caused the comparable late
nineteenth century enthusiasm to be slowly, but firmly, dis-
credited (Burghardt 1985). Workers in cognitive ethology must
emphasize repeatedly the limitations of their conclusions and
the need for careful empirical work grounded in accurate natural
history and sensitive observation. It would be unfortunate if C &
S's attempt to follow in von Uexkull's path is soon overgrown
with vines and brambles as others try to skip the hard data
gathering and "see the new freedom as an opportunity for free-
floating uncritical fantasies about mental life" (Hilgard 1980, p.
15). Ultimately, effective attempts to enter the world of another
organism, be it human or animal, are based on convincing
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illusion, the telling of a good story. As a species we seem better
at telling stories than evaluating their truth value, one clear
example being the continuing debates over creationism and
other myths. Clearly the sophistication and presuppositions of
the audience will influence how convincing a story seems.
Although I suspect that C & S may really want to experience or
appreciate the world as a vervet monkey does, they know that it
is really their vision, their story, rich and insightful though it be,
that is at stake.
Social wersus ecological intelligence
Marina Cords
Anthropology Department, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027
How monkeys see the world is an interesting, clear, and carefully
written book. Drawing largely but not exclusively on their own
research on vervet monkeys, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S)
attempt to set both upper and lower bounds to the cognitive
abilities of monkeys as they apply to behavior that occurs in
nature. Defining upper bounds seems to be the more difficult
task, and here the discussion was most speculative. For exam-
ple, do monkeys have a theory of mind? C & S conclude that
although some anecdotal and experimental results are sug-
gestive, "we lack examples that cannot be explained except in
terms of a theory of mind." They judge the weight of the
combined evidence to favor slightly the view that monkeys lack
higher-order intentionality. And yet, at least partly because of
methodological limitations, lack of evidence for a theory of mind
is not necessarily evidence against it. A critical test is needed in
which negative results have unambiguous meaning.
I am focusing on a second speculative aspect of limitations on
monkey cognition, namely, whether specific cognitive abilities
evolved largely as a result of selective pressures acting on
individuals in a social or a nonsocial domain, and whether
certain abilities are therefore limited to one domain or the other
(Chapter 9). The social intelligence hypothesis is currently
fashionable, despite the fact that there have been few attempts
to operationalize it, or its leading competitor (namely, an eco-
logical intelligence hypothesis), or to test them "against" one
another. For these reasons, the case for social intelligence has
not been entirely convincing.
C & S first point out that monkeys make spontaneous classifi-
cations of social entities (e.g., individuals, relationships) on
various bases (e.g., kinship, similarity), but that they do not
make similar spontaneous classifications of nonsocial entities. Is
the latter assertion correct? We know very little about how
primates organize knowledge of their nonsocial environment:
Ecologists are usually not particularly interested in cognition. It
seems quite plausible, however, that when primates choose a
foraging route, they classify and compare various food sources
on the basis of size, caloric or nutritional yield and even dis-
tance. If routes are planned more than one step at a time,
relations between food sources might be classified and com-
pared as well. It seems premature to rule out spontaneous
classification in the nonsocial domain: Our understanding of the
mechanisms underlying ecological tasks like food finding and
orientation is simply too incomplete. [See also Fantino &
Abarca: "Choice, Optimal Foraging, and the Delay-Reduction
Hypothesis" BBS 8(2) 1985; Houston & McNamara: "A Frame-
work for the Functional Analysis of Behavior" BBS 11(1) 1988.]
A second argument concerns the predisposition of primates to
attend to social rather than nonsocial stimuli. Much of the
evidence comes from studies of ontogeny, in which social
stimuli are undoubtedly critical. But as C & S themselves
mention, it is difficult to interpret such studies unambiguously
as indicating preeminence of social stimuli in other than a
chronological sense, because different degrees of experience
with social and nonsocial stimuli cannot be controlled. It is a
consequence of being an infant mammal that social stimuli are
most important at an early age, and infant primates in particular
depend on their mothers for almost everything.
A third argument is that primates solve problems involving
social stimuli more easily than logically similar problems involv-
ing nonsocial stimuli. Experiments with adult humans have
apparently led to exactly this conclusion, but data from non-
human primates are sparse. C & S have themselves conducted
playback experiments involving the calls of nonvervet species
(i.e., nonsocial stimuli), comparing their results to those from
similar experiments involving vervets. As long as the nonvervet
species are relevant to vervets (i.e., they are predators, or they
have common predators), vervets respond to playbacks much as
they respond to playbacks of vervet calls. Thus, based on
acoustic cues, vervets seem to recognize associations of other
species, as they recognize associations of particular conspecific
individuals. If the nonvervet species are not relevant to vervets,
however, the vervets act as if they know nothing about them: C
& S conclude that vervets are not good naturalists and speculate
that humans would behave differently. I do not think that most
humans are good naturalists either, however: The people living
near the forest where I study monkeys know almost nothing
about these animals, for even though they spend considerable
time in the forest passing through and gathering wood, the
monkeys are simply not relevant features of their world.
One puzzling finding is that vervets do not attend to visual
cues indicating the proximity of predators (e.g., python tracks),
even though predation is a major source of mortality, and
humans find such cues informative. Several hypotheses may
explain this apparent lack of ability, but the point to make here is
that using inanimate visual cues in a referential way does not
occur in the social domain either (e.g., vervets do not seem to
monitor each other's tracks). The only secondary visual cues that
vervets do use in a referential way are other vervets. For
example, the approach of a particular individual may signal the
subsequent approach of its relative. In a similar way, however, a
monkey going through the motions of feeding or intensive food
search signals the presence of food that may not be visible to an
observer monkey. Perhaps vervets make more effective visual
cues than inanimate objects simply because they are more
familiar.
The idea that specific cognitive abilities evolved in specific
domains is interesting, but at present its application to primate
cognition is difficult, for at least two reasons. First, despite all
we know about the social and ecological lives of primates, we
lack a natural history of cognition that would allow us to assign
particular abilities to particular domains; we lack especially
analyses of the cognitive bases of common ecological tasks (e.g.,
orientation and food finding). Second, as others have pointed
out, there is the very basic problem that social and nonsocial
tasks are largely coincidental in primates: for many species, and
especially those with the largest brains, exploiting the environ-
ment is done together with group-mates, and even relatively
solitary tasks are often socially learned. Should this book stimu-
late further research into the nature and development of pri-
mate ecological cognition, it will have made an important
contribution beyond the sometimes speculative conclusions it
contains.
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Let me note first that I think Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) a
splendid book. The "cognitive revolution" has been penetrating
animal behavior research in recent years and is transforming it
as surely as did the earlier influences from ethology and so-
ciobiology. Questions of intention, mind, and consciousness
were banned from animal psychology around the turn of the
century because scientists could not deal with the many prob-
lems they pose. We still have no definitive manner in which to
deal with the animal mind other than by analogy with our own
psychological experience. By adopting a "stance" reflective of
intention, mind, or the like, however, we are led to ask interest-
ing questions and discover fascinating features of animal behav-
ior and, perhaps, the animal mind. C & S show that this can be
done with an anthropomorphism that is both critical and
insightful.
If behaviorism provided a thesis, it was Donald Griffin, more
than any other scientist, who saw that it was time to provide an
antithesis. [See Griffin: "Prospects For a Cognitive Ethology"
BBS 1(4) 1978.] Griffin's approach was too extreme for many
animal behaviorists. It sensitized them however, to questions
long forgotten and helped to stimulate and pave the way for
acceptance of the syntheses of such recent balanced work as that
of Boysen, Gallup, Herman, Mason, Menzel, Pepperberg,
Premack, Rumbaugh, and others. I believe that the C & S book
will become a much-cited classic in the emergence of this
synthesis.
Nevertheless, any good academic can find a few things with
which to quibble. First, I am inclined, with C & S, to believe the
"Jolly-Humphrey hypothesis," that social relationships provide
the most likely selective pressures leading to the evolution of
abilities tapped in many laboratory tests of primate cognition.
Basically, this is a solution to the problem of "surplusage, "the
problem of why animals should display potentials of learning
ability in apparent excess of those required in evolution, which
can be traced to Alfred Russel Wallace (see Boice 1977). My
concern is with the falsifiability of the Jolly-Humphrey hypoth-
esis. C & S suggest that primates may do well in laboratory tests
based on the transitivity of relationships because they learn the
transitive nature of dominance relationships in nature and thus
can generalize to problems that are formally similar. They also
rely heavily on the notion of "domain specificity," however,
according to which abilities evolved in one context do not
generalize to other contexts (e.g., p. 295). With these two
principles of transfer and domain specificity in place^ virtually
any result can be explained. This is reminiscent of the situation
with some aspects of psychoanalytic theory. [See BBS multiple
book review of Griinbaum's "Foundations of Psychoanalysis,"
BBS 9(2) 1986.] It may be possible, with careful, empirical
studies, to delineate conditions under which transfer or domain
specificity prevail. We might then be able to make testable
predictions. For now, however, there is a real problem of
falsifiability with regard to the explanation of "surplusage" in
terms of social relationships.
Another area of concern relates to the "audience effect." My
first problem here is with the appropriation and use of a term
already in the literature with a different meaning. For Zajonc
(1965) "audience effects" are changes in levels of performance in
various tasks consequent on the presence of an audience. Thus,
improvements in such tasks as the pursuit-rotor performance,
vigilance, multiplication, and word association occur as the
result of an audience (see Zajonc 1965). For such authors as C &
S and Marler (e.g., Marler et al. 1990), however, "audience
effects" are adjustments in the emission of communicative
signals contingent on the presence of conspecifics and sug-
gestive of intentionality. The use of the same term in these two
different contexts is unfortunate.
This leads to a somewhat deeper point. Zajonc (1965) uses
some principles from learning theory to suggest that social
influences can produce social facilitation through a nonspecific,
arousal-related mechanism. He argues that high-probability
behavioral patterns will be facilitated and low-probability pat-
terns inhibited in the presence of an audience. Both C & S and
Marler et al. consider and reject arousal as a possible explana-
tion of their "audience effects." The changes in response proba-
bilities need not be reflected in overt, physiological indices,
however, they should be apparent in changed behavioral pro-
files. I think we need some old-fashioned ethological analyses
with complete behavioral inventories to determine what behav-
ioral patterns are and especially what patterns are not changed
in the presence of an audience. Marler et al. (1990, pp. 200-01)
appear to have made a start in this direction. The case made by C
& S for referential communication is, in my judgment, a very
strong one. I think that if it can be shown definitively that there
is a clear selectivity with respect to which patterns are enhanced
and inhibited in the presence of audiences, their case can be
even stronger.
Finally, I must comment on C & S's remark about the
"uncritical mentalism of Romanes" (p. 9). From my 1990s
vantage point, I can be as critical of some aspects of Romanes's
work as can C & S. Romanes was well aware of the dangers of
anecdotes, however, as can be seen in the Preface to his Animal
intelligence (1882). However much we may regret his in-
terpretations, he was not uncritical, but concerned with impor-
tant issues and trapped by the limited database available in his
time. Romanes could be a critical thinker who was capable of
very fine science (e.g., Romanes 1874; 1885a; 1885b).
It is an exciting time in the study of animal behavior as we
return to the questions considered by Romanes with methods
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Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) argue for a hybrid approach that
"place[s] empiricist findings tentatively within the framework of
a more mentalistic approach" (p. 9). The book is important in
clarifying the value and limits of the intentional approach to
interpreting monkey behaviour, particularly C & S's excellent
field work with vervets. But, unintentionally, it also demon-
strates that cognitive science is more a perspective than a
scientific discipline. To illustrate this point, I consider the
following topics: evolution of intelligence, concept formation,
philosophy of science.
Ewolutlon of Intelligence. The starting point for most modern
theories of intelligence in primates is the assumed discrepancy
between their performance on learning tests in the laboratory
and their "greater intelligence when dealing with each other"
(p. 256; cf. social intelligence hypotheses). C & S emphasize this
discrepancy while supporting a more general version such as
Rozin's (1976) inaccessibility model of intelligence within differ-
ent domains. They characterize their approach as a practical,
functional perspective, but in the end it seems to be more a
utilitarian than an evolutionary functional approach. I would
argue that their approach to intelligence is in fact a version of the
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"sufficiency argument" first introduced by Simon (1981) in the
context of AI. The essence of this approach is that intelligent
creatures must be able to represent the important aspects of
their environments in their knowledge of the world. Within a
functioning monkey society the representational requirements
of this knowledge are probably so severe that only a few modes
of knowledge can meet them. Therefore, a demonstration that a
particular mode of intelligence can support the wide range of
representations monkeys obviously do use is powerful evidence
for that mode as the appropriate model of monkeys' intelligence.
C & S are arguing that it is because of the dominance of social
affairs that the social mode of intelligence has the required
representational power. Nevertheless, it should be stated that
the notion of intelligence is too vague to be the core of an
evolutionary approach to cognitive behaviour or cognition.
Even human intelligence is not a homogenous scientific concept
(Howe 1988). Primate intelligence can be divided into several
relatively autonomous abilities, for example, perceptual or
motor skills, communicative or social competence, foraging
knowledge, categorization or classification performance. Intel-
ligence has evolved independently in different taxonomic
groups and is neither a cognitively homogeneous nor a phy-
logenetically homologous behavioural function. Intelligent be-
haviour evolved because animals had to cope with the increasing
environmental complexity resulting from evolutionary diversifi-
cation. The increasing instability of animal/environment in-
teractions could be handled only by reducing this complexity
internally, that is, from a cognitive standpoint this can be called
the duplicate complexity hypotheses).
On this basis, the critical evolutionary pressure could be
social, but it could be any other relevant ecological factor. In the
Cercopithecidae, as opposed to birds or other primate groups, it
may have been mainly a social factor. But it seems to be of little
value to stress one factor in intelligence (e.g., social knowledge)
against others (e.g., nonsocial knowledge). Instead, we should
adopt a functional approach (Dittrich 1988; 1990), taking into
account all relevant factors, both proximate and ultimate in our
attempt to understand behavioural processes. Such a view
implies that intelligence did not evolve domain-specifically. On
the contrary, domain-specificity seems to be the result of partic-
ular adaptation processes and not their starting point. In prac-
tice, the different selection pressures tending to produce intel-
ligence are linked, so any claim that the evolution of intelligence
can be explained on the basis of a single factor is highly
implausible.
Concept formation. Surprisingly, C & S do not mention any of
the important studies on the structural basis of the putative
mentalistic processes called intelligence although it has (admit-
tedly proved extremely difficult to isolate the comparatively
simple but measurable mental processes presumed to form the
building blocks of more general knowledge). Some causal inves-
tigations have been done (cf. Baddeley 1986; Griffin 1982;
Mackintosh 1983; Weiskrantz 1985). C & S give no attention to
such key areas as vision or memory and are highly critical of
experimental laboratory tests (e.g., in the area of animal con-
cepts). The results of experiments on concept formation are
certainly controversial, but that is typical in areas under inten-
sive research. There is a strong body of positive and reliable
results highlighting different aspects of concept formation (e.g.,
Herrnstein 1985; Lea & Ryan 1990; Perrett et al, in press;
Rosch & Lloyd 1978; Smith & Medin 1981). C & S correctly
emphasize that the ecological context in these studies is some-
times missing. This is important not because ecology is en vogue
but because it is a precondition for understanding the idea of
concepts to grasp functional relations between external objects
and internal cognitions.
To understand the mind of monkeys C & S look at the
monkeys' immediate environment, but they ignore the organi-
zation of cognitive components as the basis for conceptual order.
Laboratory experiments on concept formation perhaps do the
reverse, but ecological factors are ultimately not enough to allow
us to understand the diversity of monkeys' ability to categorize
and classify (Dittrich 1988). Such cognitive factors as hypotheses
(Gregory 1980) or schemata (Lorenz 1975) are operating in
perception and memory and play an important role in goal-
achieving behaviour. The reference points of mental represen-
tations, however, are not necessarily the goals to which be-
haviour is oriented or is intended to reach (McFarland 1989).
According to the "connection principle" formulated by Searle
(1990), intention and its communication is bound to con-
sciousness, which monkeys probably lack. Thus, is the monkey's
lack of what Searle calls aspectual shape the reason why mind-
reading between monkeys will ultimately remain in the realms
of science fiction?
Philosophy of science. Different approaches to primate eth-
ology provide different perspectives and different perspectives
lead to different observations. Different does not imply better,
however. Does the utilitarian cognitive viewpoint proposed by
C & S offer a broader or more realistic perspective for observa-
tion and data collection than the more cautious classical ap-
proach? The intentional perspective may be more convenient
for describing primate behaviour, but it does not necessarily
lead to a better understanding of what is happening in the
monkey's mind. The reality of the monkey's mind or the "how to
be like a monkey" is forever inaccessible but this is not, as C & S
claim, an empirical matter, but a logical one. The achievable aim
is to understand the effects and causes of monkeys' behaviour,
including the roles played by their cognitions and the underly-
ing physiological structures. The concept of intelligence is
purely descriptive; it has not been established as a valid explana-
tory concept in scientific psychology (Howe 1988). The same
holds for the concepts of mind, belief, and intention. The
founders of ethology were acutely aware of the trap of believing
that by describing animals' behaviour they were providing
reasons for the behaviour; this is a necessary distinction, often
lost in cognitive science when we account for behaviour in such
terms as belief, desire, goal-orientation or intention. Can we
transfer traditional ethologists' wisdom to modern primatology?
Or will it turn out that human, scientific intelligence is domain-
specific?
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Ian Gordon, Michael Howe, Catriona Ryan, and
especially Stephen Lea for helpful discussions. Preparation was sup-
ported by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation through a Feodor
Lynen Fellowship held by the author.
Of monkeys, mechanisms and the modular
mind
Lee Alan Dugatkin3 and Anne Barrett Clarkb
department of Biology, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New
Brunswick, Canada EOA 3CO and bDepartment of Biology, P.O. Box
6000, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
Electronic mail: aldugatkin@mta.ca and baclark@bingvaxa.bitnet
Unquestionably, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) present us with a
fascinating, insightful picture of vervet monkey life, a picture
illuminated as much as is now possible from the vervet monkey
perspective. More important, their work offers compelling
reasons for exploring the domain-specific view of learning es-
poused by the new field of evolutionary psychology (Cosmides
1989; Cosmides & Tooby 1989). Many features of "domain
theory" remain quite vague, however, especially when applied
to animals. We explore this problem in the context of the
verve ts.
One major issue raised in C & S's book stems from the
observation that monkeys do not behave as naturalists and in
particular ignore cues based on other species' salient behaviors,
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1992) 15:1 153
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00067959
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 10:55:40, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Commentary/Cheney & Seyfarth: How monkeys see the world
cues that would presumably have enormous survival value.
Vervets do not realize that a dead gazelle in a tree signifies a
leopard in the vicinity or that a python's track indicates danger.
C & S suggest that "that type of information" does not fall under
the domain of social interaction, the most apparent and fine-
tuned domain of vervets. But with 70% mortality from preda-
tion, as C & S note, "can it really be more important, in terms of
survival, to develop a conceptual understanding of social rela-
tionships than to recognize the track of a python?" (p. 311). One
immediately wonders what selection pressures are necessary to
select for domain formation - when do we expect the evolution
of a set of specialized cognitive abilities organized to solve a very
specific kind of problem?
This is not a question about the accessibility of cognitive
processes used in another, in this case social, domain. The issue
is the absence of an autonomous "secondary predator-cues"
domain for problems that do not seem intuitively to be any more
challenging than those in the social sphere. If vervets have seen
a leopard drag kills into a tree, the monkeys need only be
capable of associating the objects dragged with the hanging body
and thus a leopard's presence. Analogs to this type of reasoning
certainly seem to exist in the vervets' domain for social interac-
tion; yet we see no evidence of learning and reasoning directed
at these situations. They are neither "accessing" the learning
abilities used in the social domain nor have they developed a
similarly specialized but no more complex "secondary predator-
cues" domain.
Perhaps we have not accurately judged the cognitive mecha-
nisms that (we imagine) animals must use to solve particular
problems. Our assessment seems to follow a two-stage process:
First, we apply our intuition based on what we believe about our
own cognitive processes as they underlie human social interac-
tions, and we infer how monkeys might carry out the similar
actions we observe; then we try to understand how the underly-
ing cognitive processes in the social realm would or would not be
sufficient to solving antipredator problems. But not only is it
possible that social cognition really is inadequate to the task of
noticing and then linking inanimate cues of a predator with its
possible presence, it is also possible that monkeys use cognitive
mechanisms in their social interactions very different from those
that humans use, mechanisms that may not be appropriate for
learning to use secondary predator cues. Finally, we may not
even have assessed correctly our own social cognitive abilities;
monkeys may have similar abilities but we are not accurately
describing theirs or ours. In essence, this calls for researchers to
step back from the question of accessibility across domains to
first examine the particular cognitive mechanism within particu-
lar domains.
These problems of inference from observed behavior to pro-
cess, from human to animal, lead to one final comment. In a
series of ingenious and arduous habituation experiments, C & S
showed that vervets treat either a starling's alarm call or an
impala's snort as if it provides information similar to their own
alarm call. Vervets do not seem to learn that an impala's snort
and a starling's alarm have the same referent, however. Their
results were unlikely to be the result of the alarm calls of the
starling and impala presenting information about different types
of predators. C & S speculate that vervets cannot use informa-
tion unless they themselves are one of the reference points.
Alternatively, we suggest that from a vervet's point of view the
starling's and impala's alarm calls provide different information
about the location of the same predator. For instance, impalas
sense by smell and are better at detecting predators hiding in
bush, whereas starlings are better at sensing danger at a some
distance. If this were the case, we might expect the wise vervet
to habituate to either call, but not to transfer habituation across
these calls.
Evolutionary psychology is a very young field and already
owes a big debt to the work presented in this fine book. We
agree with C & S who end with a discussion of domain-specifici-
ty and note: "We will make little progress in understanding the
minds of nonhuman primates until we investigate these issues
more thoroughly" (p. 312). We hope that investigation will not
be limited to primates. Such studies as these promise to re-
introduce some mechanisms and ideas about architectural con-
straints into the adaptationist realm of behavioral ecology.
Obviously, scientists interested in animals and humans should
keep very close watch on each other's progress and working
assumptions.
mentality: Canons to the right
canons to the left of them . . .
Aurelio J. Figueredo
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721
Electronic mail: ajf@rvax.ccit.arizona.edu
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book is a pleasure to read. The
second chapter alone is a review of cercopithecine social struc-
ture so concise, current, and comprehensive that it could almost
stand alone as required introductory reading for new students of
primatology. It goes beyond a description of their basic natural
history to convey a profound understanding of the social world
in which these monkeys live. By doing so, it greatly facilitates
the central mission of the rest of the monograph, which boldly
attempts to probe what it is like subjectively to be a vervet
monkey.
C & S have done an excellent job of marshalling all the
available evidence both for and against the proposition that the
observable behavior of vervet monkeys is indicative of certain
levels of cognitive information processing of which many had
previously thought nonhuman animals incapable. C & S have
cautiously walked a tightrope between two very different ap-
proaches to the attribution of animal mental abilities. Although
their degree of success in this precarious balancing act is note-
worthy, I am going to try to make some trouble by sharpening
this fine line. My intent is not to undermine their arguments,
which I find generally well-supported and convincing, but to
point out the broader implication of their work: We need to
renew the dialogue in comparative psychology about the mental
abilities of animals.
Two contrary positions have historically characterized the
various approaches to this issue. One of these is the liberal
interpretation, most often associated with Romanes (1882). This
view emphasizes the continuity between human and nonhuman
animals and does not hesitate to attribute human-like abilities to
nonhuman animals wherever convergent behavioral phe-
nomena are manifested. The other is the conservative in-
terpretation, which emphasizes the principle of scientific par-
simony in attributing mental abilities to animals. In comparative
psychology, this principle is known as "Lloyd Morgan's Canon";
Lloyd Morgan (1894) proposed that we should attribute the
behavior of an animals to no higher, or more complex, a level of
mental ability than is strictly necessary to account for that
particular behavior.
Methodologically, C & S appear to adhere to the latter, more
conservative, point of view. They painstakingly show that it is
indeed strictly necessary to attribute certain levels of cognitive
processing to vervets to satisfactorily account for their observed
behavior. Their field and laboratory experiments are routinely
designed to address systematically any alternative hypothesis
that the results might somehow be attributable to lower levels of
cognitive processing. Although no single experiment is ever
perfect, the cumulative corpus of C & S's work is compelling in
this regard. Because I am certain that a disproportionate amount
of the peer commentary will be on these methodological issues,
I dispense with any more detailed critique and move on to my
central point. It is when C & S are through laboriously demon-
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strating the need to attribute these mental abilities to vervets,
and thus feel free to speculate on their adaptive functions, that a
totally different point of view emerges. This is a more interest-
ing perspective, differing from both the liberal and conservative
positions, and thus merits more detailed consideration. In
speculating on the evolution of these mental abilities, C & S do
not typically ask what level is minimal to perform any given
adaptive function, but what level is optimal.
For example, in considering the vervets' internal representa-
tion of social dominance, two different alternatives are present-
ed. One of these is the "brute force" level of information
processing, in which an individual is required to observe and
remember the interactions between every troop member and
every other to determine their social status relative to each
other. The other is the ability to perform what is called "tran-
sitive inference" and thus to compute the relative status of every
troop member with respect to every other with much more
limited information. [See Bernstein: "Dominance" BBS 4(3)
1981.] Thus, if subjects observe that, in rank, A > B and B > C,
they are not required either to observe directly or to remember
explicitly that, therefore, A > C. In a large enough troop, this
can be a tremendous savings in the costs of both initial learning
and memory storage. C & S report that even trained human
observers who have been there for some time have yet to
observe interactions between every troop member and every
other. If any individual monkey's internal representations of his
natural social structure were either so chronically deficient or so
late in full development, he would be at a grave social disadvan-
tage compared to monkeys capable of transitive inference and
thus the more rapid development of social competence. There is
no question that, given the requisite genetic variability, rapid
natural selection would rapidly competitively exclude the
"brute force" cognitive strategy (even without taking into ac-
count the unknown neuronal "hardware" requirements of such
extensive memory storage).
Thus, we go beyond the stark empirical question of what
mental abilities nonhuman animals either possess or lack to the
question of what mental abilities they need. What is implicit in
this argument is a theory of optimal cognitive strategy (OCS)
based on the adaptive cost-effectiveness of information process-
ing algorithms rather than of overt behaviors. I wish I could go
on to expound on the properties of such a theory, but that will
have to wait until we have one. The only thing I can suggest is
that C & S might apply this type of reasoning to their finding that
many vervet mental abilities are so domain-specific. C & S seem
to imply that it would much behoove the vervets to apply their
intellectual talents to behavior in the antipredator domain, for
instance, recognizing the characteristic tracks of pythons. This
skill seems to be well within their mental abilities in the social
domain, but is found curiously lacking. What I suspect is that if
an OCS perspective can be invoked to explain the abilities that
they manifestly do have, perhaps it. can also explain the abilities
that they manifestly do not have. Assuming that the basic design
of the vervet mind permits adequate python-tracking abilities,
is it just an historical accident that no python-tracking vervet
mutations ever occurred? If not, why is python-tracking not
naturally selected in vervets? Analogically, why don't monkeys
have a "theory of mind?" How this type of question is answered
may have substantial implications for how we think about the
evolution of animal cognition.
Theory of society, yes, theory of mindf no
Hans G. Furth
Catholic University of America, life Cycle Institute, Washington, DC 20064
Starting with the discovery of well-developed logical thinking in
children who were profoundly deaf and consequently ignorant
of a societal language (Furth 1966), I have been using Piaget's
developmental theory as a fruitful framework for research for
more than three decades and have expanded it into such new
areas as Freudian dynamics (Furth 1987; 1992a) and social-
societal construction (Furth 1992b; Furth & Kane 1992) in
children. It has long been clear to me that a genuine grasp of
what Piaget calls sensorimotor know-how is critical for an under-
standing of his entire theory. This is not surprising because in
human development the sensorimotor is the transition from
biological to object-symbolic knowledge; in contrast to the
preceding and subsequent stages, it is itself aptly described as
action knowledge. [See also Chevalier-Skolnikoff "Spontaneous
Tool Use and Sensorimotor Intelligence in Cebus Compared
with Other Monkeys and Apes" BBS 12(3) 1989.]
Even before I was asked to make some constructive com-
ments on Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S), I had directed students to
analyze the wealth of observations on the social life of vervet
monkeys collected in this volume, to help us gain a better
understanding of the scope, the richness, and the relative
openness and flexibility characteristic of sensorimotor know-
how. In this respect this book is a veritable treasure chest of
carefully controlled and judiciously selected descriptions con-
cerning the social action of vervet monkeys. It is sure to become
an inexhaustible and lasting contribution to an evolutionarily
valid science of psychology.
I now turn from the core to the theoretical framework in
which C & S saw fit to present their research. I begin with the
title, How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another
species. There is no problem with the subtitle insofar as mind (or
mental) is here used as equivalent to the word psychology (or
psychological). But the main title is something else. It prejudges
a case that should be scientifically explored rather than simply
asserted. In the ordinary sentence, "I see the point," seeing
does not refer to visual perception but to a theoretical position-
ing vis-a-vis a known object. To "see" the.world therefore
presupposes not merely that there is a world within which the
species acts, but that the "world" is approached as an object,
separate from the simple knowledge of how to act in the world.
Perhaps these monkeys do not "see the world" at all, in this
sense. This distinction - frequently dismissed as hairsplitting
with no objective basis - is nevertheless merely a more explicit
way of saying what C & S themselves repeatedly assert as a
conclusion to their inquiry: Vervet monkeys do not know that
they know, or, they know but the knowledge is not accessible to
them. Now, what is knowledge that is inaccessible or unknown
yet individually developed with respect to how to relate and act
in the species world? It is nothing else but sensorimotor know-
how. From inside the sensorimotor psychology (mind) of an
animal with this knowledge it is literally meaningless to ask how
the world is seen. Sensorimotor know-how is in the action of the
species, it is not an object in the mind of the species.
No doubt these theoretical comments can never attain the
persuasiveness of empirical evidence, but they carry a logical
conviction once the overriding theoretical framework is spelled
out. Nor would my criticism be valid if it were just a question of
Piaget's theory - and my interest here is not at all Piaget's theory
itself but the observations and their adequate interpretations.
My claim is that C & S, following the current cognitivist
tradition, have an inadequate, largely implicit theory of knowl-
edge that leads not only to logical inconsistencies (as pointed out
above), but to anthropocentric (or, more precisely, adult-
human-centric) perspectives that seem quite alien to the evolu-
tionary-ethological stance that generated the core contributions
in the first place.
A preliminary point is the surprising inclusion — primarily to
clarify or reinforce some cognitive argument - of a great variety
of other species of monkeys, and also of apes, humans, and
birds. Where I would have expected a taken-for-granted em-
phasis on species-specific adaptations, there is throughout the
book the insinuation that more - in the sense of more similar to
humans - is somehow better. Besides, is it legitimate to refer
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globally to the psychology of monkeys and apes when the
genetic difference between vervet monkeys and chimpanzees is
probably much greater than between the later and humans? I
found it intriguing that vervets, who are keenly attentive to
sounds and vocal signals, failed to be aroused by the sight of a
dummy leopard or to infer the nearby presence of a real leopard
from the sight of a freshly caught carcass (p. 284). I am not at all
convinced that such a genetic selective inattention needs any
more evolutionary justification than the genetic predisposition
to selective sensory attention. C & S are prone to speculate on
evolutionary possibilities and benefits - and in many instances
they unfortunately consider only the hypothetical benefits (not
the cost) of a more human-like competence. I would have
thought that this human-centered way of doing comparative
psychobiology had gone out of fashion a long time ago.
Why should C & S (who must surely know better than I the
fallacy of anthropocentrism) appear to give the impression of this
bias? I would blame the aforementioned cognitivist approach for
this direction. Cognition seems to be taken out of its species
context and treated as so many interchangeable and opera-
tionally defined specific mechanisms. Again and again C & S ask
about the exact mechanisms that mediate a particular know-
how. They imply that only a series of crucial experiments,
preferably in a lab setting, could lead to a definite answer and
thereby raise the truth value of heretofore anecdotal observa-
tions to a proper scientific status. Female vervets A, B, C have a
decreasing rank order within the group. As B and C groom each
other, the dominant A approaches. It is observed (p. 82) that of
the two females who are approached, the lower ranking C is
more likely to yield than B. Several mechanisms of understand-
ing dominance hierarchies are then proposed, including a pos-
sible grasp of conceptual transitivity.
Here and in a great number of other instances that document
reliable and psychologically fascinating social interactions, the
readers are alerted to the supposed need for scientific rigor and
the hope of some definite answers. The penultimate substantive
chapter, in fact, the longest of the book, on attributing mental
states to others, is indeed the high point of this entire cognitive
preoccupation. I have only two things to say about it. First, in
spite of an impressive series of experiments, there is not a single
exact answer concerning the precise cognitive mechanism in-
volved in any particular know-how. This is hardly surprising
considering that we could not possibly get an adequate answer
in connection with any ordinary human know-how. More perti-
nent for the gist of my comments, however, is the fundamental
question: Why would animal psychologists adopt a theory-of-
mind framework?
Unless you take an anthropocentric stance, you would never
choose the cognitive mind as an evolutionarily significant goal.
Moreover, you are in danger of limiting your perspective to the
middle class Western ideology of the past three or four hundred
years that emphasizes the role of the ego, the self and its mental
state. As C & S so well document, knowledge in the animals
under discussion is oriented toward the construction and main-
tenance of social interactions and in each individual case begins
with a period of social dependency and attachment. This fact
alone shows that sensorimotor development can be found only
within a social context and is by evolution functionally oriented
toward the social dimension.
Where C & S describe the vervets' vocalizations they have the
brilliant idea to go beyond the usually observed alarm calls - in
the service of defense - and turn to vocal communication within
a positive social context (pp. 114-28). Their analysis reveals a
number of astounding language-like features, at least if you
initially assumed some mechanistic, associative signal-action
connection. Here again is the focus on the richness and flexibil-
ity of sensorimotor know-how that I consider the major scientific
contribution of the C & S's research.
I would like to suggest a similar turn from the largely defen-
sive theory-of-mind posture - usually observed in active or
passive deception experiments - to the positive interactions
that ground a species's social cohesion. On this issue Premack
(1988a) documented that humans make attributions by the time
they are four years old, whereas chimpanzees' attributions even
in a limited respect are questionable. C & S (pp. 252-55) agree
that vervets show no evidence of mental attribution, but in the
case of apes they speculate on the evolutionary connection
between this cognitive competence and social cohesion. They
mention briefly (p. 224) the absence of active pedagogy in
nonhuman species and its presence in human children. To this
can be added the significant fact that in humans successful
learning is done in the mutuality of mental recognition and
approval. We can conclude that monkeys, apes, and humans all
have a theory of society (either sensorimotor or mental) that, in
contrast to a theory of mind, is indeed a major evolutionary
feature. The entire book amply attests to the fruitfulness of
treating knowledge in relation to the social cohesion it serves.
In short, it would seem to me to be more adequate for a
biologically grounded comparative perspective to accept spe-
cies differences in social-societal relations and ask questions
about cognitive mechanisms as a function of these differences.
This would avoid focusing on some particular cognitive compe-
tence (as was done in parts of the present research endeavor)
that may turn out to be a derivative specific to human societies
and therefore unsuitable to guide a meaningful inquiry into
subhuman cognition.
Social and nonsocial intelligence in
orangutans
Birute Galdikas
Department of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British
Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada
Primatologists have long debated the relative importance of
ecological variables versus social variables as selective mecha-
nisms favoring the rise of primate intelligence. Cheney &
Seyfarth's (C & S's) book can be seen as a treatise arguing for the
primacy of the latter. In Chapter 9, entitled "Social and Non-
social Intelligence," C & S argue that many of the problem-
solving skills vervets demonstrate in a social context are domain
specific and nontransferable to ecological contexts. Conse-
quently, C & S contend that the vervet mind, and by extension
the monkey mind, is equipped to solve social problems far
better than analogous ecological problems. By contrast, C & S
argue, many nonprimate animals excel at solving problems that
relate to feeding ecology, yet comparable social skills for such
animals have not been reported. As Harcourt (1988, p. 151)
notes, the lack of data pertaining to the social lives of nonprimate
mammals must surely stem from the fact that
Many primatologists have sociological and ethological training and
are, therefore, ready to recognize and note complexities of social
interaction. However, non-primatological mammalogists are far
more often ecologists, and neither they nor their studies are designed
to analyze social behavior.
Therefore, adopting a dichotomous, domain-specific view of
primate versus nonprimate intelligence should be cautioned
against, at present.
The dichotomy between social and ecological variables as
they relate to intelligence may be more convenient than real;
both played a role in shaping the emerging primate mind. On
this count it is illuminating that Jolly (1979), who was the first
to articulate the social intelligence hypothesis, states, "Are not
two or three good reasons for evolving a trait better than
one? . . . why must we choose either/or?"
The primate on which my own research focuses, the orangu-
tan, is an excellent case in point that the social intelligence
hypothesis and the ecological intelligence hypothesis are not
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mutually exclusive. Orangutans exhibit higher order intel-
ligence in their ability to store, process, and recall information
pertaining to the location and phenological cycle of food sources.
Moreover, they demonstrate complex sensorimotor Intel-
ligence when handling food during extractive foraging. Given
the difficult problems orangutans face In feeding themselves,
ample room exists for ecological selection pressures to favor
their intelligence. Because of the orangutan's enigmatic status
as least social ape, orangutan intelligence has always been
regarded as problematic in the context of the social intelligence
hypothesis. Nevertheless, orangutans do not live in a social
vacuum and evidence exists that they possess a "Machiavellian
social intelligence" (Byrne & Whiten 1988). [See also Whiten &
Byrne: "Tactical Deception in Primates" BBS 11(2) 1988.] Like
C & S's vervets, orangutans appear capable of recognizing other
Individuals, their own personal relationships, and the rela-
tionship of others, and they put this social knowledge to use
during acts of coalition and deception (Galdlkas & Vasey, In
press). Hence, even among the relatively asocial orangutans,
social factors probably play an important role in shaping orangu-
tan Intelligence. In their attempt to assess the nonsocial intel-
ligence of vervets, C & S examine the ability of these monkeys to
infer relationships between auditory and visual cues associated
with various sympatric species. Given that numerous species
demonstrate impressive nonsocial "intelligence" when faced
with feeding problems, it may have been appropriate for C & S
to examine the vervet's ability to Infer nonsocial relationships
pertaining to feeding ecology. I suspect that had such a meth-
odology been followed, the vervet's performance In experi-
ments testing for nonsocial Intelligence would have been much
better. For example, recent work by Menzel (1991) demon-
strates that Japanese macaques have detailed knowledge and
"Inferencing" abilities that are frequently exercised in nonsocial
feeding contexts.
These concerns aside, C & S have written one of the most
exciting and Informative books I have seen in a long time. The
breadth of Information and Issues dealt with are truly im-
pressive. What remains exceptional about How monkeys see the
world Is C & S's ability to make hypotheses about the primate
mind explicit and operational in an experimental context. This
book will long be cited as a successful Investigation Inside the
mind of another species. The young field of cognitive ethology
owes many thanks to the authors.
Perception theorf and the attribution of
mental states
Philip A. Glotzbach
Department of Philosophy, Denison University, Granville, OH 43023
Electronic mail: glotzbach@denison.bitnet
Radical behaviorism and indeterminacy of translation argu-
ments (themselves directly inspired by behaviorism - cf.
Quine, 1960) long ago forced psychologists and philosophers to
reevaluate the principles that guide investigations of human and
animal mentality. Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) careful and
illuminating study of vervet monkeys provides yet another
occasion to consider the conceptual basis of mental state attribu-
tions - whether to members of other species or our own. How is
it possible to write with confidence about the mental world of
another species when questions have been raised about whether
(and, if so, how) we can know very much about even the
meanings human speakers attach to their words?
One powerful justification for appealing to mental states is the
argument that they are required to explain observed behavior.l
C & S claim the intentional ground for their primates this way by
contending that monkeys need to represent both social relations
and "meaning In vocal communication" to predict the behavior
of their fellow critters and to use vital information about the
environment (e.g., the location of a predator) that other
monkeys' vocalizations make available. Naturally, C & S use
similar arguments to claim the same ground for themselves,
maintaining that they too are able to predict and explain the
observed primate behavior effectively only If they are permitted
to move beyond (e.g., Quine's) 1960 behaviorist strictures and
make cognitlvist attributions of mental activity to the primates.2
These considerations are compelling, but C & S's case could be
further enhanced, and other conceptual tools would be made
available to them, If it were possible to link their ethological
analysis more directly with other appropriate domains of psy-
chological explanation - specifically to perception theory.
Much of C & S's study deals with what vervet monkeys know
(or believe) about their environment and each other based on
available perceptual Information. They make it clear that these
animals need to recognize and react appropriately to an extraor-
dinary range of environmental and social properties. These
include kin (they are adept at recognizing their own close
relations, as well as those In the matrilines of others in their
group), predators, potential mates, food, places affording safety
from predators, and limits to their own group's territory as well
as those of different groups. In addition, they need to recognize
the meaning of a wide range of vervet behaviors signalling
aggression, appeasement, dominance relations (in both their
own groups and, possibly, in others), requests to form tempo-
rary alliances with one monkey against another, willingness to
groom or be groomed, willingness to mate, and so forth. Pre-
sumably, therefore, it should be possible to establish links
between psychological accounts of perception and the kind of
ethological investigation under consideration. This would en-
able us to understand better both the monkeys' perceptual
abilities and the use they make of them. Not all perception
theories prove of equal value to this project, however. C & S's
ethological approach does not fit easily with standard cognitivist
or computational accounts of perception. Instead, their research
is much more compatible with the more controversial ecological
approach to perception developed by Gibson et al. (cf., e.g.,
Gibson 1979; Glotzbach & Heft 1982; Reed 1988).
Standard perceptual theories tend to define the perceptual
project in terms of inferences or hypotheses that the perceiver
must construct on the basis of (typically) ambiguous or at least
Incomplete sensory input (for an example, see Fodor &
Pylyshyn 1981; Glotzbach, in press). Moreover, traditional
theories tend to define the objects perceived (I.e., the "distal"
environmental objects) in terms of their physical properties
without any particular reference to the perceiving animal. But
none of this has much to do with the task of the field ethologist.
The latter needs to determine what environmental features
inform the animals of the various functional properties of objects
In the animals' eco-nlche, and these functional properties need
to be defined in terms relative to the animals themselves and
their specific needs.
The ecological account of perception attempts to do precisely
this. It begins not with a description of physical stimuli occur-
ring at the sensory receptors but with a description of the
environment in functional terms relevant to a perceiver. Such a
description uses size and time scales which pertain to the
perceiver's body size and activity rates, and it highlights rela-
tional properties relevant to the perceiver's ongoing projects.
Such relational properties cannot be defined either as purely
objective, physical properties of the environment or as entirely
subjective properties of the animal considered in Isolation from
its surroundings. For example, a tree branch at a certain height
off the ground may afford grasping to an adult vervet, but not to a
young infant. Conversely, that same branch might afford run-
ning under (without ducking) for the infant, but not for the
adult. Animals (and humans) routinely perceive such relational
environmental properties, but such properties cannot be de-
fined without reference to perceivers and their intended ac-
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tions. Proponents of the ecological approach have attempted to
extend this analysis to describe perceptible cultural3 and social
afiPordances as well. The latter are features of the social environ-
ment which (properly socialized) individuals can perceive as
enabling or affording certain kinds of social actions. McArthur
and Baron (1983) discuss research that indicates the existence of
invariant, detectable stimulus information enabling observers
to perceive many different kinds of social interactions, events,
and such complex relational structures as "kinship, friendship,
and status differentials" (p. 223), as well as emotions and causal
relations in interpersonal interactions. Much of the perceptual
activity described in How monkeys see the world fits neatly with
these concerns, and such ethologists as C & S could only benefit
from availing themselves of the conceptual tools the ecological
approach to perception makes available.
Methodological comparisons between the ethological and
ecological projects can be drawn as well. C & S point out
important differences between what can be learned about ani-
mal mental processes from studies conducted in the wild and
those restricted to laboratory settings. This is not to deny the
utility of the latter investigations, but C & S emphasize the need
to insure "ecological validity in laboratory experiments" (p. 11),
a demand that can be met only by attending closely to species-
specific relations between animals and their natural environ-
ments. Such methodological concerns also characterize the
ecological approach to perception. Its proponents have worked
to identify stimulus variables that have functional relevance to
perceiving subjects as opposed to focusing on the abstract and
often functionally irrelevant perceptual tasks that have been so
frequently investigated in the perception lab.
Let me conclude by returning to my initial question about the
evidence for attributing mental states. I have argued elsewhere
(Glotzbach 1983) that Quine's referential inscrutability and
indeterminacy of meaning theses are rooted in the overly
restrictive account of perception built into his concept of stim-
ulus meaning. A theory of language beginning with a more
adequate account of perception — as represented by the ecologi-
cal approach, an account that explains how perception places us
in contact with determinate environmental objects - might offer
a greater prospect for determining just what perceivers use their
language to talk about. This remains to be shown in detail, but it
is reasonable to make a similar conjecture here with regard to
the ethological project. If we want to know what is on an animal's
mind, we would do well to begin with a rich analysis of the
environmental objects and features it perceives. Cheney &
Seyfarth make extensive use of just such a methodological
principle. The ecological approach to perception provides the
conceptual foundation needed to justify that principle.
NOTES
1. Fodor (1981) aptly writes: "The strongest argument against behav-
iorism is that psychology has not turned out this way; the opposite has
happened. As psychology has matured, the framework of mental states
and processes that is apparently needed to account for experimental
observations has grown all the more elaborate" (p. 115).
2. (Cf. pp. 178ff.) As C & S realize, this position has been explored
and defended at length by Dennett (1978; 1987) and explicitly with
regard to their own research in Dennett (1983).
3. For an example of a cultural affordance, consider a recognizable
metal container of a certain characteristic size, shape, color(s) and
location which affords mailing a letter (Heft 1989). Cultural afFordances
are obviously not relevant to the ethological project under discussion.
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in this possible monkey worlds?
Harold Gouzoules
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In How monkeys see the world, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) have
made significant advances toward answering the question of
what life is like for a monkey. They bravely go where philoso-
phers have feared to tread (or echolocate), undertaking the
journey with remarkable insight and sobriety. As guides on this
tour of the monkey mind, C & S recognize and alert us to
virtually every philosophical and logistical pitfall that one might
encounter in such an endeavor, and they are keenly aware of the
limitations of particular methodologies and various lines of
evidence. The conclusions drawn from their evolutionary per-
spective will be eminently satisfying to many, I suspect;
monkeys are superb social strategists (their intelligence having
evolved in response to social problems) but they lack cognizance
of these skills and cannot apply them, to any appreciable extent,
outside this narrow domain.
In the spirit of BBS commentary, I play devil's advocate and
suggest that some of the studies discussed by C & S may
overestimate the social skills of monkeys, whereas others may
underestimate their general intelligence. This suspicion is
based on concerns about the interpretation of insufficient and
mixed evidence. As C & S note (p. 60), to date, too few
experiments provide precisely the kinds of evidence needed for
a valid assessment of, for example, monkeys' ability to attribute
mental states to others. In addition, too few species have been
investigated, and the likelihood of major differences, in particu-
lar cognitive abilities among species is great, given what we
know about interspecific variation in (micro)social systems and
the ecological conditions under which evolution has taken place.
The elusiwe "perfect" experiment Rarely will hard-won data
from even the most clever field experiments be sufficient for us
to be confident about what monkeys know and how they use that
information. Consider the issue of reciprocity. As C & S point
out (p. 43), reciprocal altruism is highly relevant to work on
social intelligence because its evolution will, in cases, be depen-
dent on complex mental operations, including individual recog-
nition, memory, the calculation of costs and benefits for differ-
ent interactions, and the ability to detect cheaters. Very few well-
documented cases of animal reciprocity have been reported -
presumably because the necessary cognitive underpinnings for
its evolution are absent in most species — and its occurrence in
monkeys would argue for a complex social intelligence. No
study of monkeys has actually demonstrated a critical compo-
nent of reciprocity, however: that the animals are sensitive to
the costs and benefits of assisting unrelated individuals. Data
revealing that cooperative behavior between two animals has a
direct and causal influence on future interactions have not been
presented. C & S have come closest to doing so. They played
one individual's threat grunts (calls given when vervets threaten
or chase one another) to an unrelated animal under two condi-
tions: after the two had groomed within the past 30 to 90 minutes
and after a period when the same two had not groomed in at least
two hours. Subjects looked to the speaker significantly longer
when grooming had occurred than in its absence, leading C & S
to speculate that "when a vervet monkey hears another calling
for support, her decision to attend . . . is affected by . . . What
has she done for me lately?" (pp. 68-69). A missing control
condition - that any recent interaction, even a fight, might
influence the tendency to attend to the call - is needed before
the more cognitively complex interpretation can be entertained.
C & S underscore the difficulty of inferring mental states from
behavior elicited from playback experiments, but sometimes an-
swers to even less daring questions about animal behavior are
elusive. Clearly, the logistical problems of conducting playback
experiments with adequate controls in the field are many, for
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example, dwindling populations, problems of habituation (and the
number of studies described in the book that make use of the
technique is testament to C & S's patience and persistence); but
often, then, the kinds of data needed to address what the animal
knows, and how it uses that information, will be difficult to obtain.
I am all too familiar with this problem, encountering it as I have
in my efforts to interpret the agonistic screams of macaques.
"The"'monkeymind. Most of the data discussed by C & S come
from vervets, the monkeys that they have studied intensively
and know best. How are differences in social systems and
physical environments among Old World monkeys reflected in
how the various species view their worlds? Some of the five
features of vervet monkey social organization described in
Chapter 2 no doubt characterize (to some degree) other species,
but how have differences (subtle or profound), where they exist,
influenced cognitive evolution? Smuts (1985), for example,
reports that male and female baboons form "friendships" that
increase the male's reproductive access to those females. Ver-
vets do not exhibit long-term friendships between males and
females. Studies by both Takahata (1982) and Enomoto (1978)
indicate that Japanese macaques do, but these relations de-
crease the chance that mating will occur between the animals
involved. We lack the data necessary to assess how such dif-
ferences might be significant to the evolution of monkey cog-
nitive abilities, but such variation should make us cautious about
generalizing about monkey minds.
Finally, of the many studies and observations reported in this
book, the most perplexing for me concern the apparent failure of
the Amboseli vervets to respond to cues that (as C & S point out)
they logically should attend to, such as the secondary visual cue
of a carcass in a tree that signals a leopard's proximity. Some
might view this as a dreadful failure of natural selection (or of
adaptationist hypotheses). The vervets do seem to be sensitive
to secondary auditory cues (e.g., cow bells), and C & S speculate
about how this difference might relate to contrasts in the ways
vervets use visual and auditory signals in their social interactions
(the latter signals having referential properties). One might ask
why, in the face of clear selective advantages to being sensitive
to secondary visual cues, the ability has not evolved - presum-
ably proficiency in one domain (auditory processing) does not
preclude it in another. But then it is never very productive to
speculate about why some trait or ability did not evolve. On the
other hand, maybe the vervets are better with secondary visual
cues than present tests reveal. C & S (p. 169) describe how
vervets attacked by feral dogs on the Cameroon savanna re-
spond with alarm calls and run to the trees, as they do for
leopards. Elsewhere, the vervets are hunted by armed men who
track the monkeys with dogs. Here the vervets flee silently into
dense brush where the hunters cannot follow. In the latter case,
the dogs would appear to be a useful, secondary visual cue to the
approach of hunters.
Cheney & Seyfarth have provided us with a carefully crafted
and unified theory of the monkey mind. I am certain they would
agree with the suggestion that much additional data will be
needed before the final chapter is written on how monkeys see
the world.
How autistics see the world
Francesca Happe and Ulta Frith
Medical Research Council Cognitive Development Unit, London WC1H
OAH, England
Electronic mail: u.frith@ucl.ac.uk
In their stimulating discussion of monkey communication and
socialisation, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) mention autism as an
example of the dissociation possible between social and non-
social intelligence (p. 270). We would like to suggest that autism
is also an important example for many of the other points raised
in this excellent book. Although the authors suggest a parallel
between vervet and normal human infant communication (p.
173), an even more informative analogy can be made with the
abilities and handicaps of people with autism. These individuals
suffer from a circumscribed brain abnormality (from a variety of
biological causes) that affects development from birth. The basis
of their handicap is a specific cognitive disorder that results in
the absence of theory of mind. This in turn leads to specific
impairments in imagination, socialisation, and communication
(Frith 1989). We raise only a few points here that arise from our
explanation of the three core features of autism and relate to
issues in primate research.
Pretence. One area where monkeys are more like autistic
children than like normal infants, or Down syndrome children,
is pretence. C & S conclude that there is little good evidence of
pretence in monkeys. Autistic people - unlike normal two-year-
olds - also fail to show pretend play (Wulff 1985). It was this
observation that was crucial in suggesting that autistic people
might also lack a theory of mind, because both require the
ability to represent mental states (Leslie 1987).
Socialisation. The hypothesis that autistic people - like C &
S's vervets - lack a theory of mind, can account well for the core
handicaps of autism. Like monkeys, however, autistic people
are capable of social skills that do not involve a theory of mind.
So, for example, autistic children can use sabotage (manipula-
tion of behavior) to achieve a desired end, although they cannot
use deception (manipulation of beliefs, Russell et al. 1991;
Sodian & Frith, in press). Primates, too, probably manipulate
behaviour rather than mental states. Sabotage is seen, for
example, in the bonobos who removed the means of escape from
the moat to leave individuals below stranded (p. 211). Such
behaviour seems to indicate an understanding of goal-directed-
ness, and a parallel, rudimentary understanding of desires as
drives seems to be present in autism (Baron-Cohen 1991a; Tan
& Harris 1990). Autistic people can also understand and manip-
ulate seeing (Hobson 1984; Leslie & Frith 1988) in much the
same way a monkey or ape may be able to conceal information,
for example, by hiding from dominant males behind a rock
before grooming a subordinate male (p. 191).
Communication. C & S make a distinction between "calls that
provide information only about the signaller's emotional state or
subsequent behaviour . . . and calls that denote a specific ex-
ternal referent" (p. 104). This is clearly a useful distinction when
the signaller's intention to signal is in question, but it may be
that the distinction becomes less useful when dealing with
deliberate communication - such as the vervets' vocalisations.
Here a distinction between internal (as cognitively simple) and
external (as more complex) referents could be -misleading. Con-
fusion could arise because the two categories above overlap with
two very different categories that have been found to be useful
in looking at the quality of autistic communication.
Expressive versus instrumental communication. In autistic
people it has been fruitful to examine whether the gestures and
speech produced are protodeclarative or protoimperative. Pro-
todeclarative gestures indicate an external referent to communi-
cate something about the signaller's internal state ("Look at that
bird; I'm interested in it!"). Protoimperatives, on the other
hand, indicate an external referent to achieve a behavioural end
("Look at that bird; give it to me!"). The cognitive and social
sophistication underlying these two categories, however, is
precisely the reverse of that ascribed to C & S's classes -
protodeclaratives are more advanced because they require a
theory of mind. Not surprisingly, then, protoimperative point-
ing is understood and used by autistic children, but pro-
todeclarative pointing is not (Baron-Cohen 1989b). Similarly,
autistic children use instrumental gestures but not expressive
gestures (Attwood et al. 1988).
Ostensive versus coded communication. The protodeclarative/
protoimperative distinction is also related to the distinction
between ostensive-inferential communication and coded com-
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munication (Sperber & Wilson 1986; see also multiple book
review of "Relevance" BBS 10(4) 1987). Ostention is behaviour
that alerts others to and makes clear the actor's intention to
convey some piece of information. We would predict that
neither the autistic person nor the monkey would be capable of
ostensive-inferential communication - because neither has a
theory of mind capable of systematically representing and ma-
nipulating intentions. On the other hand, communication in
autistics and monkeys can still be achieved by means of coded
communication. Unfortunately, coded communication is rela-
tively inflexible, because signals have a set meaning that is not
dependent on contextual factors or the signaller's intention. In
autism, the single-word instrumental speech and echolalia com-
monly seen (Paul 1987) may be a form of coded communication
(i.e., "apple" always means, "Give me apple!").
No!" In monkeys the availability of coded communication and
the lack of ostensive-inferential communication may explain the
absence of an equivalent for the word "No!" in vervet vocalisa-
tions (p. 226). Humans use the word "no" in a flexible way; its
precise meaning varies with context, because we understand
this "vocalisation" in terms of a speaker's intention rather than
as a code. Such flexible "loose usage" would seem to be impossi-
ble without an understanding of mental states (Happe 1991). It
is not yet known how flexibly autistic people use this term, but
we would predict that they use "No!" as a code with a set
meaning (such as "Go away!").
Pedagogy. The presence of ostensive behaviour would greatly
increase the likelihood of pedagogy. Unless individuals pay
attention preferentially to ostensive versus nonostensive be-
haviour the opportunity for teaching is severely restricted.
Ostention should receive preferential attention because it car-
ries a guarantee of relevance (see Sperber & Wilson 1986).
Social and nonsocial intelligence. C & S claim that "a crucial
distinction between humans and other primates may be that
humans are better able to generalise, or extend, skills used in
social interactions to nonsocial domains" (p. 262). It seems a
plausible and exciting possibility that awareness of mental rep-
resentations preceded and provoked the use of other represen-
tations, such as notational systems, in evolution. Within the
individual and on the developmental time-scale, however,
there seems to be relatively little proof of generalisation of social
skills to nonsocial domains. In normal children, for example,
social skills are relatively independent of other abilities (Nunez
& Riviere 1990). Similarly, there are autistic people who have an
above average IQ despite their handicaps in imagination, so-
cialisation and communication (Gillberg 1991). In contrast,
some high-functioning autistic people may be able to use their
nonsocial intelligence to unravel the mysteries of social situa-
tions. These people seem able to solve social problems only by
using their general intellectual capacities, or perhaps by revers-
ing the evolutionary story and using such nonmental represen-
tations as pictures as a model for understanding mental states.
Close connections between social and nonsocial intelligence in
humans may therefore be a feature of abnormal rather than
normal development.
We would like to suggest that some light might be thrown on
the question of why social and nonsocial intelligence are so
distinct in primates by studying their understanding of such
nonmental representations as maps and photographs. The un-
derstanding of nonmental representations may tell us whether
monkeys are more like young (pre-theory-of-mind) normals or
more like autistic individuals. While autistic children seem to
understand the representational nature of photographs
(Leekam & Perner, in press; Leslie & Thaiss, in press), normal
3-year-olds do not understand "false" photographs (Zaitchik
1990) and have difficulty using a model as a map (DeLoache
1987). If primates can understand the representational nature of
maps, models, and photographs, could they perhaps be taught
to use such nonmental representations as models for under-
standing their own thoughts?
"How
monkeys?
see the world." Why
A. H. Harcourt
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616
Electronic mail: ahharcourt@ucdavis.edu
"This very richness of information [on wild animals solving
complex problems] makes it all the more challenging to specify
how animals and humans differ," Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S)
write. "As we hope to demonstrate, the social behavior of
nonhuman primates offers a glimpse of almost-minds at work"
(p. 4). C & S have jumped from using the cognitive abilities of all
animals to tell us something about our own cognition to using
just primates. Why is this a book about the cognitive abilities of
only monkeys (and apes) and not about those of all animals? One
answer is that monkeys are what C & S have so preeminently
studied. But they review others' work, and their aim is to
understand animals' minds, not just monkeys' minds. More
specifically, C & S's interest is in the possible adaptive advan-
tage of higher cognitive abilities, which means studying how
animals use their minds in the natural environment. In the
discipline of animal cognition, this is a huge step, but a vital one
if we are to understand the evolution of the human mind. Most
animal psychology is done in the sterile physical and social
environment of solitary testing in the lab. No wonder it has told
us so little about the evolutionary functions of mental abilities.
So why concentrate on monkeys' minds? The answer lies in part
in the long-standing assumption that primates are both more
intelligent and more complex socially than nonprimates, and
that the two attributes are functionally connected: Intelligence
allows complexity, and survival in a complex social environment
selects for intelligence.
Just how obvious is it, though, that primates are more socially
complex, more socially intelligent than nonprimates? Some
years ago I was asked to write a chapter for a book on social
intelligence in primates, using data from my studies of wild
gorillas. I replied that if I were to be totally objective, I could not
see that gorillas were doing anything much more sophisticated
than a sheep could accomplish. That was only a slight exaggera-
tion, and it led me to ask what, if anything, did in fact distinguish
primate from nonprimate levels of social intelligence.
Agreeing with others before me that social interactions in-
volving three animals were probably more complex than those
that involved two, I went to the literature on coalitions and
alliances in contests. Do primates, I asked, use cooperation in
competition differently from the way nonprimates do? The
literature indicated that they might (this sentence is phrased
very deliberately). In both primate and nonprimate societies,
cooperation in contests temporarily and sometimes perma-
nently improves the helpers' or the recipients' competitive
ability; in both, individuals apparently make use of information
about the relative competitive ability of contestants by preferen-
tially joining contests on behalf of the more dominant indi-
vidual, other things being equal; but only in publications on
primates could I find evidence that individuals preferentially
direct friendly behaviour up the hierarchy when no immediate
benefit is apparent. One interpretation, in strictly functional
terms, is that primates, but not nonprimates, use information
about potential quality of group members as partners to estab-
lish friendly relationships now for future payoffs. Only primates,
it seems, manipulate the probability of receiving help in the
future from particularly valuable partners. For nonprimates, a
coalition is an end in itself; for primates it is a means to an end.
Many peoples' work led to this conclusion, but C & S's highly
elegant and sophisticated questions and analyses of social be-
haviour of monkeys in the wild weighed very heavily in the
survey. Nobody else has taken the analysis of social complexity
and of the implied cognitive abilities as far as they have. Least of
all has anyone in this area taken the ethological tradition of
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experimentation in the field as far. Nobody is saying that the
primates are consciously calculating future benefits against
current behaviour, but the apparent taxonomic difference in
nature of social relationships at least hints where to look for
complex mental abilities. Maybe it is now up to the laboratory
psychologists to work out the minimum cognitive rules neces-
sary to programme an animal to produce the behaviours seen.
The sterility of the laboratory, however, surely constrains the
animals' behaviour. Perhaps only those who watch animals in
the full moment-to-moment intricacy of survival in the wild can
approach a realisation of the potential complexity of the social,
and hence cognitive, abilities of the animals?
If the question of taxonomic differences is worth asking, how
should we progress? We most certainly need to look at more
species, not just of nonprimates but also of primates: The
apparent dichotomy relies on evidence from just two families,
the Pongids and Cercopithecines, and four genera of socially
complex primates. In their statements about the advanced social
intelligence of apes, C & S tend not to distinguish gorillas from
chimpanzees. They have watched gorillas in the wild and be-
lieve that, despite appearances to the contrary, they are intel-
ligent. So why do the animals not show it? In their environment,
they might have no need to, for food is abundant and wide-
spread. If the use of cooperation in contests is a mark of social
complexity, then we need to study a species that uses resources,
access to which is improved by cooperation. Finally, having
chosen the species to study, we should use C & S's volume as the
manual of what behaviours to study and how to study them.
In suggesting the course of action that I have - study more
species and do it as C & S have - I am assuming that comparative
psychology is an important discipline and that field experimen-
tation produces valid answers of a sort difficult to produce in the
normal animal psychologist's laboratory setting. I also assume
that searching for a primate/nonprimate dichotomy is worth-
while. If success in solving complex social problems requires
advanced information processing abilities, then the obvious
difference between primates and nonprimates in the size of
their information processing organ provides some expectation,
if only crude, of where a difference might be found. After all, it is
partly the size of our own large brain that leads us to expect a
human/nonhuman dichotomy in cognitive abilities. Whether or
not a difference exists, the search will help to "ultimately tell us
how, in the course of our own evolution, some minds gained an
advantage over others" (p. 4), as long as we remember that the
abilities evolved not in animals placed alone in a steel box with
pedals, but in the wild with its bewildering array of daily
physical and social problems.
Are monkeys nomothetic or idiographic?
Linda Mealey
Psychology Department, College of St. Benedict, St. Joseph, MN 56374
Electronic mail: lmealey@csbsju.bitnet
"Are monkeys and apes as skilled at monitoring each other's
states of mind as they are at monitoring each other's behavior?
Do they recognize the distinction between mental states and
behavior, either in themselves or others? Do they know what
they know?" (p. 206). These are the fundamental questions
asked in Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) marvelously researched
and well-documented book. The answer? Tentatively, no. Ac-
cording to C & S, "monkeys are primatologists who have spent
too much time studying a single species" (p. 180); their reason-
ing consists of domain-specific computations and is restricted to
first order intentionality (i.e., there is intent to modify the
behavior of others, but no intent, or even conceptualization of
the ability, to modify the thoughts of others).
C & S seem surprised at their own answer, because they have
assumed throughout that "the moment that an individual be-
comes capable of recognizing that her companions have beliefs,
and that these beliefs may be different from her own, she
becomes capable of immensely more flexible and adaptive
behavior" (p. 206). This argument is similar to that of Humphrey
(1983),' who hypothesized that human consciousness evolved
because it enhanced our ability to predict one another's behav-
iors, thereby increasing the likelihood that we would interact
with others in an adaptive fashion. Plutchik (1980) argued in a
similar vein that the higher emotions evolved because they
enhanced the likelihood of responding appropriately to external
stimuli, especially social stimuli. I am not so sure that this
assumption of adaptive value is correct, however.
At one point in the book (p. 252), C & S acknowledge the
possibility that for a monkey, responding to the relevant aspects
of the world might not require second order intentionality. They
also document throughout the text that in spite of an apparent
lack of second order intentionality, monkeys are very good at
manipulating the behavior of other monkeys and are able to use
what is essentially correlational data (learned contingencies), to
behave in ways that might seem superficially to imply an
understanding of other monkeys' behavior. The monkeys'
nomothetic (actuarial or statistical) approach to the world is
apparently accurate and reliable and does not seem to necessi-
tate the utilization of additional idiographic (individualistic)
hypotheses. In fact, the assumption that an empathy-based,
idiographic approach to predicting the behavior of others is
necessarily better than a contingency-based, nomothetic ap-
proach, seems to me a species-specific cognitive bias which may
not even be correct for our own behavior, let alone that of
another species. (See, e.g., Monohan, 1982, for a review docu-
menting the clinical bias in favor of the idiographic approach in
spite of the superiority of the nomothetic approach for predict-
ing violence in humans.)
Reading C & S's description of monkey cognition reminded
me of the time a student asked me if a psychopath would make a
good psychologist. After thinking, I responded that I guessed it
would depend on what one was looking for in a psychologist: By
definition, psychopaths would be lacking in empathy, but on the
other hand, they would excel at being able to manipulate the
behavior of others by pulling all the right strings and pushing all
the right buttons. The psychopaths' success at manipulating the
behavior of others results in an apparent understanding of the
thoughts, feelings, and motivations of others, that is, in an
apparent empathy. Yet given the known absence of such empa-
thy, it is presumably psychopaths' average to above average
intelligence that is being used to learn the contingencies relat-
ing others' behavior to their own, and with which they (and
presumably the monkey) manipulate others so well.
Although C & S have convinced me that they won't find
empathy and second order intentionality in monkeys, I hope
that they continue to look. Functionally, with respect to the
monkeys' behavior among themselves, it will make no dif-
ference what they find. But our own bias toward putting such
supreme value on empathy and intentionality in human interac-
tions has caused us to undervalue other species that don't have
empathy, or at least with whom we don't share it. In this sense,
we have become the psychopaths of the world, manipulating
things to our own advantage and to the detriment of others. (C &
S point out in Chapter 2 that the monkey populations they
studied fell from 215 individuals to 35 individuals during the
period of 1978 to 1988, and that much of this reduction in
population was from human-related habitat destruction.) I hope
that we keep looking for empathy and intentionality in monkeys
because I want it to be there; on the other hand, I hope that we
never find the answer, because I am afraid that if the answer is
not we may find that we have no room left in our world for
monkeys.
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What are mental states?
William Noble3 and lain Davidsonb
aDepartment of Psychology and bDepartment of Archeology and
Paleoanthropology, University of New England, Armidale, New South
Wales, Australia
Electronie mail: awnohle@gara.une.oz.au; bidavidso@gara.une.oz.au
The aspect of the text that is the subject of this commentary
turns on what "mental states" may legitimately be attributed by
human observers to the other species whose behaviour they
study, and what attributions and understandings those crea-
tures have with respect to each other. It is never a matter of
doubt for Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) that other animals have
these "mental states," whether or not they behave as though
they do: "Animals may be able to behave adaptively simply by
attending to the behavior of others; they may not need also to
attend to their mental states" (p. 206).
We are even asked to entertain the possibility (following an
account of an experiment in which a parent monkey communi-
cates nothing to its offspring about salient features of the en-
vironment) that "monkeys do recognize the difference between
their own knowledge and the knowledge of others, but . . . this
recognition simply has no effect on their behaviour" (p. 223).
The question must be faced: What are these "mental states"
that are so readily invoked, and invoked as "causal agents" (p.
209)? Are we talking about states of the visual cortex, the
hypothalamus, the cerebellum? It appears not; rather, C & S
use Dennett's (1983) phrase about "beliefs and desires" as
mental states. If that is what we are considering, how are these
states mentally manifested (as against behaviorally expressed),
and how, in the absence of their behavioral expression - as in
the experiment mentioned above - might these mental states be
accessed by conspecifics? This is a puzzle that has gripped
biologists and psychologists to the point where "thought trans-
ference" by means of ESP has been seriously proposed as the
solution (Huxley 1983, p. 18). [See also Alcock: "Parapsychol-
ogy" BBS 10(4) 1987.]
C & S don't seem to go that way, although their account of
Menzel's (e.g., 1971) observations (p. 238) on chimpanzee
communication couches it mysteriously. A chimpanzee shown a
hidden food cache is returned to the holding cage that contains
other chimpanzees and a few minutes later all are released from
the cage. "There was no indication that the first chimpanzee
(termed the leader) communicated what he had seen to the
others before being released . . . Nevertheless, once released,
the others behaved as if they knew not only what the leader had
seen but also approximately where he had seen it" (p. 238). Any
close reading of Menzel (e.g., pp. 228-30) will dispel the
mystery - the conduct of the chimpanzees is readily understood
in terms of their (sensorially) perceiving the contingencies of the
micro-world (or macro-Skinner box) in which they are im-
pounded. These include, for example, learning to associate the
leader's level of excitement, and rate and directness of travel,
with the experience of successful food-getting.
The contrast is drawn between the attributions of mental
states that young children can achieve, and the evidence for such
capacities in other primates. C & S provide an account of the
emerging cognitive skills of children between the ages of about
three and six years - the capacity to perceive that one has, and
that others have, beliefs and desires; the capacity to perceive
that others may harbour false beliefs or be ignorant of what one
knows; the capacity to perfect the telling of lies. Not noticed in
this account is that we are talking about creatures gaining these
fairly "hard-won" capacities while immersed in cultural worlds
of language-based experience - stories and fables; instruction in
reading, drawing, writing; exposure to the narratives of TV.
Instead, we are confronted with the prospect that these kinds of
higher-order capacities are possibly resident in the "minds" of
other primates, but somehow just a bit trickier to find evidence of.
C & S are frank in saying that monkey vocalisations do not
qualify as language, and it comes through strongly that, for all
their complexity, vervet calls seem to be less intricate than those
of chimpanzees. The common ancestor between chimpanzees
and humans looks to have been around 5 million years ago, and
in our arguments (e.g., Davidson & Noble 1989; Noble &
Davidson 1991) the point made is that from the archaeological
evidence the hominid ancestors of modern humans should be
seen as more like other apes in their behaviour than they were
like humans. The vervet studies emphasise that similar issues
must also be considered concerning the evolutionary separation
of monkey and apes, which may have occurred about 18 million
years ago (Groves 1989, p. 189). We note, incidentally, that
those issues will require explanation by evolutionary processes
similar to those proposed in Davidson and Nobel's arguments
and that "special" features of humans should not be invoked to
account for either branching.
The evolutionary emergence of human abilities involved the
same processes of random appearance of new variation together
with its directed selection. C & S's study of natural communica-
tion in vervets shows in what arenas complexities of communica-
tion may have selective advantage. The discussion of the rela-
tion between communication and predation (p. 113) demonstrates
how natural selection can operate differentially on communicative
performance. Equivalent research is urgently required into the
natural communicative habits of chimpanzees and bonobos.
The grace of this fascinating book is the integrity of its authors
and the richness of its narrative detail. Being described is a vast
range of behaviour, and its varied expression within individuals,
so that the student of evolutionary ethology can witness the
bases (as in behaviour that functions to manipulate or mislead
conspecifics) for later selection once the means to deliberately
exploit such conduct have become available. The descriptions
and analyses raise more questions than answers and in so doing
put many significant issues about perceiving and communicat-
ing in sharper focus.
intriguing the§ne9 but oneCalls as I
with limitations
Donald H. Owings
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, CA 95616
Electronic mail: dhowings@ucdavis. and dhowings@ucdavis.edu.
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) is an excellent book, which bears
this pair's usual trademarks - creative use of biologically valid
field and laboratory methods to test hypotheses of substantial
current importance and visibility. The writing is clear and
entertaining, and the treatment of the empirical and conceptual
literature is scholarly. If I were to offer a seminar in animal
cognition, this book, with its emphasis on natural behavioral
systems, would be one of my principal sources.
Like any thematic emphasis, the cognitive focus of this work
as channeled research toward some fascinating discoveries and
away from other topics, including some that I would enjoy
learning more about. The questions I raise deal with the nature
and ontogeny of communicative processes. C & S's interest in
cognition, and especially their emphasis on vocalizations as
labels, appear to me to have biased them toward a view of
communication that is relatively static. The result, I propose,
has been an approach that is insensitive to the more dynamic
properties of communication and its development.
Might verve! calls be used In tonic communication? Most or all
of the data on antipredator calling by vervets is based only on the
first vocalization from each encounter. Given C & S's interest in
the possibility that calls serve as labels for predators, this seems
like the most rigorous methodological step to take. Only those
calls that are free of the influence of the vocal labeling activities
of other vervets should be included in the data set. A potential
cost of this step, however, is that our attention is deflected from
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most of the calling that occurs, because vervets engage in
prolonged vocal choruses during and after a predatory encoun-
ter (p. 219). Some consideration is given to the significance of
such persistent calling, that is, during snake mobbing (p. 219),
or as confirmation to "correctly" calling infants (p. 137). C & S
generally ignore prolonged vocal responses, though, or even
suggest they are a nonfunctional byproduct of vervet cognitive
limitations (an inability to judge whether or not their audience is
informed - p. 219). The immediate evocative effects of such
calling may be lower than for initial calls. (Imagine the futility of
yelling the label, "Leopard! leopard! leopard!" over and over
again.) Persistent calling might still be functional, however, but
toward different ends and in another time frame. Others (e.g.,
Smith et al. 1977) have proposed that persistent antipredator
calling reflects a tonic communicative process in which indi-
vidual vocalizations serve to maintain or foster a longer term
outcome with repeated inputs, rather than producing a discrete
effect with each vocalization (Schleidt 1973). During encounters
with mammalian predators, California ground squirrels shift
from initial nepotistic warning calls to a non-nepotistic re-
petitive vocal pattern that tonically sustains vigilance in others,
perhaps to maintain an "early warning system" for the caller
(Loughry & McDonough 1988; Owings et al. 1986).
Might calling by Infants be appropriate for their age-specific
circumstances? Another effect of treating antipredator signals as
labels for predators is that when infants use calls differently from
adults one is disposed to treat the infants as mistaken, or as not
yet having refined the definition of the call (p. 225). Ontogeny,
then, becomes the process of achieving adult levels of compe-
tence in signal use. C & S make a reasonably compelling case for
this adult-focused view. Infant vervets really do behave as though
they were more ignorant than adults about the quality and
quantity of threat posed by various heterospecifics; this greater
ignorance is revealed by the infants' tendency to call in reaction
to both predators and nonpredators, and by the greater inci-
dence of maladaptive responses to antipredator calls (pp. 129-
36). Infants may in fact need the confirmation of adult calling in
order to refine their assessment of heterospecifics (p. 137).
Although I do not contest this adult-focused approach, an age-
specific viewpoint generates a complementary set of questions,
that is, about how infant calling might be appropriate for the
conditions under which vervets live at that developmental stage
(e.g., see Galef 1981; Owings & Loughry 1985). For example,
given that infants are ignorant, how do they cope with the
resulting uncertainty? Perhaps occasional barks at warthogs
reflect not mistaken leopard labels but efforts to recruit adult aid
and guidance. Such initiatives by youngsters might be expected
because adults show little tendency to teach their offspring
about predators (p. 133).
Some of C & S's data are compatible with the general idea that
infants do not attempt to cope with predators in the self-
sufficient style of adults but use parents as a source of guidance.
The sound of alarms often evokes protective behavior by the
mother (p. 226), as well as flight to the mother by very young
vervets (p. 135). If infants look toward adults before responding
to an alarm call their behavior is more likely to be appropriate for
the call's typical predatory elicitor than if they do not glance at
an adult first (p. 136). Furthermore, infants evoke potentially
important feedback by calling; adults chorus if a predator has
elicited the infant's call but remain silent after infants call at
nonpredators (p. 137). Such feedback might not only shape the
development of knowledge about predators, but it might also be
used immediately by infants to judge the danger they face.
Has the precision of predator labeling by infants been under-
estimated? The social dynamics of antipredator calling, com-
bined with age differences in knowledge about heterospecifics,
may have yielded an inflated estimate of the vocal "mistakes"
infant vervets make. Given that youngsters really are less
precise than adults, infants are statistically less likely to be first
callers when a real predator is in the vicinity (because older
individuals will also call), but they are more likely to call first
when the disturbance arises from a nonpredator (because no
other ages are likely to call). So the sample of infant first calls is
probably more biased toward the nonpredator incidents than if
infants had been tested alone. Such adult pre-emption of infant
antipredator behavior has also been observed in California
ground squirrels and can mask a remarkable amount of adult-
like antisnake knowledge among infants (Coss & Owings 1985).
These comments are derived from a management approach
(Owings & Hennessy 1984), which treats participation in com-
munication, in part, as a multi-leveled process of managing the
behavior of others. Application of a similar process-based ap-
proach to cognition would shift attention away from the contents
of mind and move toward the processes of knowing (Michaels &
Carello 1981).
Exploring the "boundary" between the
minds ©f monkeys and humans
Sidney I. Perloe
Department of Psychology, Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041
Electronic mail: sj)erloe@acc.haverford.edu
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book is a notable addition to the
exploration of the cognitive differences between humans and
other animals, an undertaking that has had religious and ideo-
logical as well as scientific motivations. Like many who enter the
region from the animal behavior direction, C & S present
evidence indicating that nonhuman primates can lay claim to
more territory than traditional maps show. Careful observa-
tional and experimental field studies of monkey communication
and social behavior undercut the anthropocentric view that
monkey behavior is restricted to Dennett's (1987) zero order
intentionality region, in which behavior is produced by mind-
less, reflexive responses to internal and external stimuli.
The strategic flexibility shown by monkeys in generating
dominance and kinship structures and their ability to recognize
classes of social relationships involving other monkeys as well as
themselves require mental operations extending into the realm
of first order intentionality, that is, action guided by goals and
expectations. This implication is buttressed by evidence that
monkey calls communicate information about environmental
referents and are aimed at influencing the behavior of other
animals, rather than being mindless expressions of internal
motivational states.
After persuasively presenting the case for extending monkey
cognitive competence into areas that some would reserve for
humans, C & S refocus their discussion to emphasize a new
boundary beyond which monkey cognition cannot move. Al-
though monkeys shape their behaviors to influence other ani-
mals, they are shown to lack second order intentionality, that is,
action guided by an understanding of its impact on the cogni-
tions of its intended target. Despite the similarities in some
aspects of the social systems of monkeys and humans, we are
told that the two are generated by rather different mechanisms.
Monkeys are shown to act to influence what their partners will
do, not what they will think. Humans, on the other hand, are
said to generate social patterns through a consideration of the
impact of their actions on what their partners think or feel.
C & S draw the boundary between the mental mechanisms
that produce the social systems of humans and other animals in
front of second order intentionality, although not without some
doubt about the placement of apes. This conclusion is quite
consistent with the view taken by modern social psychology
(Markus & Zajonc 1985). From this perspective, action is seen as
the consequence of actors' understanding of the situations in
which they act and a prominent part of this understanding
involves attributions of mental states, viz. intentions, beliefs,
attitudes, and so forth, to others (Jones 1990).
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But boundaries can be breached in two directions. While
animal ethologists and sociobiologists have been examining the
possibility of higher order cognitive mechanisms among non-
humans, human ethologists and sociobiologists have been ex-
ploring the operation of lower order mechanisms among hu-
mans. Recently, some social psychologists have cast doubt on
whether we always attribute mental states to our partners in
social interaction (Weiner 1985). They suggest that we think
about the mental states influencing the actions of others mainly
when their actions are unexpected or have a negative impact on
us. Thoughts about others' experience or knowledge may not
occur in interactions that follow predictable, nonaversive paths.
In such settings our attention may be focused on our goals and
not on the minds of our partners. There are also human actions
that occur at the lowest, mindless level of intentionality (Langer
1989). Such nonverbal human communicative behavior as
smiles, assertive swaggers, dejected slouches, and so forth are
common examples of zero level behaviors that can have signifi-
cant social impacts. Important preferences among stimuli and
perhaps among actions as well may have noncognitive determi-
nants (Zajonc 1984).
If zero and first order intentionality plays a substantial role in
the production of human social behavior, why do most social
science theories of action agree with C & S about the ubiquity of
higher order intentionality among humans? The answer may lie
in how we justify or give accounts of why we act as we do.
Because the goal of such explanatory interaction necessarily
involves affecting the beliefs of others, we may simply carry over
this orientation to the actions being explained. That is, the
adoption of second order intentionality in the action of explain-
ing ourselves to others may be inappropriately generalized to
the actions being explained. In addition, introspections about
behaviors characterized by zero and first order intentionality
may be misleading because our responses may be influenced
more by implicit theories about how our behavior is supposed to
be determined than by actual recollections of the cognitions
surrounding our actions (Nisbett & Wilson 1977). The assump-
tion that human social interaction almost always involves consid-
erations of the minds of partners may form a central part of
laymen's implicit theories of action as well as of social science
theories.
Questioning the role played by thoughts about the minds of
others does not imply that these cognitions have no influence on
human social behavior. Rather, it indicates uncertainty con-
cerning how and when our actions are influenced by our inten-
tions, purposes, and reasons (Quattrone 1985). This uncertainty
should make us wary of placing all human action in the area of
high level intentionality. The boundary setting task is made
even more difficult by the possibility that evolved strategic
constraints might influence some of the cognitive mechanisms
involving considerations about the minds of others just as they
constrain the lower level mechanisms seen in monkeys. For
example, we may be particularly likely to think of social interac-
tions as involving occasions for reciprocal exchange and es-
pecially to be alert to signs that our partners intend to cheat
(Tooby & Cosmides 1989).
Although there is no reason to expect a book about monkeys to
examine human mechanisms in detail, it would be unfortunate if
readers interpreted C & S's persuasive justification of limiting
monkeys to first order intentionality as simultaneously justifying
a boundary between monkeys and humans at that point. Recog-
nition of the operation of lower order intentionality among
humans is important because it raises the question of how
mechanisms producing this kind of action interact with ones that
involve reliance on higher order intentionality. Answers to such
questions should help us provide a more integrative account of
human behavior than is possible when we assign monkeys to one
cognitive territory and humans to another. It may be time to
replace the boundary metaphor with one that focuses us on
clines or transition zones.
mental states to
monkeys: First, know thyself
Daniel J. Povinelli3 and Sandra deBIoisb
department of Anthropology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520 and
bDepartement de Psychoiogie, Pavilion F. A. Savard, Universite Laval,
Quebec G1K 7P4, Canada
Electronic mall: povdanj@yalevm.ycc.edu
It is clear from their twin chapters on deception and attribution
(Chapters 7 & 8) that Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) want to know
whether nonhuman primates attribute mental states to them-
selves and to others. Unlike investigations of operant learning,
however, comparative studies of social attribution must ask
whether animals possess a capacity that is at present only known
to exist for certain in humans. As a consequence, it is we who
must initially be used as a standard for comparison. Thus,
although we do not believe that monkeys and apes are develop-
mentally arrested children, we advocate systematic com-
parative studies of human children and nonhuman primates. In
particular, we believe that there are two compelling reasons
why studies of attribution in nonhuman primates must begin by
testing children. [See also Parker & Gibson, "A Developmental
Model for the Evolution of Language and Intelligence in Early
Hominids BBS 1(3) 1979; Chevalier-Skolnikoff "Spontaneous
Tool Use" BBS 12(3) 1989; and Greenfield "Language, Tools
and Brain" BBS 14(4) 1991.]
First, part of the challenge in developing tests of attributional
capacities for nonhuman primates has been to create non-
linguistic variations of experiments traditionally conducted with
children. To be sure that our linguistic tasks are really measur-
ing the capacity in which we are interested, however, we must
first demonstrate that children respond the same way to both
variations of the test (linguistic and nonlinguistic). For example,
let us suppose we wished to investigate the attribution of false
belief in orangutans. First, a behavioral paradigm to test for its
presence would be created. Next, a set of age-related hypoth-
eses about the expected performance of young children would
be constructed from existing data on the attribution of false
belief in children, and appropriate-aged children would be
tested using the paradigm that was to be used with the orangu-
tans. If the task sorts children into age-classes according to
previous research using linguistic tasks, we can be reasonably
confident that the task is measuring false belief. If children
younger than 4 years old solve the task easily, however, we
should be conservative and accept the null hypothesis until
there is unambiguous evidence that 3-year-olds do, in fact,
possess a clear understanding of false belief.
The second reason to test children first is that if we cannot
characterize a 3-year-old's theory of mind, how can we expect to
characterize a velvet's? In Chapter 8, C & S do draw on the child
development literature as a guide to understanding the minds of
nonhuman primates, but their use of this material is patchy and
at times inconsistent. They rely on a model that posits children
moving from an egocentric theory of mind to a partial one in
which they understand ignorance but not false belief, until
finally achieving an understanding of false belief. A number of
other frameworks that exist in the field of developmental psy-
chology for conceptualizing how the child's theory of mind
emerges, however (see Table 1 for a summary of some of the
positions), and we refer to these frameworks as we proceed. Let
us look at a few of the topics they address and help to expose
their complexity.
Eartf language use. Following Bretherton (Bretherton et al.
1981; Bretherton & Beeghly 1982) and her colleagues, C & S
argue that even 2-year-olds express explicit knowledge of their
own and others' intentions, moods, and actions because they use
words that refer to these states. Yet this same logic would force
us to conclude that 2-year-olds have some adult-like under-
standing of such words as "know" and "think." Other pos-
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Table 1 (Povinelli and deBlois). Some theories of the child's theory of mind.
Children younger than four years old have a behavioristic understanding of "mental states"; "to
know," for example, is equated with "to act successfully"; older children develop a representa-
tional understanding of knowledge states akin to our own.
Symbolic play is evidence that three-year-olds (and even younger children) can conceive of
mental states as representations. These young children, however, fail to understand two
critical aspects of mental states, (1) how mental states are formed (hence they attribute knowl-
edge "miraculously") and (2) that mental states are what cause behaviour to occur.
Even young children have some understanding of mental states as representations. That is,
how mental states are caused and how they affect behaviour.
Young children understand the mind in terms of representational states (including false be-
liefs), but sometimes fail to respond to linguistic interrogation correctly because they fail to
understand the experimenter's purpose when questioning them.
sibilities exist. Children may Inhabit a fundamentally different
social world where such words as "know" and "want" refer to
contingencies between expectations and actions (the frame-
works of Perner [in press] and Flavell [1988] in Table 1). Indeed,
Plaget argued that very young children use words like "bicycle"
In a preconceptual way. If children are using such concrete
words differently from the way we do, why should we believe
that their spontaneous utterances of "think" and "know" and
"pretend," reflect an awareness of abstract mental states as
opposed to behavior?
Symbolic play. Following Leslie (1987, see Table 1), C & S
also adopt the position that symbolic play Is evidence for an
understanding of mental states. In particular, they claim it as
evidence of an understanding of the difference between ap-
pearance and reality (p. 207), an ability to possess several
different (mental?) representations of objects or behaviors (p.
207), an ability to manipulate knowledge in themselves and
others (pp. 243-44), and the presence of self-awareness. Unfor-
tunately, all of these conclusions are open to doubt. Symbolic
play begins to emerge at the end of the sensorlmotor intel-
ligence stage and is signalled by the child's willingness to use
one object (or person) to stand for something else. But contrary
to what C & S seem to Imply, this ability may reveal nothing
about the child's conception of "appearance" and "reality" as
mental states. Indeed, at least in the visual modality, children
do not understand the appearance-reality distinction until about
4 years of age (Flavell et al. 1989). Take the case that C & S find
striking - two young children Involved in a pretend game
together where they verbally agree to use, for example, a
banana as a telephone. Should this be taken as evidence that the
children are attributing mental states to each other? The prob-
lem, again, is how best to interpret their use of language. For all
we know, the children may merely be agreeing to use the
banana In the same way that they use a telephone. Do they know
that it is not a telephone? Yes, of course, and this Is what Piaget
referred to as the use of objects as concrete symbols - using one
object to stand for another. But this necessarily precedes the
child's conception of mental represented ion. Indeed, rather than
seeing it as an indicator of an awareness of mental states, Plaget
saw early symbolic play as a consequence of the child's difficulty
in grasping the social and representational aspects of language.
For the same reason, we find C & S's claim that symbolic play is
evidence of early attempts at manipulating knowledge states
suspect. Finally, C & S offer no explicit support for their
argument that symbolic play Is evidence of self-awareness.
Self-recognition and seif-awareness* Despite the fact that
they cite a number of the key papers in the self-recognition
literature, C & S fail to address the central Issue that emerged
from this research nearly a decade ago. Indeed, the conclusion
of their abstract - that monkeys, but not chimpanzees, lack a
theory of mind - has been repeatedly stressed by Gallup and his
colleagues for nearly a decade (Gallup 1982; 1983; 1985; Gallup
& Suarez 1986). C & S appear completely unaware of Gallup's
argument that self-recognition Is an empirical marker of the
onset of self-awareness and that self-awareness provides an
Intuitive access to the minds of others (cf. pp. 241-42). Beyond
this, It is unclear what new meaning C & S are trying to impose
on the term self-recognition. Their definition - distinguishing
self from others - would mean that we would have to talk about
certain species of flowering plants as being capable of self-
recognition (Haring et al. 1990). We understand C & S's desire
to define self-recognition as distinct from consciousness, but the
existing literature treats self-recognition as a specific behavior
(the act of producing self-directed behavior In front of a mirror),
which requires some degree of self-awareness (or consciousness
of the categorical self). The distinction they attempt to draw Is
best left to two terms which refer to mental processes - self-
perception (their "self-recognition") versus self-conception
(self-awareness; see Butterworth, In press).
In a recent series of experiments in conjunction with our
colleagues, we have attempted to subject Gallup's idea that self-
recognition is a behavioral marker of a theory of mind to its first
empirical test (Povinelli & deBlois, submitted; Povinelli et al.,
1990; Povinelli et al., in press b; submitted). For example, in
one test, we sought to determine whether chimpanzees and
rhesus monkeys understand the causal connection between
seeing and knowing. Each subject was given the opportunity to
follow the advice of two people - one of whom had seen where
food was hidden, the other had not. The results largely con-
formed to Gallup's predictions that chimpanzees, but not
monkeys, ought to be able to attribute knowledge to the correct
person. We remain cautious about Inferring the complete ab-
sence of social attribution In rhesus monkeys, however, pre-
cisely because when we tested children on the same task, young
3-year-olds (who are quite capable of self-recognition) proved
unable to distinguish between the person who saw candy hidden
and the person who did not. Thus, although our research (as well
as C & S's) may point to important differences between chim-
panzees and monkeys, at present It argues more for the com-
plexity of the chimpanzee's theory of mind than for the monkey's
complete absence of one.
Although we have counseled that we must first understand
the ontogeny of attribution in children before we can under-
stand it in other species, we see a future In which the reverse is
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true as well. When studies of attribution in apes and monkeys
become as disciplined as those with children, we may finally be
at the threshold of answering critical questions about the evolu-
tion of attribution in our prelinguistic ancestors.
R. M. Ridley
Division of Psychiatry, Clinical Research Centre, Harrow, Middlesex HA1
3LU, England
Electronic mail: rridley@uk.ac.mrc-crc
I read Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book searching for informa-
tion from monkeys' natural behaviour about their memory
systems. Human memory is of particular interest to the clinical
psychologist because it is profoundly disturbed in the neu-
rodegenerative dementias, and memory loss is one of the most
incapacitating consequences of brain trauma and encephalitis.
Clinical psychologists look to the laboratory-based neuropsy-
chologists to provide experimental support for the classification
and subsequent neural localization of memory systems. But to
study the neural substrates of memory in animals from a clinical
perspective it must be shown that the psychological tests used in
animals are drawing on the same components of memory as are
affected in amnesia patients (Ridley & Baker 1991). Even using
essentially the same tests in animals and patients may not suffice
because a different mental strategy may be used by different
species - for example, whereas humans may use verbal rehears-
al animals presumably do not. It is in the realm of cognition
(which uses data-based memory) compared to conditioning
(which modifies habit-based performance) that the monkey
becomes more important than the rat in psychological experi-
ments; it is these higher order mental processes that are most
relevant to human dementia and amnesia.
In assessing the type of memory a monkey or human is using a
distinction must first be made between procedural skill and
declarative knowledge (Cohen & Squire 1980). A procedural
skill (e.g., climbing trees) is demonstrable only by the quality of
an action and implies the existence in the nervous system of
facilitated pathways in which activity leads to a relatively invar-
iant response. (Climbing trees has to be learnt but it does not
require memory). Declarative memory implies the existence in
the brain of a data-based storage or memory system from which
novel responses can be generated in different circumstances.
Various examples are cited in C & S's book that imply the
existence of declarative memory in vervets. For example, social
responses by one monkey may be determined by the rela-
tionship between two other monkeys in a triad. This behaviour
is therefore not an invariant response to either of the other two
animals.
Declarative memory is next subdivided into semantic knowl-
edge (mental representations of things [e.g., snakes are nasty]
and abstract things, relationships rules, propositions etc. [e.g.,
avoid A who is friendly with B]) and episodic memory (memory
of the occurrence of events [e.g., I saw a snake this morning; her
sister bit me yesterday]; Squire 1986). [See also multiple book
review of Tulving's Elements of Episodic Memory BBS 7(2)
1984.] This distinction is important because amnesic patients
primarily lack the ability to form new episodic memories where-
as semantic knowledge may be largely spared. C & S's book
provides strong evidence that monkeys inhabit a declarative and
semantic world. When an isolated infant vervet emits a distress
call its mother will look toward it whereas the other mothers will
look toward the mother. When an aggressive exchange takes
place between two vervets there may be further aggressive acts
between the relatives of the two aggressors. These and similar
observations of social behaviour demonstrate that the rela-
tionships between monkeys in a group are facts that the
monkeys understand and that they use both to guide their own
behaviour and to predict the behaviour of others (e.g., when
they avoid the kin of the aggressed). This supports our view
(Ridley & Baker 1991) that the majority of discrimination tests
carried out in the Wisconsin General Test Apparatus in the
laboratory require the monkey to use semantic knowledge
although it has been claimed that these tests merely assess habit
formation (Mishkin et al. 1984).
The demonstration of episodic memory in monkeys is more
difficult both in the field and in the laboratory but it is the most
important form of memory from the clinical perspective. C & S
claim that vervets' friendships and alliances are determined by
memory of previous events, but this is not convincing. Each
monkey may acquire a "credit-rating" that depends on previous
alliances without the events of those alliances being remem-
bered. Many supposed tests of amnesia in monkeys (Mishkin et
al. 1982) test "recognition" of an object seen only once before.
But monkeys may succeed on these tests because the object
acquires the quality of familiarity rather than because the
monkey remembers the event of its previous presentation.
For a monkey to recollect an event it must be able to
distinguish between the events of the present and the events of
the past. This may require an animal to have access to the
content of its own mind. But are nonhuman primates aware of
the contents of their own minds and the minds of others? These
questions are not yet answered but the accumulation of anec-
dotal evidence especially involving deception and the withhold-
ing of information suggests that chimpanzees are sometimes
aware of the content of the minds of others. Chimpanzees'
ability to interact with their own reflection in a mirror, and
language-trained chimpanzees' ability to use symbols about
their own feelings and desires implies self-awareness in apes.
But the evidence for a similar self-awareness in monkeys is
inconclusive. They clearly have some self-awareness because
they know their own dominance relative to all the other
monkeys in a group. In addition, neurosurgical studies in the
laboratory suggest a dissociation between "personal memory,"
that is, memory for one's own responses and memory for
external events (Gaffan 1987).
Finally C & S point out that monkeys' cognitive skills may be
far superior in the within-species social domain than in the
world of objects and other animals. This may well be true, but
where monkeys do succeed in object-based tasks in the laborato-
ry it would seem reasonable to assume that they are using their
most sophisticated mental processes even though these may
have evolved in a social context.
It is to be hoped that ethologists and neuropsychologists will
form closer alliances in the future. This is necessary because our
ability to understand the mental processes of other species is as
surprisingly poor as is monkeys' apparent inability to acquire
and use the same level of mental representation of relations in
the inanimate world as of relationships amongst their own
species.
Knowing thyseSf5 knowing the other: They're
not the same
Jonathan SchuISa and J. David Smith6
department of Psychology, Haverford College, Haverford, PA 19041 and
bDepartment of Psychology, New School for Social Research, New York,
NY 10003
Electronic mail: aj-schull@acc.haverford.edu and
bsmith@newscho. hitnet
In this commentary we address Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's)
claim that monkeys do not know what they know, and cannot
access or examine their own mental states. The evidence for this
conclusion is quite indirect and tenuous, as the authors admit (p.
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240). C & S focus on monkeys' apparent failure to monitor the
thoughts and motives of others. They then take this to imply that
monkeys do not monitor their own thoughts and motives. Thus
C & S seem to suggest that the absence of other-awareness
indicates the absence of self-awareness.
Our first concern about this conclusion is empirical. We
believe our own research shows that monkeys can easily and
adaptively monitor and exploit their own mental states of doubt
and uncertainty (Smith et al., in preparation). In our paradigm,
animals receive discrimination trials which range from very easy
to impossibly hard, together with food rewards or long time-outs
for correct and incorrect responses, respectively. The twist in
our experiment is that animals can also use a "bail-out" response
which lets them escape, at some cost, into easier guaranteed-
win trials. Both of the rhesus monkeys we have tested bail out
sparingly and selectively on only the most difficult trials. Vari-
ous analyses and arguments converge on the conclusion that
their bail-out responses reflect metacognitive reactions to sub-
jective uncertainty rather than lower-level reactions to (e.g.)
objective stimuli or conflicted behaviors. That is, monkeys bail
out when they know they do not know the solution to a trial.
Thus a direct assessment of monkey self-awareness yields
positive evidence. Although it could be that rhesus monkeys
have more access to their own mental states than do vervet
monkeys or that our task creates the very metacognitive capacity
it measures we believe that wild vervets living in complex
biosocial environments have an equivalent need to access their
own mental states and will demonstrate an equivalent capacity
to do so when "asked" directly if they can.
Our second concern is theoretical. C & S almost conflate the
concept of other-awareness with that of self-awareness. For
example, in summarizing their chapter on attribution they pass
imperceptibly from the "hypothesis that monkeys are unable to
attribute mental states to others" (p. 253) to the "view that
monkeys do not know what they know, and cannot reflect upon
their knowledge, their emotions or their beliefs." (p. 254) For C
& S, having a theory of mind apparently means having both
kinds of awareness. This assumption may reflect an implicit
theory - that self-awareness is the necessary and sufficient
condition for other-awareness. This theory would justify the
authors' belief that self-awareness is a measure of other-
awareness (p. 240), and their belief that the absence of other-
awareness indicates the absence of self-awareness.
We question this theory. Self-awareness could be easier to
master than other-awareness, and it might emerge earlier (phy-
logenetically or ontogenetically). Moreover, self-awareness
could be adaptive even without other-awareness and therefore
it might exist by itself in some species. These possibilities cannot
even be explored until these two modes of metacognition, these
two theories of mind, are clearly distinguished.
Nonetheless, we do agree with Cheney, Seyfarth, Humphrey
(1976) and others that self-awareness (when present) might
support or encourage other-awareness. Furthermore, our own
laboratory results suggest that monkeys are self-aware. In that
case, they may also be well-prepared to understand each other's
mental states or social behaviors. Indeed, this notion could
explain C & S's observation that their monkeys' cognitions about
the social world are much more sophisticated than their cogni-
tions about the natural world. It may be that monkeys bring
special skills (introspection) to the social arena. They may get
'inside information' about things social from insight into their
own thoughts and feelings.
Following this line, one is led to rethink the monkeys' seem-
ing failures of other-awareness. One possibility is that monkeys
are other-aware, but clumsy at carrying through the Machiavel-
lian strategies suggested by that awareness. [See also Whiten &
Byrne: "Tactical Deception in Primates" BBS 11(2) 1988.] And,
as C & S admit, there are alternative explanations for many
apparent vervet ineptitudes. For example, vervets make snake
calls whether or not other monkeys already know about the
snake. On the one hand, this might suggest a failure to take the
other's state of knowledge into account. But on the other hand, a
redundant snake call does no harm, because monkeys and
people can forget or be careless. We suspect that Cheney would
make a redundant snake call to Seyfarth under similar circum-
stances, yet we know that she is both other-aware and self-
aware. The point is that monkeys too may have other-awareness
competence beyond their other-awareness performance.
Thus, we do feel that the distinction between other and self-
awareness must be sharpened. Nonetheless, we applaud this
extraordinary volume for its skillful blend of psychological analy-
sis and behavioral observation. Cheney & Seyfarth have clearly
advanced the discussion of animal awareness and animals' theo-
ries of mind. Some important next steps will be to distinguish
more clearly other- and self-awareness to gather direct evidence
for each and then to explore their empirical and theoretical
relationships.
The sounds of silence
Charles T. Snowdon
Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wl 53706
Electronic mail: snowclon@wiscmacc.bitnet or snowdon@macc.wisc.edu
Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book is a remarkable achieve-
ment. Few scientists have studied a nonhuman species as
thoroughly as they have. There are a limited number of species
for which we have such details of social and mental life. No other
scientists have refined the playback technique .so carefully nor
applied it with such creativity. Often there is a tension between
field and laboratory workers, with field workers decrying the
"unnaturalness" of captive environments and laboratory work-
ers decrying the lack of experimental rigor and control of field
studies. C & S have adapted experimental techniques to field
research in a way that few other scientists have. Of these other
scientists none have worked with nonhuman primates. The
authors have been extremely careful in their experimental
designs and extremely cautious in drawing conclusions about
what is in the minds of vervet monkeys. It is accordingly quite
difficult to be critical of the book. I raise four points that arose in
my reading, however.
First, I am concerned that silence is used as support for the
existence of deceptive communication. I think the argument is
based on the assumption that alarm calls or food calls must be
strictly referential. If an animal should always call when a
potential predator or food is present then the failure to call
might be interpreted as deception. However, if the call has an
affective component as well or does not function as a scientist
suspects it ought to, then failure to call may be an index of lack of
interest rather than deception. For example, chimpanzees call
infrequently when given five prunes and call more frequently
when given 20 prunes (Hauser & Wrangham 1987). Failure to
call when given five prunes may simply indicate that five prunes
are not worth commenting about, not that deception has oc-
curred. Recently, Elowson et al. (in press) found that cotton-top
tamarins have distinctive calls that are associated with food. The
tamarins were also tested for their preferences for different
foods and then call rate was correlated with food type. For eight
of nine monkeys there were positive correlations with individual
preference and call rate. Thus, calling is not deceptive and for
tamarins, at least, failure to call indicates a low preference for a
food. Marler et al. (1986) also report a correlation of food-call
rate with food preference for chickens.
Second, the playback technique is quite powerful for demon-
strating that an animal can respond to the information encoded
in a signal in the absence of any other contextual features. Thus,
we can use the technique to determine which acoustic features
in a call are critical for monkeys or birds to classify a call as to
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whether or not It is from a member of their own species or a
familiar Individual. We can use the technique to determine
whether animals classify their call types the same way human
observers have classified them, to understand how animals
perceive their own vocalizations, to determine an animal's
expectations about its neighbors (such as playing back a neigh-
bor's call from the neighbor's normal location or from a different
location), to determine whether animals can habituate to calls
from an unreliable signaller (and therefore whether animals can
detect deceptive communicators), and to determine how a
perceiver represents the semantic aspects of different calls.
The playback technique, however, can only tell us about the
perceptual and cognitive processes of the listener and not those
of the communicator. As human observers we are able to make
many Inferences from the communication patterns of infants and
even other adults without the content of those patterns being
explicitly semantic or linguistic. For example, cries or shrieks
can be associated with certain contexts for certain Individuals; so
a cry from an Infant or a shriek from a colleague next door can
lead to fairly predictable inferences about what has just hap-
pened, even though no words are exchanged. We also know that
young children at a given age understand language at a more
complex level than they can emit language. Thus, the ability of
animals to form Inferences from playback studies that appear to
be semantic or referential does not mean that the communicator
is able to produce utterances at the same cognitive level. The
playback studies with vervet monkeys tell us much about the
cognition of percelvers, but they may not tell us as much about
the complexity of what Is being communicated. Either we will
need to develop some new experimental techniques to evaluate
what a calling monkey Is Intending or we need to accept C & S's
view that monkeys may not be able to communicate In the
strongest semantic sense of trying to modify the mental state of
another animal.
Third, it Is extremely puzzling with predation being an
Important pressure affecting their survival and with their other-
wise high levels of cognitive functioning that vervets should be
so obtuse concerning secondary characteristics of predators.
Why don't they avoid a bush that has a python track leading to it?
Why don't they express fear when they see a gazelle stashed in a
crotch of a tree? Sand wasps can learn subtle features around
their nest when they exit and use these cues to find their nests
again (TInbergen & Krayt 1938). White rats can readily learn to
associate a light or a tone with an averslve event and avoid that
event when the signal Is present. Why can't vervets learn the
same types of signals in the real world where the consequences
of not attending to such signals can be fatal?
Finally, why haven't vervets and other monkeys evolved
teaching techniques to assist in the survival of their young?
Achieving optimal reproductive success should place demands
on the evolution of the teaching of young animals. Monkeys can
learn to be fearful of predators through observing another
monkey behave fearfully or calling to a predator. If the ability to
teach Is predicated on an understanding of the knowledge base
of another animal and If even our closest relatives do not
understand enough about mind to teach their offspring then
there Is truly a fundamental gap between human and nonhuman
animals that will not be bridged by demonstrations of self-
recognition, self-awareness, or even teaching analogues of lan-
guage. Cheney & Seyfarth, who sought initially to demonstrate
the parallels between humans and other primates, have con-
cluded with a profoundly conservative view of the vast gap
between humans and other animals.
Michael Tomasello
Department of Psychology and Yerkes Primate Center, Emory University,
Atlanta, GA 30322
Electronic mail: psymt@unix.cc.emory.edu
How monkeys see the world Is not meant to be a comprehensive
review of cognitive ethology but it Is a very thorough selective
review, and marks, I believe, a turning point In the field. Most
of the early proponents of cognitive ethology were so concerned
with establishing the legitimacy of animal cognition as a field of
study that they appeared to be cheerleaders rather than hard-
headed scientists (e.g., Griffin 1976). Certainly, working to
establish legitimate phenomena for the field was a reasonable
endeavor at the time, especially In the context of a hostile
behavioristic psychology and a traditional ethology not con-
cerned with cognitive or other proximate Issues. But the chal-
lenge is now to move beyond the simplistic question of "do they
or don't they?" and Cheney & Seyfarth's (C & S's) book provides
an Interesting proposal for how to begin to do this.
One of the most important indications that cognitive ethology
Is coming of age Is the concern with what animals cannot do, a
negativity that is only possible In a field secure In its founda-
tions. In the classic tradition of comparative psychology, C & S
compare the cognitive abilities of vervet monkeys to those of
other species, Including humans, so that monkeys' limitations as
well as their competences are Investigated (cf. the similar
strategy of Tomasello, 1990, for chimpanzee social learning).
Thus, based on a comparison of a variety of primate species
including humans, one of major conclusions of the book — and
one that Is likely to surprise people who only know C & S's
earlier writings unabashedly boosting monkey abilities - is that
"monkeys cannot communicate with an Intent to modify the
mental states of others because, lacking attribution, they do not
recognize that such states exist" (p. 310). This is not to detract
from the very complex picture of sophisticated monkey commu-
nication that has been developing over the past 15 years; it Is
simply to try to take the picture from all angles.
C & S argue that monkeys have a "laser beam Intelligence."
Despite recent arguments for the modularity of human intel-
ligence, it Is all relative, they argue, and domains of monkey
Intelligence do not seem to communicate with one another (are
not "accessible" to one another) in the same way as do those of
humans. C & S Invoke this argument in particular in discussing
why monkeys who make many complex inferences about social
relationships fall to make seemingly simpler Inferences in non-
social domains, for example, In failing to use secondary cues of
predator presence (dead carcasses, snake tracks, etc.) to en-
hance their very immediate chances of survival. In addition, In
the nonsocial domain, C & S distinguish visual from auditory
cues and provide evidence that only the latter are used by
vervets in making inferences about the presence of predator
species. They argue that this Is further evidence of the modu-
larity of monkey Intelligence.
I, for one, do not find C & S's arguments for modularity
convincing. Vervet monkeys do make complex inferences about
predator presence, comparable to their social Inferences, from
auditory cues. And very different learning conditions obtain In
the visual modality. For example, the sound of cow bells is
almost always associated with humans and often precedes their
presence - supporting, perhaps, some type of causal inference.
The visual detection of gazelle carcasses is only sometimes
associated with leopards; and when It is, there Is no canonical
temporal ordering pattern, making causal Inferences more
problematic. C & S address these issues, but I remain uncon-
vinced that the differential use of visual and auditory cues of
predatory presence results from anything other than differences
In general learning conditions (or the causal Inferences that may
result). I should add that this modality difference In making
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nonsocial inferences may also be a case of a behavioral phe-
nomenon peculiar to vervet monkeys from which C & S have
overgeneralized; it certainly does not hold in many other pri-
mate species.
Another problem with the modularity thesis is in the social
domain itself. The various social-cognitive skills of vervet
monkeys all show similar abilities and disabilities. Thus, from
their very interesting review C & S conclude that vervet
monkeys do not show second-order intentionality in their com-
munication, deception, empathy, instruction, imitation, social
relationships, cooperation, and self-awareness. (In cases in
which the distinction is meaningful, they do show first-order
intentionality.) This would seem to imply a cross-domain ap-
plication of concepts of intentionality, and this is so even across
tasks that are primarily auditory (e.g., communication) and
those that are primarily visual (e.g., imitation). The overall
problem concerns what should be considered distinct domains.
Perhaps all of these tasks are best considered parts of a single
social intelligence. Who knows? I know of no criteria, either in
this book or elsewhere, that provide satisfying ways for deter-
mining what should be considered discrete domains of intel-
ligence once we focus our attention on animals with a cortex.
Although there is no doubt that specially adapted, domain-
specific learning devices must play an important role in any
theory of behavioral ecology or comparative psychology or
cognitive ethology, my own suspicion, and that of many others,
is that such devices are much less prevalent and important in
primates than in most other orders of animals.
The proof of any new scientific paradigm is in the eating - the
scientific discoveries and theoretical advances to which it leads.
Cognitive ethology is a kind of controlled anthropomorphism,
and, as C & S point out, "anthropomorphism works." It has led
us to discover all kinds of animal competences simply not
discoverable by looking through the myopic lenses of behav-
ioristic psychology or traditional ethology. The truly exciting
thing is that this approach to animal cognition, along with
judicious use of the comparative method, is now yielding fruits
in the reverse direction as well. For example, Premack's investi-
gations of the chimpanzee Sarah's "theory of mind" were begun,
almost certainly, by anthropomorphizing Sarah to some extent.
[See Premack: "Does the Chimpanzee have a Theory of Mind?"
BBS 1(4) 1978.] The resulting findings stimulated, in turn, what
is arguably the most exciting area of human developmental
research today, children's "theories of mind." This human work
is now informing the work of such other primatologists as C & S,
as evidenced most especially by their Chapter 8 on attribution.
In general, much of what has been discovered about the cen-
trality of social cognition in the evolution of primate intelligence
- note especially deWaal's (1982) study of chimpanzee politics -
derives at least in part from viewing nonhuman primates in
human terms (see also the papers in Parker & Gibson 1990). And
all of this will, in the very near future I predict (and hope),
reverberate back on the study of human cognition, mired for so
long in the totally noncomparative and asocial metaphor of the
computing machine.
C & S's book, by their own admission, has many gaps and
speculations. But it is an overall success precisely because it
goes beyond the available data. The authors do an excellent job
of revealing many of the exciting possibilities that open up when
primate social cognition is viewed in comparative perspective.
Comparisons to nonprimate species would reveal, I believe,
that Cheney & Seyfarth have overemphasized to some degree
the modularity theme. Overall, however, the book may be seen
as an important first step in a balanced view of how primates see
the world, and, one hopes, in bringing about a truly comparative
cognitive psychology in which social intelligence plays a major
role.
is lack of understanding of cayse-effect
relationships a suitable basis for interpreting
monkeys5 failures in attribution?
Elisabetta Visalberghs
Istituto di Psicologia, CNR, Via Alclrovandi 16 B, 00197 Rome, Italy
Electronic mail: zoo@irmkantbitnet
This is indeed a very stimulating book! It presents a large body of
evidence differentiating monkeys from apes in their abilities to
attribute states of mind to others. My attempt here is to present
the hypothesis that monkeys' lack of understanding of cause-
effect relationships is a factor that can account for their inability
to take into account other conspecifics' state of mind, as well as
to comprehend such other phenomena as tool use and imitation.
I accordingly try first to clarify (to the extent this is possible)
what a cause-effect relationship is and then to validate my
approach by examining a few examples reported in Cheney &
Seyfarth's (C & S's) critical review, especially the last chapter,
which provides excellent material to work on.
C & S state that "many of the results we describe could result
from associative learning; they might also involve a more com-
plex process that includes an understanding of causal relations
between different events" (p. 272). In fact, C & S sometimes do
suggest the importance of the understanding of causal rela-
tionships for the cognitive skills they consider (e.g., p. 289), but
they do not discuss this point thoroughly.
The study of perceptual illusions prompted Leslie (1988) to
argue that early in life we have a "perceptual mechanism
operating automatically and incorrigibly upon the spatio-tem-
poral properties of events yet producing abstract descriptions of
their causal structure" (p. 187). His experiments have shown
that six-month-old infants do not simply perceive spatiotem-
poral properties; they appear instead to identify causal rela-
tionships (Leslie 1986; Leslie & Keeble 1987). Such an under-
standing can promote particular ways children will
subsequently draw inferences and organize their knowledge
(see also Bower 1989). Because of this, children can greatly
improve the kinds of reasoning they adopt for dealing with life.
Experiments similar to those performed with infants will be
more than welcomed in primatology, especially because we do
have scattered evidence that monkeys do not seem to use a
cause-effect framework to represent their knowledge about
their physical and social world (whereas apes probably do, at
least to some extent).
What is a cause-effect relationship between A and B? How is it
different from an association between them? Events in space
and time can be organized as associations of two or more
elements or as cause-effect relationships. In the latter case, two
requirements must be fulfilled: A must be a sufficient condition
for B to occur (not a necessary one, because B can occur for other
causes as well), as in the logical relation of "material implication"
A D B. Usually some kind of proportionality is also expected: B
should be stronger or more evident if A is strong and evident.
Knowledge deriving from specific associations is often not suffi-
cient for behaving adequately when new conditions are present-
ed. In contrast, an analysis in terms of a cause-effect relationship
that incorporates the available information and suggests a tem-
poral and causal relation between elements allows us to formu-
late possible explanations when new conditions are presented.
On this basis it is then possible to draw inferences, to incorpo-
rate new elements, and to test, practically or mentally, the
relative plausibility of different cause-effect interpretations.
The comprehension of cause-effect relationships allows one to
connect events and to produce further hypotheses about how
things might be affected by the same or similar causes. Hypo-
thetical results can be compared with those produced by prac-
tical experimentation.
The attribution of mental states to conspecifics is clearly
advantageous. Attribution requires that an individual recognize
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that others' mental states can be different from his own, and that
what the other individual thinks can have an effect on behavior
(C & S, p. 249). I would add to this that attribution also requires
the understanding that what another individual "thinks" is in
turn caused by specific external/internal factors. Given this
consideration, let us then examine whether monkeys' lack of
success in attribution can indeed be accounted for by a lack of
causal understanding.
To know what a conspecific thinks, believes, feels (empathy),
or fails to master (thus requiring additional teaching), it is
necessary to have had, or to have witnessed, similar experiences
and to be capable of evaluating the effects of external/internal
circumstances (or other factors) on the conspecific. For exam-
ple, to feel empathy toward a mother whose infant died, it is
necessary to know (or imagine) the feelings caused by such a
loss. I suggest that in addition to the other requirements cur-
rently emphasized by primatologists as conditio sine qua non for
mind reading (e.g., Whiten 1991a) and imitation (Whiten &
Byrne 1991; see also Whiten & Byrne "Tactical Deception in
Primates" BBS 11(2) 1988), mind reading and imitation also
require the ability to draw inferences about the basis of cause-
effect relationships. For mind reading, associations would be
too time consuming, too unflexible, or impossible for rare
events, and not rapidly adjustable to new situations overall. For
example, deception requires an understanding of how knowl-
edge and lack of knowledge are caused. Similarly, to teach
something to somebody it is necessary to identify the cause of
the flaw in that individual's performance and to selectively teach
and draw attention to the erroneous step (see Boesch 1991).
Analogously, the failures reported for "naturalist monkeys"
(p. 277) can be accounted for by this framework. The reports
(Chapter 9) that baboons or vervets are not alarmed when they
see a carcass of an animal recently killed by a leopard or the track
left by a snake suggest that the monkeys have not previously
associated carcasses with the presence of leopards, or snakes
with tracks, nor can they infer from the carcass that a cat has
recently been in that area or that a snake has just passed by. A
causal approach to knowledge of events would have allowed the
monkeys, on the basis of elements of their past experience, to
infer the causal origin of a carcass. By the way, what is really a
predator for a monkey? It seems that a predator means much
more to us than to the animal itself: Thorough knowledge of a
predator involves its behaviors, its leftovers, the likelihood of
encountering it in different habitats, and so on. In contrast, for a
monkey the concept of a predator seems to be much more
restricted and cognitively simple.
Our experiments on tool-using skills and imitation in ca-
puchins (Cebus apella) also suggest that when these monkeys
use tools successfully, they have little or no comprehension of
the cause-effect relationships involved in using them (Vis-
alberghi & Limongelli in preparation; Visalberghi & Trinca
1989). The finding that capuchins' performance is full of errors,
which do not disappear through time, can also be accounted for
by a lack of understanding of what is wrong, that is, of the factors
that cause errors. Similarly, it can be argued that capuchins
consistently fail to imitate proficient models in tool-using tasks
because they do not understand the cause-effect relationship
linking objects, action, and outcome (see also Koehler 1925;
Piaget 1945; Visalberghi, in press; Visalberghi & Fragaszy). In
this sense, mind reading, tool use, and imitation sensu strictu,
all seem to depend on causal understanding.
An understanding of cause-effect relationships allows one to
identify the possibly relevant aspects of a phenomenon and to
select the potentially important elements within the wide range
of the existing ones, such that future experiences can confirm or
disconfirm the hypothesis. Whenever a phenomenon is under-
stood at a further level, its functioning is clarified so that several
possibilities can be discarded beforehand. The understanding of
a phenomenon produces explanations of its functioning on the
basis of which further predictions can be made.
In short, apes (or at least a language-trained chimpanzee such
as Sarah) are able to infer the solution of a problem they have
never solved before (Premack 1988b) and to understand the
cause of its solution. For example, Premack has demonstrated
that Sarah could answer such questions as: "What caused this?"
In addition, there is evidence that apes have a theory of mind
(see Whiten 1991a) and that they are capable of deception
(Woodruff & Premack 1979). Recent experiments have shown
that chimpanzees are capable of modeling the visual perspec-
tives of others (Povinelli et al. 1990) and that they know the
relationship between seeing and knowing. The chimpanzees are
thus able to infer the state of knowledge of another individual
resulting from seeing and not seeing. Povinelli et al. (1990)
argue that there can be no other basis for making such inferences
about the other's state of knowledge without an understanding
of the relevant causal relationship.
As C & S put it, "our inclination is to accumulate information
about the world that is not directly relevant to the getting and
spending of daily life" (p. 277). In addition, humans seem able to
adopt causal relationships to organize such information. This
opens up countless possibilities, for further inferences, predic-
tions, and interpretations about how things happen, work, and
are affected by a given set of elements. In contrast, whenever
there are two new elements a new association needs to be learnt,
and only then can it be used on later occasions.
ig, pretence and imitation in
A. Whiten
Scottish Primate Research Group, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews,
Fife KY16 9JU, Scotland
Electronic mail: a.whiten@st-andrews.ac.uk
How monkeys see the world offers an object lesson in how deep
questions about other primates' minds can be addressed in an
imaginative but rigorous empirical fashion (Whiten 1991b). I
think there are two major reasons why it has so advanced our
understanding.
First, the work has synthesised field observations of natural
social interactions with controlled experiments, in both field
and laboratory. Although excellent models for this approach
have been available for some time (e.g., Krebs & Davies, 1990,
for a review; Tinbergen 1951; 1959), their application to pri-
mates has been all too limited despite the pioneering attempts of
Kummer (1971; 1981). Second, Cheney & Seyfarth (C & S) have
devised ways of testing, usually for the first time, the operation
in monkeys of a number of mental processes generally consid-
ered central to human social cognition: in particular, social
knowledge, the representation of meaning, and attribution of
mental states to others.
All this can hardly fail to raise many matters for discussion.
Here I restrict myself to those that, as the authors say, "strike at
the heart of how monkeys see the world" (p. 183) and thus
occupy the longest chapter, on the attribution of mental states to
others (mind reading).
C & S describe two series of experiments testing for (and
interpreted as indicating a lack of) mental attribution. As the
first attempts to do this for monkeys these are admirable, but
there are difficulties of interpretation. In one experiment (pp.
218-23), mothers failed to make more attempts to inform infants
about foods or potential "predators" when the infants were
ignorant of these than when they already knew about them.
However, as described, the experiment appeared to separate
mother and infant with a steel partition, so the mother would
herself be ignorant of whether or not the infant could see the
critical events. In successful tests of the attribution of knowl-
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edge versus ignorance by chimpanzees (Povinelli et al. 1990; see
also summary in Premack 1988a), the mind-reading subject
could see directly whether the other individual could see the
events.
C & S's second experiment, to be able to discriminate be-
tween ignorance and knowledge the subject was first required to
understand the operation of one-way windows. Although sub-
jects were familiarised with such windows, however, there is no
check that they had understood their significance. Moreover, it
would seem that for the experiment to work, just to understand
the implications of the one-way mirror for the potential object of
mind reading would itself require attribution of a sort that may
be particularly sophisticated: an appreciation that another indi-
vidual would suffer the same particular state of ignorance to
which one had oneself earlier been subject when looking
through the window one way, but not the other.
Despite this, the experiment produced several results pre-
dicted by the attribution hypothesis, as well as negative results.
C & S are inclined to dismiss the positive results because they
say they could have been produced by the subject discriminat-
ing behavioural rather than mental states: However, if this is the
case, then one must ask what results the authors would have
accepted. Was the experiment a valid test in the first place?
Therefore, it does not seem appropriate to dismiss mental
attribution on the basis of these first experiments with monkeys.
It may be, however, that C & S have aimed rather high in testing
for attribution of knowledge in the first instance. In child
development, there is evidence that attribution of such epis-
temic states does not occur in the earliest stages, but rather is
preceded both by what Wellman (1991) calls a "simple desire
psychology" in which others' wants are represented, and by
some understanding of seeing (Flavell et al. 1981). Attribution of
these "easier" states by monkeys might thus be more rewarding
of investigation. Whiten and Byrne (1988a) found that most of
their catalogue of primate tactical deception was concerned with
the monitoring and manipulation of others' seeing and visual
attention, and Whiten and Byrne (1988b) argued that episodes
of partial hiding in monkeys (in which A hides a part of itself from
B while still watching B) suggested the ability to take the visual
perspective of another: But this has yet to be tested experimen-
tally.
Cheney & Seyfarth and Whiten and Byrne (1.991) are in
agreement that (1) neither observational nor experimental stud-
ies to date have supported attribution in monkeys, whereas (2)
on the basis of both observational and experimental evidence,
"chimpanzees do indeed seem more skilled than monkeys at
attributing states of mind to others' (p. 252); is the expression
"more skilled' to imply that monkeys may mind-read a little? It
would be interesting to know what the authors are thinking of
here).
Whiten (1989b) and Whiten and Byrne (1991) have suggested
that this apparent monkey/ape difference in mind reading may
be part of a much larger mental pattern, which also finds
parallels in developmental distinctions. Interestingly, the phe-
nomena of pretence and imitation which we incorporate into this
analysis are also addressed in C & S's chapter on attribution, but
with different interpretations.
Whiten and Byrne (1991) extended Leslie's (1987) argument
that an ability to represent representations (metarepresenta-
tion) is not only fundamental to developing a theory of mind, but
is first expressed in children's development of pretend play.
Leslie offers evidence for this both in the sequence of develop-
ment in normal children and, perhaps more powerfully, the
dual deficits in both theory of mind and pretend play in autistic
children. Whiten and Byrne showed that, as predicted by this
model, chimpanzees showed dual superiority in the evidence
for both mindreading and pretend play, and we further sug-
gested that imitation fits the same underlying monkey/ape
difference in metarepresentational ability. Thus, what we offer
is the prospect of a unifying explanation for a cluster of mental
abilities, and for both developmental and phylogenetic changes
in these.
C & S discuss much of the same evidence for pretend play,
but instead they use it as one of several "measures" of mental
attribution (others include deception and teaching, for exam-
ple). They suggest that self-awareness is one measure of attribu-
tion and that pretend play is suggestive of self-recognition.
Quoting F. Scott Fitzgerald ("The test of a first rate intelligence
is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind and still retain
the ability to function" [p. 205]), they suggest that the mind
reading of an ape falls short of attributing mental states different
from its own, and that equally, pretend play does not require the
handling of different mental states: "Although an individual who
engages in pretend play must entertain multiple representa-
tions of an object or an event, these representations are shared
by all of the game's participants. To recognise someone else's
belief, on the other and, an individual must consider multiple
representation that differ among those involved" (p. 244). It is
certainly true that no ape has yet passed a test of false belief
attribution (Premack 1988a; Premack & Dasser 1991). The point
of Leslie's analysis of pretend play as metarepresentation, how-
ever, was that holding "two opposed ideas in mind" was essen-
tial. The child pretending a banana is a telephone cannot merely
represent the object as a telephone: It is essential for the child's
maintenance of a grasp on reality to preserve a primary repre-
sentation of the object as banana, together with a metarepresen-
tation of the banana as telephone. Chimpanzees playing quite
complex games with imaginary objects (C & S, p. 206; Whiten &
Byrne 1991) must equally have in mind a representation of the
true absence of the object, together with a representation of its
pretend presence and properties.
Turning to imitation as another possible measure of attribu-
tion, C & S suggest that "chimpanzees and other apes seem
more adept than monkeys at learning to use tools through
observation, possibly because they are more adept at imputing
purpose to others" (p. 229). I agree about the apparent
ape/monkey difference in imitation (Whiten 1989a; Whiten &
Ham 1992). However, is this because apes mind-read others'
purposes? This may explain some aspects of chimpanzee obser-
vational learning, such as the tendency to copy the results of
others' actions rather than their precise form, as reported by
Tomasello et al. (1987): However, it does not account for the
ability to copy a range of actions with no apparent purpose, such
as spinning on one leg and pulling faces, as tested by Hayes and
Hayes (1952). Instead, Whiten and Byrne (1991) have suggested
that the imitative capacity of chimpanzees may also be explained
by an underlying metarepresentational facility. To imitate a
complex action pattern requires, in effect, getting the be-
havioural programme out of the other's head and into one's own.
This is not merely a matter of visual perspective taking in the
sense of knowing what the other can or cannot see, but rather of
being able to represent the actions as controlled from the other's
perspective and translating this into one's own action
programme.
Cheney & Seyfarth's achievements in this book lead to some
optimism that such differing interpretations of the evidence will
be subjected to further imaginative and careful testing.
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Characterizing the mind of another species
Dorothy L. Cheney3 & Robert M. Seyfarthb




We want to begin by thanking our reviewers for their many
complimentary remarks and for their constructive criticism. If
we are ever to gain an understanding of how another species
thinks, the enterprise will have to be a joint venture, ap-
proached from many different perspectives. It will be a pleasure
to work with colleagues whose thinking is so often less woolly
than our own, even though the same issues seem to confuse us
all. It is evident from the reviewers' sometimes conflicting
advice and criticism that the goals and methods of our (and their)
research have not yet been clearly delineated or defined. On the
other hand, if they were, the pursuit would be much less fun. If,
in this riposte, we occasionally point out the ways that reviewers
contradict each other, this is not to belittle their comments but
only to emphasize that similar goals need not preclude quite
different approaches and attitudes.
1. The general approach. Is it scientifically respectable to
talk about what monkeys might need to think about?
Perhaps Nagel, Wittgenstein, and Quine (in addition to
many others) are right to suggest that it is foolish hubris
even to attempt to understand how another species (or
even another human) thinks. Yet we believe that this
"Panglossian paradigm" (Dennett 1983) is at the very
least heuristically interesting, if only because it addresses
intriguing problems and generates predictable hypoth-
eses. It seems to us that one can learn little about the
mind of another species if one does not at least attempt to
tackle the issue from that species' own perspective, with
some consideration of that species' functional needs.
Although our book purports to examine how monkeys
think, we can in fact say little about the mental mecha-
nisms (cognitive or otherwise) that underlie behavior.
Our definitions and methods are operational. We rely
exclusively on behavior to infer mental processes, and our
approach is at best indirect. Allen correctly points out
that we have fudged the issue of realism. This is partly
because of our ignorance of philosophy, but it also seems
to us true that talk about mental content - whether
philosophically reasonable, logical, or not - is indeed
indispensable to adaptive explanations of behavior.
Many reviewers in addition to Allen are aware of the
dangers of attempting to chart a course between the
Scylla of subjective mentalism and the Charybdis of
behaviorism. Indeed, Burghardt's remarks suggest that
we may have to spend the rest of our careers removing the
hurdles we have erected in our paths. There is little
consensus among reviewers, however, about precisely
which hurdle is most likely to bring us down. Dittrich
cautions that the utilitarian approach to animal cognition
may be doomed because we will never really be able to
understand how another species thinks. FIgeeredo and
Glotzbachj in contrast, think that an approach that at-
tempts to determine what animals "need" to know may
be helpful in explaining not only what abilities animals do
have but also what abilities they manifestly do not have.
We do not claim, as Dittrich thinks, that getting inside
the mind of a monkey is a simple empirical problem. It is a
truism that we will never understand completely what it
is like to be a monkey, simply because we are not
monkeys. But this logical fact need not bring on empirical
paralysis.
For anyone who believes that it is logically impossible
even to attempt to understand how another species
thinks, the second part of our book's title is futile pre-
tense. Furth, in contrast, has no problem with this part of
the title; his quarrel is with the first. For Furth, our use of
the word "see" presupposes that monkeys are in some
sense able to reflect actively upon the world, rather than
simply behaving in it. Because we conclude that monkeys
do not know what they know, we can really only talk about
sensory-motor know-how. Thus our use of the word
"see," rather than being a heuristic term (our original
intent), instead reveals our inadequate theory of knowl-
edge.
It is clear from the reviewers' comments that the role of
anthropomorphism in studies of animal cognition remains
a matter of some debate. Tonaasello believes that an-
thropomorphism can help scientists discover all kinds of
competences in animals not previously uncovered by
behaviorism or traditional ethology. Seowdoe finds our
comparisons of vervets' abilities with humans' and other
animals' at least conceptually interesting. Why, for exam-
ple, don't vervets teach their infants when it would seem
adaptive to do so? Why don't they recognize python
tracks when sand wasps are capable of recognizing the
subtle visual cues that demarcate their nests? Burghardt
agrees that critical anthropomorphism can be a valuable
tool in designing experiments and generating predictions
about behavior, but only if (and here he is not particularly
reassuring) one can avoid its many pitfalls. Povleelli &
deBlois, in contrast, believe that our work is flawed
because we have not been anthropocentric enough. In
their view, we should link our research with comparable
work on children more explicitly.
Furth also believes that our work is deeply flawed, but
for the opposite reason. For him, our adult-human -
ceetrism prevents us from viewing behavior in terms of
species-specific adaptations. Rather than being puzzled
about such apparently maladaptive behavior as the failure
to attend to a dummy leopard (actually no such result was
ever mentioned in our book, but the example will suffice),
we should be content to explain behavior as the result of
species-specific, genetic predispositions to engage in par-
ticular sensory-motor activities. Furth believes we would
be better off accepting species differences and asking
questions about cognitive mechanisms as a function of
these differences. This is certainly a reasonable long-term
objective; it is worth noting, however, that to date there
have been surprisingly few studies on issues like "inten-
tional" communication, theories of mind, or domain-
specific knowledge in group-living nonhuman primates.
It is therefore inevitable that the behavior and commu-
nication of vervet monkeys will sometimes be compared
with that of humans, but this does not imply a judgment
that humans are better than monkeys.
Moreover, Furth does not say how it is possible to
investigate species differences without at some point
making at least implicit comparisons. How can we even
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ask whether monkeys, for example, recognize mental
states in others if we do not already know that adult
humans do? How can we assess the vocalizations of
monkeys without some comparisons with those of birds
and humans? How easy is it to recognize the absence of an
ability in one species without first identifying its presence
in another?
2. Social behawior* How do monkeys keep track of social
relationships and past interactions? Midley describes sev-
eral means by which vervets might remember past in-
teractions and argues that their memory is unlikely to be
episodic. Rather than remembering past events, Ridley
argues, monkeys may simply judge individuals and
events as familiar and act accordingly.
None of our observations or experiments allow us to
identify the mental processes that underlie behavior.
Nevertheless, we wonder whether a vervet's memory of
previous social interactions is based solely on familiarity.
Consider, for example, the "reciprocal altruism" experi-
ment described in Chapter 3 and discussed by Gouzoules
(see below). In these experiments, recent affinitive in-
teractions with a particular individual influenced whether
or not a monkey would attend to that individual's solicita-
tion for aid, but only if that individual was a nonrelative. If
the solicitor was a close relative, subjects responded
regardless of whether or not they had recently interacted.
This selective attention suggests, at the very least, that
monkeys remember past events involving particular
classes of individuals quite differently. It is also difficult to
apply the familiarity principle to the spite shown by
chimpanzees toward individuals who have recently
formed alliances against them. On the other hand,
whether or not monkeys or even apes have conscious
access to their own memory is Indeed doubtful. If epi-
sodic memory requires such access, then perhaps a ver-
vet's memory is primarily declarative, as Ridley suggests.
Our discussion of primate social relationships draws
heavily on laboratory research on animal "concepts." We
are therefore puzzled by Dittrich's assertion that we are
critical of such research. In fact, we discuss this research
at some length on pp. 86-91, citing some of the same
authors as Dittrich does. Although laboratory experi-
ments do indeed sometimes lack ecological and social
relevance, they can also be more successful than field
observations in addressing the mechanisms that govern
behavior. Clearly, research on animal cognition requires
an integrated approach that makes use of both laboratory
and field data. Because studies of animal cognition have
tended to be strongly laboratory-oriented, however, we
agree with Harcourt that it Is important to emphasize
how much can be learned from less precisely controlled
but perhaps more functionally relevant field observations
and experiments.
Our experiments and observations are far from com-
plete. Many gaps and holes need to be filled, and many
experiments need to be replicated and elaborated.
Gouzoules points out one Important missing control in
our "reciprocal altruism" experiment. Let us add an-
other. One conclusion of this experiment is that prior
affinitive interactions affect the willingness of vervets to
cooperate with nonrelatives. In contrast, vervets' willing-
ness to aid kin appears to be unaffected by recent events.
In fact, to document this kin effect more convincingly, we
should have controlled for overall interaction rates. Gen-
erally speaking, monkeys interact more with kin than
nonkin. As a result, our apparent kin effect could simply
have occurred because two individuals who Interact at
high rates pay less attention to any particular recent event
than two individuals who Interact Infrequently. Future
tests of the reciprocal altruism hypothesis should control
for this potential confound more explicitly by exploiting
the variation in interaction rates that exists among kin and
nonkin. If we could show that monkeys are more willing to
attend to kin with whom they seldom interact than they are
to unrelated "friends" with whom they interact at high
rates, we could claim with more certainty that cooperation
with kin is not dependent on reciprocity.
3. Communication. Any discussion of a topic as broad as
communication will suffer from sins of omission; ours Is no
exception. Thus Owings is right to point out that first
alarm calls may serve different functions from second and
subsequent alarm calls. Similarly, the apparent "mis-
takes" that Infants make when giving alarm calls may
Indeed be requests to recruit adult aid and guidance, and
the silence of adults after Infants' alarm-call at non-
predators may shape the infants' developing knowledge
about predators. We only wish that Owings had provided
some suggestions about how we might go about testing
these hypotheses.
We also agree with Dewsbury that we need more old-
fashioned ethologlcal studies to Investigate not just what
stimuli (social or otherwise) cause calls to be given or
modified, but more especially to determine what patterns
of behavior are not changed by the presence of an au-
dience. It is always more difficult and inconclusive to
study negative results, but we will learn much about the
production and function of signals by doing so.
We are puzzled by Dewsbury's claims that we reject
the arousal hypothesis as a possible explanation for the
"audience effect." We were not aware of doing so. In-
deed, as we state explicitly in several places in the book,
our assessment of the meaning and function of vocaliza-
tions depends almost entirely on the responses these
signals evoke from others. As a result, we can never state
precisely what the motivational basis of a signal is. It may
well be that signalers are simply more aroused when they
are In the presence of their relatives than when they are
alone or near unrelated animals, and that as a result they
call more when kin are present.
The fact that we assess the meaning and function of
vocalizations almost exclusively through responses, how-
ever, is a fundamental weakness of our observational and
experimental methods, and we wish that Snowdon were
less perspicacious In revealing this flaw. Because our
definition of the meaning and function of calls is derived
from listeners' responses, we can say little about the
perceptual or cognitive processes underlying the produc-
tion of calls. If we observe that a female fails to give an
alarm call and that her rival is consequently eaten by a
leopard, we can say that the female's silence functioned to
deceive, but we cannot say that the signaler intended
such deception.
Under natural conditions, the only way to measure the
meaning of a call from the signaler's perspective is to elicit
a call, and this proved very difficult with vervet monkeys.
One can attempt to elicit calls by presenting subjects with
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either a visual stimulus (e.g., a stuffed python) or an
auditory stimulus (e. g., a leopard's roar, a starling's alarm
call). Until holograms become a routine part of field
experimentation, most sorts of visual stimuli will remain
impractical - how does one present a monkey with a
stuffed version of a close relative or a higher-ranking
female? Playbacks of auditory stimuli are more feasible,
but in the case of vervet monkeys they failed to elicit vocal
responses. Vervets are relatively quiet and seldom an-
swer each other's calls. As a result, we could assess the
meaning of calls only through the behavioral responses
that our playback experiments evoked.
Many other primate species, however, are consider-
ably more "conversational" than vervets. Baboons not
only answer each other's calls at high rates but also
regularly split up into foraging parties that maintain
contact through calls and answering countercalls. In such
species, presumably, signalers have the option of "choos-
ing" to provide or withhold information to those who are
out of sight and to answer other individuals' calls with
acoustically similar or different calls. It seems possible,
therefore, that playback experiments could successfully
be used in other species to reveal the meaning of calls
from the signaler's perspective.
fiappe & Frith discuss some fascinating parallels be-
tween the communication of nonhuman primates and
that of autistic humans. They point out that both monkeys
and autistic humans fail to represent or manipulate other
individuals' intentions. The communication of intention
is a rich contextual component of human speech, and one
that apparently makes speech far more flexible than the
vocalizations of monkeys. The suggestion that monkey
vocalizations have a semantic meaning that is relatively
context-independent was initially controversial. Iron-
ically, however, as Happe & Frith point out, this context-
independence actually places severe restrictions on com-
munication. Like autistic humans, monkeys appear to
have a form of coded communication with set meanings
that, although certainly capable of transmitting informa-
tion, is relatively rigid.
Baron-Cohen makes the related point that most vervet
calls appear to be imperative, in the sense that they are
given with the intent of causing another individual to do
something, like flee from a leopard. Children's utter-
ances, in contrast, tend to be declarative comments about
the world. Whereas monkey vocalizations function to
influence behavior, children's comments appear to be
given with the intent to influence attention. It is indeed
difficult to think of any vervet calls that are declarative
rather than imperative. The one that comes closest is the
grunt that vervets give when they are about to move into a
potentially dangerous area of their range, or when they
are observing others do so. This "MIG" grunt appears to
function to direct listeners' attention to the group prog-
ression, and can be interpreted to mean something like
"Look! I'm (or Claude is) moving into a dangerous area.
Watch out for me (or Claude)!" Nevertheless, because
this call can also be viewed as a low intensity alerting or
warning call, the line between declarative and imperative
function is blurred.
If declarative comments do indeed suggest that the
speaker is trying to affect the listener's mind, as Baron-
Cohen suggests, we might expect to find more evidence
of declarative comments in apes (or at least chimpanzees)
than in monkeys. Unfortunately, there have as yet been
no detailed studies of the vocalizations of any of the great
apes. It is interesting to note, however, that in Greenfield
& Savage-Rumbaugh's (1990) study of the spontaneous
"sentences" generated by the language-trained bonobo
Kanzi, most of Kanzi's messages appeared to be imper-
ative rather than declarative. Although Kanzi combined
many signs into novel two- and three-word sentences, the
majority of these were imperatives, directed at causing
the trainer to do something for Kanzi. The paucity of
declarative sentences may reflect a genuine cognitive
difference between bonobos and children. It may also, of
course, simply reveal that a bonobo is not particularly
motivated to make profound or interesting comments
about life to a member of another species.
4. Attribution. The majority of commentators focused
their remarks on our chapter devoted to theories of mind,
thereby reinforcing Furth's suspicion that the emphasis
on self and mental state is the product of middle-class
Western ideology.
It is clear from the reviewers' comments that there
exists no single definition of a theory of mind, and that
many different patterns of behavior will have to be exam-
ined before we understand the extent to which monkeys
and apes attribute mental states to each other. Whiten,
for example, cites Leslie's (1987) work on pretend play in
children as one of the earliest manifestations of the child's
developing ability to represent representations. In con-
trast, Povinelli & deBlois are not convinced that pretend
play is anything more than evidence of the child's in-
ability to grasp the representational aspects of language.
Similar problems arise in the reviewers' discussions of
self-awareness. Povinelli & deBlois deride our definition
of self-recognition (as opposed to self-awareness) as im-
plying that "we would have to talk about certain species of
flowering plants as being capable of self-recognition." But
this is precisely the point. All animals - and even cells -
recognize themselves to some degree. At what point,
however, do individuals become able to reflect upon
themselves, in a sense to interview themselves? We are
sure that many reviewers will be as surprised as we were
to learn that self-recognition is defined primarily in terms
of one "specific behavior . . . (- that) of producing self-
directed behavior in front of a mirror." Surely, just as
there are many levels of self-recognition and self-
awareness there must also be more than one criterion by
which to measure the ways individuals in any species
recognize themselves.
Other commentators are more willing than Povinelli &
deBlois to discuss self-recognition outside the mirror
context. Armstrong agrees with our suggestion that
monkeys do not have "meta-self-awareness," as evi-
denced particularly in the apparent inability of monkeys
to transfer a skill acquired in one context to another.
Clearly, however, monkeys have some degree of self-
recognition. Ridley agrees that monkeys' ability to recog-
nize their own dominance rank relative to others requires
some form of self-recognition, even if they do not have
complete access to the contents of their own minds.
Monkeys obviously have a form of self-recognition differ-
ent from that of a flower or the immune system. But how
should we characterize it?
As we mention in Chapter 8, even when self-recogni-
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tion is defined solely in terms of mirror tests, results are
ambiguous. On the one hand, monkeys do not seem to
recognize their own reflections. On the other hand, they
do not always treat mirror images as other monkeys and
can learn to use mirrors to guide their own hands. If we
restrict the definition of self-recognition to the ability to
recognize one's reflection in a mirror, then clearly chim-
panzees have self-recognition and monkeys don't. This
stark dichotomy obscures some important information,
however. Research on self-recognition will be severely
constrained if we limit our definition to one narrow
behavior, particularly one whose function is not at all
clear.
This point is reinforced by Schull & Smith, who con-
tend that monkeys have considerably more self-
awareness than we (and those who define self-recognition
in terms of mirror recognition) had previously believed.
They cite an experiment in which captive rhesus maca-
ques learn to "bail out" of discrimination trials that are too
difficult for them. Such behavior, they argue, indicates
that monkeys are able to monitor and exploit their own
mental states of doubt and uncertainty.
We never argued that monkeys are unable to monitor
their own abilities. Indeed, no doubt many animals in
addition to primates regularly do so. Vervet monkeys
assess not just their opponents' but also their own domi-
nance ranks and fighting abilities before deciding
whether or not to intervene in a dispute. Similarly, in
many animal species (including many species of insects),
competitive interactions between 'males are charac-
terized by prolonged, ritualized displays that apparently
function to allow opponents to assess each other's relative
fighting abilities. If a rival's fighting ability seems greater
than his own, a male will "bail out" before the contest
escalates, just as rhesus macaques "bail out" of difficult
discrimination tasks. Our point is not that monkeys and
other animals are incapable of assessing their own abili-
ties but that they may not be aware of making such
assessments. The methodological and conceptual chal-
lenge is to determine some way to measure the extent to
which a rhesus macaque (or any other animal) can actively
reflect and report on his actions.
Povinelli & deBlois correctly argue that tests of attribu-
tion in nonhuman primates have much to learn meth-
odologically from similar tests in children. We also be-
lieve, however, that we should be cautious in drawing too
many parallels between children and nonhuman pri-
mates, if only because we are dealing with entirely
different species that have evolved under different social
and environmental selective pressures. Because children
are not monkeys or apes, we can never be sure that a
monkey or ape "fails" or "passes" a test of attribution for
the same reason a child does. Precisely for this reason, it
seems advisable to investigate nonhuman primates' theo-
ries of mind in as natural a setting as possible.
Laboratory tests with captive animals are valuable for
many reasons, and research on the cognitive capacities of
animals would be severely constrained if it relied ex-
clusively on free-ranging populations. At the same time,
however, we agree with Harcourt that laboratory studies
should not ignore their subjects' natural history or be
conducted in a functional vacuum. The tests conducted
by Povinelli and his colleagues have suggested that chim-
panzees, but not rhesus macaques, attribute knowledge
and ignorance to human trainers (Povinelli et al. 1990).
These experiments are potentially important, because
they provide some of the first nonanecdotal evidence of
chimpanzees' recognition that two individuals can simul-
taneously hold different beliefs. Povinelli's experiments
are complicated, however, by the fact that they rely on
human informants and depend on a surprisingly large
number of training trials. Differences in the frequency
with which chimpanzees chose knowledgeable humans
over ignorant ones reached statistical significance only
after at least 100 trials (for the most accomplished sub-
jects). Even then, subjects continued to choose ignorant
guessers approximately 30% of the time.
Circus trainers know that it is possible to train a pig to
put coins into a piggy bank, but no one imagines that this
behavior occurs in the absence of human training or has
any function outside the circus context. Instead, the
banking behavior reflects pigs' natural predilections for
rooting and digging. Similarly, the fact that captive chim-
panzees can be trained to distinguish between knowl-
edgeable and ignorant humans suggests - but does not
prove - that they might also be able to recognize igno-
rance and knowledge in their companions under less
constrained conditions (although the fact that they con-
tinue to choose the ignorant trainer at such a high rate
remains puzzling). The experiment tells us nothing, how-
ever, about why chimpanzees might need to assess men-
tal states in others or the circumstances in which they use
this ability under natural conditions.
From our own perspective, Povinelli's experiment
would be far more illuminating if it dispensed entirely
with human training and used other chimpanzees as
informants. If untrained chimpanzees could be shown to
recognize the difference between a knowledgeable and
ignorant conspecific (as we suspect they could), we would
be in a better position to begin to address some of the
"critical questions about the evolution of attribution in
our prelinguistic ancestors" that concern Povinelli &
deBlois.
Boesch also argues that evidence of imitation, teach-
ing, and empathy must be sought in contexts where such
abilities are functionally relevant; he cites several exam-
ples of apparent teaching and empathy among chim-
panzees in the Tai forest. Boesch's data have been pains-
takingly gathered and make a major contribution to the
study of animal cognition. The examples he cites suggest
that chimpanzees are far more adept than monkeys at
monitoring the mental states of others. We wonder,
however, whether the Tai chimpanzees are as different
from Gombe chimpanzees as Boesch claims. For exam-
ple, it is clear that the Tai chimpanzees recognize injuries
and physical handicaps in others and tend to injured
individuals in ways that monkeys do not. We cited several
similar examples from Gombe in our book. Although
chimpanzees respond to visual manifestations of dis-
abilities, however, there is still no convincing evidence
that they empathize with other individuals' feelings,
especially those (like grief) that have no obvious, overt
manifestation. There have as yet been no reports, for
example, of chimpanzees comforting a mother whose
infant has died.
Similarly, if the Tai chimpanzees really differ from
other populations of chimpanzees in showing active ped-
agogy, why does teaching occur so infrequently? Boesch's
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explanation that teaching is rare because most skills can
be learned through other methods is not very satisfactory;
even when it is not absolutely essential, teaching can
nevertheless be far more efficient than trial and error or
observational learning. Despite hundreds of hours of
observation, Boesch (1991) has recorded only two clear
instances of teaching among the Tai chimpanzees (al-
though he has observed many hundreds of instances in
which mothers apparently stimulated and facilitated their
infants' learning). Assuming that chimpanzee mothers
really do compare their own knowledge with the knowl-
edge of their offspring, is active teaching rare only be-
cause it is generally not essential to survival and re-
production? How do we test this hypothesis?
We agree with Boesch that we must not exaggerate the
importance of teaching, informing, and imitation when
considering how information is exchanged. As Perlcie
points out, even among humans, communication often
occurs at the level of zero- and first-order intentionality.
One implicit theme running through these commen-
taries, however, is that we must develop some means of
measuring the significance of the absence of a behavior.
This is not just silly metaphysics; it is not the same as
asking why competing male butterflies have not evolved
machine guns, or how many angels could dance on the
head of a pin. Animals do many things that we think we
can explain; they also do many things we can't explain and
fail to do many things we think they ought to do. If we' see
an apparently maladaptive behavior, we should not con-
clude immediately that it is beyond the animals' sensory
capacities to do otherwise, as Furtti argues. Similarly, if
we fail to see some expected pattern of behavior we
should not be too quick to conclude that the behavior is
not functionally relevant. Both these conclusions are
likely to be correct, but we will miss a lot if we don't at
least entertain other explanations.
Like Boesch and Perloe, Mealey questions whether a
contingency-based strategy for interpreting other indi-
viduals' behavior is really less effective than one based on
the analysis of other individuals' mental states. One
simple answer to this question is that it depends on the
strategy used by one's audience. Mealey correctly argues
that even humans often use a contingency-based strategy
when interacting with each other; she cites a hypothetical
psychopath who, though lacking empathy, is able to
manipulate the behavior of others. As a thought experi-
ment, this example is instructive. It would have been
more helpful, however, if Mealey had provided some
real-life examples of psychopaths who lacked any knowl-
edge of other individuals' thoughts, knowledge, or feel-
ings and yet were able to manipulate other peoples'
behavior in noncoercive ways.
Whiten agrees with our general conclusion that few
studies to date have found convincing support for the
attribution of mental states in monkeys. He also feels,
however, that we have aimed rather high in defining
attribution in terms of the recognition of knowledge. His
argument is not just theoretical, but also empirical. He
questions our interpretation of an experiment in which
macaque mothers apparently failed to recognize igno-
rance in their offspring and therefore failed to alert them
to food or danger. Because their offspring were hidden
behind a steel partition, he argues, mothers could not
know that they could not see the critical events. We
would reply that because offspring were absent when the
critical events occurred, any mother capable of doing so
should have inferred that her offspring was ignorant,
particularly because the offspring's subsequent behavior
(e.g., approaching a dangerous area) indicated ignorance.
In fact, however, neither absence during the event nor
subsequent behavior cued the mothers to their offspring's
ignorance. Just as in the mirror experiments mentioned
by Whiten, it seems that if one is incapable of recognizing
how knowledge is acquired, one may not be able to
recognize knowledge or ignorance in others.
Whereas Whiten feels that we may have prematurely
dismissed the possibility that monkeys attribute mental
states different from their own to others, Noble & David-
son think that we have concluded the reverse. They infer
from our use of the term "mental state" that we have
concluded that monkeys attribute mental states to others.
This is an alarming misconception because it suggests that
our prose was so inscrutable that we conveyed precisely
the opposite of what we intended. What we thought we
said was this: Monkeys may indeed have mental states
(although we are vague about what forms these mental
states take), but they do not apparently recognize mental
states in others or even in themselves. Apes (or at least
chimpanzees) seem better than monkeys at recognizing
ignorance and even false beliefs in others, but the data are
inconclusive and sometimes contradictory. Our in-
terpretation of Menzel's experiments depends neither on
ESP nor the attribution of mental states (although both
remain possible). Indeed, as we state on p. 238, "some
aspect of the leader's behavior (our emphasis) allowed the
rest of the group to recognize when the hidden item was
aversive.
6. Domain-specific intelligence It is a tautology that
animals are adapted to perform some tasks more easily
than others and that apparently stupid animals sometimes
do remarkably intelligent things. Leaf-cutting ants, for
example, cultivate fungus farms to feed themselves and
their larvae. Leaves are cut from trees and "planted" in
the nest to allow a particular form of fungus to grow on
them. The growing fungus is carefully cultivated and any
undesirable species of fungus that might begin to grow on
the leaves is carefully weeded out (as described by Gould
1982). The ants behave as if they recognize that fungus is
caused by keeping leaves in dark, damp places, and their
careful cultivation of the fungus crop seems as purposeful
and goal-directed as any human farmer's. Nevertheless,
even though we can apply a purposeful, intentional vo-
cabulary to leaf-cutting ants, it is extremely unlikely that
the ants are aware of their goal-directed behavior, or that
they understand the causal relation between decompos-
ing leaves and growing fungus. Instead, the behavior is a
relatively inflexible adaptation to a particular environ-
mental selective pressure.
It is intuitively easy to explain leaf-cutting and fungus
cultivation in terms of specialized neural structures
adapted to perform in specific, narrow contexts. It is more
difficult, however, to imagine that some of the apparently
complex patterns of behavior manifested by nonhuman
primates might also be confined to relatively specific
contexts. Is it really possible that a baboon who uses
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transitive inference to assess companions' dominance
ranks would be unable to assess the amount of food
contained in different-sized containers?
The notion of domain-specific intelligence is unsatisfy-
ing from both a conceptual and empirical perspective.
Indeed, so little research has been done on this topic that
we cannot even state for certain that we are dealing with a
real phenomenon. As Tomasello points out, it has proven
difficult to define precisely what a domain is and what
mechanisms underlie it. Is a domain a discrete perceptual
system, as Fodor (1983; see also BBS multiple book
review of Fodor: "The Modularity of the Mind" BBS 8(1)
1985) might argue? Are we talking about differences in
sensitivity to particular stimuli, learning, memory, or
some combination of all these factors? In addition, what,
if anything, delineates one domain from another, and how
much communication occurs between domains? We dis-
cuss these points to some extent in Chapter 9, but
Dugatkin & Clark are right when they emphasize that we
know as little about cognitive mechanisms within appar-
ent domains as we do about the transfer of skills across
domains.
Part of the difficulty results from the fact that we still
know little about the neural structures underlying behav-
ior and perception. Moreover, even though it may
eventually prove possible to correlate some forms of
behavior with specific neural structures, similar correla-
tions for other patterns of behavior will no doubt remain
more elusive. It is now possible, for example, to identify
specific areas in the forebrains of birds that control song
production and comprehension. We also know that there
are specific areas in the left hemispheres of monkeys'
brains that are important in the perception and produc-
tion of species-specific calls. As yet, however, we cannot
even begin to talk about specific areas in the brain that
affect the ability to attend to social, as opposed to non-
social, stimuli.
There are also methodological problems. First, as is
true for other aspects of the research discussed here, we
have no satisfactory means of dealing with negative re-
sults - the failure to perform a task or recognize a
stimulus. Second, there have as yet been almost no
attempts to present animals with logically similar prob-
lems that differ only in stimulus type. As a result, there is
still very little evidence that any monkey species is really
more adept at solving social problems than ecological
ones.
These problems disturb many commentators. Dews-
bury is concerned that the social intelligence hypothesis
is so vague that, when combined with the principle of
transfer, it can be used to explain almost any observation.
Cords worries about the appropriateness of opposing a
socially based view of intelligence with an ecologically
based one, because food-finding occurs in conjunction
with social competition. We make this same point in
Chapter 9. Cords also emphasizes that we know very little
about how monkeys classify and compare food resources.
Experiments with birds, for example, have shown that
animals are often very adept at assessing the relative
value of two widely separated food patches, and they
apparently compare food patches before deciding to
abandon one patch for another. Comparable experiments
with nonhuman primates simply have not been done.
Response/Cheney & Seyfarth: How monkeys see the world
Like Cords, Dittricti and Galdikas argue that the
evolution of intelligence should not be viewed in terms of
selection acting in a single, narrowly defined domain. In
fact, we never make this claim as baldly as Dittrich
implies. As we state on p. 295, "the argument about
domain-specific intelligence does not aim to oppose one
comprehensive ecological argument against an equally
comprehensive social one" (original emphasis). Rather
the hypothesis is that abilities manifested in one context
may not always be generalized to others.
Implicit in much of the "social function of intelligence"
hypothesis is the assumption that nonhuman primates
have more complex social relationships and know more
about their social companions than nonprimates do. This
assumption, however, has never been tested. Many non-
primate animals live in complex social groups composed
of both kin and nonkin. Some also manifest complexities
of social structure that may be unequalled by any primate
species. For example, like nonhuman primates, male
dolphins form coalitions against rival males. Occasionally,
however, two coalitions will also form an alliance against a
third. Such coalitions between coalitions have not been
observed in monkeys or apes (but see Abegglen, 1984, for
one possible exception). Harcourt's survey suggests that
nonhuman primates may be the only animals that manip-
ulate the probability of receiving help in the future when
establishing friendly relationships with other group
members. [See also Caporael et al.: "Selfishness Exam-
ined" BBS 12(4) 1989.] Although it is often assumed that
monkeys (not to mention apes) are somehow more intel-
ligent than other mammals, and although laboratory tests
occasionally suggest that this intuition has some sub-
stance, it remains difficult to point out many examples
from the natural behavior of monkeys that indicate great-
er social complexity. For this reason alone, such surveys
as Harcourt's deserve further attention.
Of all the data and observations discussed in our book
perhaps the most puzzling and least satisfying is the
vervets' apparent failure to attend to the inanimate visual
cues left by such predators as pythons and leopards.
Many commentators offer their own explanations for our
observations. None of these explanations is easily dis-
missed, if only because so little is known about how
monkeys perceive their environment. Indeed, the lack of
empirical data is what makes this avenue of research so
frustrating, and so much fun.
Dugatkin & Clark suggest that we should not attempt
to link the vervets' failure to recognize carcasses in trees
with a comparable ability in the social domain. Because
vervets also fail to attend to secondary visual cues in their
social world, the question of accessibility is moot. Never-
theless, they do not attempt to explain why vervets might
ignore important predator cues. Cords suggests that
people, too, are often remarkably ignorant about appar-
ently irrelevant aspects of their environment. She does
not venture a guess, however, about whether humans are
better than vervets at recognizing visual cues of danger.
Tomasello is unconvinced that the apparent differential
use of secondary auditory and visual cues results from
anything other than differences in general learning condi-
tions. He adds that the apparent modality difference in
making nonsocial inferences may be peculiar to vervet
monkeys, and not monkeys in general. Gouzoules, on the
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other hand, speculates that perhaps this difficulty is
specific to Amboseli vervets, and not vervets in general.
Gouzoules cautions us about drawing too many conclu-
sions about "the" monkey mind until we have investigat-
ed the cognitive capacities of monkey species whose
behavior is quite different from that of vervets. He also
suggests that vervets in other areas of Africa might be
better than Amboseli vervets at recognizing the second-
ary cues of predators. He mentions vervets in the Cam-
eroon, who recognize dogs as a secondary visual cue of the
approach of human predators. But dogs are animate
visual cues, and Amboseli vervets are also adept at recog-
nizing such cues - they readily recognize, for example,
that cows and donkeys signal the approach of Maasai
tribesmen. Instead, Amboseli vervets appear not to rec-
ognize inanimate visual cues - dust and python tracks, for
example. We simply do not know whether vervets in
other areas of Africa are better than Amboseli vervets at
recognizing inanimate visual cues.
How should we go about testing the modularity hy-
pothesis? How can we determine which features of the
environment are relevant to an animal and which are
irrelevant? Glotzbach suggests that Gibson's ecological
approach to perception may be valuable to these investi-
gations, and no doubt he is right in suggesting that the
environment cannot be defined without reference to
perceivers and their intended actions. By so doing, we
may be better able to identify the stimuli that are func-
tionally relevant to the species under consideration.
Visalbergfil argues that the apparent failure of
monkeys both to attribute mental states to others and to
recognize the visual cues left by predators may result
from their inability to understand causality. Deception,
for example, requires that an animal understand how
behavior causes knowledge. Similarly, the recognition
that a python track is dangerous requires some under-
standing of how a python track is caused. We think
Visalberghi's point is important, and we agree that future
research should focus more explicitly on the mechanisms
underlying learning. If vervets acquire knowledge about
each other and their environment primarily through
associative learning rather than an understanding of
causality, they may indeed find it difficult to learn that a
python track means danger.
We will never be able to evaluate the domain-specific
hypothesis until we are able to design logically similar
experiments that differ only along stimulus dimensions.
We agree with Dugatkin & Clark that such research
should not be limited to nonhuman primates. Indeed,
some of the best comparative work on domain-specific
memory is currently being conducted on caching and
noncaching birds. Clark's nutcrackers, for example, are
better than pigeons at remembering the location of food
caches, apparently for the simple reason that under
natural conditions Clark's nutcrackers store food and
pigeons do not (Balda & Kamil 1988; Balda et al. 1987). It
would be interesting to determine whether such spatial
memory is also context- or stimulus-specific. Are Clark's
nutcrackers better than pigeons at remembering where
their neighbors' nests are located? Such experiments
would provide a crucial test of the domain-specific view of
intelligence.
It remains for future research to determine whether
the apparent failure of monkeys to attribute mental states
to others, to recognize causality, and to attend to certain
aspects of their environment are real. There is a huge
amount of work to be done. Issues concerned with vocal
communication, the attribution of knowledge, and do-
main-specific intelligence do remain vague, ill-defined,
poorly developed, puzzling, and perhaps even incorrect.
But this is also what makes the investigation of these
issues so compelling.
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